Development of a novel single-phase auto-reclosing scheme for distribution network with integrated distributed generation. by Tan, Sock Fua
  
 
OpenAIR@RGU 
 
The Open Access Institutional Repository 
at Robert Gordon University 
 
http://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
 
 
Citation Details 
 
Citation for the version of the work held in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’: 
 
TAN, S. F., 2010. Development of a novel single-phase auto-
reclosing scheme for distribution network with integrated 
distributed generation. Available from OpenAIR@RGU. [online]. 
Available from: http://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 
Items in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’, Robert Gordon University Open Access Institutional Repository, 
are protected by copyright and intellectual property law. If you believe that any material 
held in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’ infringes copyright, please contact openair-help@rgu.ac.uk with 
details. The item will be removed from the repository while the claim is investigated. 
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development of a Novel Single-Phase Auto-Reclosing 
Scheme for Distribution Network with Integrated 
Distributed Generation  
 
 
TAN SOCK FUA 
 
 
The thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirement of  
The Robert Gordon University  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
   
      June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
Abstract 
 
 
According to G59 recommendation, the common practice adopted by utilities in the 
UK is to disconnect Distributed generators (DGs) immediately once a network fault 
is detected to prevent islanding operation and disruption of the operation of 
conventional auto-reclosing schemes. However, with the continuous increase of 
penetration of DGs into existing distribution networks, it is becoming increasingly 
important that DGs must support power networks during steady-state and fault 
conditions. It has been recognised that 80% of faults in distribution networks are 
temporary and most of them are single-line-to-ground (SLG) faults. This should give 
a strong incentive to find ways for maintaining DGs in service during temporary 
SLG faults as far as possible which would benefit utilities, DG developers and 
customers. The literature survey shows that no research work has been carried out to 
investigate a  fault identification and phase selection algorithm suitable to be used in 
a novel single-phase auto-reclosing (SPAR) scheme, specifically suitable to 
distribution networks with DGs, for maintaining the continued operation of DGs 
during fault conditions.  
 
The work in this PhD has focused on investigating feeder protection requirements for 
continued operation of DGs in radial and ring overhead distribution networks with 
DGs, particularly the new requirements for operating an auto-reclosing scheme in 
networks with DGs. Simulation results obtained from this investigation have 
revealed that it is a possible to maintain continued operation of DGs that are based on 
DFIG and FSIG during temporary SLG faults in radial and ring operated networks. 
This is followed by investigating the development of an adaptive fault identification 
and phase selection algorithm suitable for a SPAR scheme in a power system with 
DGs. The proposed fault identification and phase selection algorithm uses only the 
three line currents measured at the relay point. The waveform pattern of phase angle 
and symmetrical components of the three line currents during the transient period 
following a fault condition is analysed using IF-THEN condition-based rules in order 
to determine the type of SLG fault. The verification test results have revealed that the 
proposed method can correctly detect the faulty phase within one cycle in a 
distribution network with DGs under various network operating and fault conditions. 
The work in this PhD has resulted in publication of papers (see Appendix I).  
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Chapter 1 Introduction   
 
 
1.1 Research Challenge  
In the UK, a typical rural distribution network has a partially looped network 
configuration [1-3] and is designed to operate in radial operation mode without 
having to accommodate any generation unit. It is estimated that 80% of network 
faults are temporary single-line-to-ground (SLG) faults [3-4]. Thus, automatic 
restoration of electric supply after a network fault event is required to improve 
overall network reliability. The auto-reclosing scheme can be used to clear temporary 
faults and isolate the permanent faults to allow automatic restoration of the electric 
power supply. Under an auto-reclosing scheme the source circuit breaker, with auto-
reclosing at the primary substation or  pole mounted automatic recloser along the 
main feeder, carry out a variable sequence of tripping and closing to check the 
protected feeder and clear the fault, or isolate the faulty feeder, if necessary,  with the 
coordination of an automatic sectionaliser, fuse and relay [3-5].  
 
The continued increase of distributed generation (DG) or embedded generation (EG) 
penetration into existing distribution networks in recent years has resulted in (i) 
changes in the direction and magnitude of power flow and (ii) changes in the 
network voltage profile [6-11]. Consequently, these have an important impact on 
network protection [7-8, 12-21]. The protection issues that have been identified are: 
(i) increase of network fault level which makes costly upgrading protection devices a 
necessity (ii) disruption of the operation of feeder protection, which causes 
miscoordination between protective devices, unnecessary tripping of healthy feeders 
and  prevention of successful reclosing of circuit breakers, (iii) introduction of new 
protection requirements such as loss of mains (LOM) protection to avoid the 
unintentional islanding condition and high speed relaying to trip network faults while 
retaining the transient stability of DGs. Substantial research work has been done to 
resolve these protection issues [14, 22-32]. However, only a limited number of 
publications [28-30] have considered maintaining the operation of DGs during 
network fault conditions. With increased penetration of DGs into distribution 
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networks and customer demand for a highly reliable power supply, it is significant to 
maintain the operation of DGs during fault conditions as far as possible.  
 
In order to maximise the integration capacity of DGs, future distribution network is 
very likely to operate in ring operating mode, compared to existing radial operating 
mode [24, 33-35]. Ring operation mode increases the reliability of electric power 
supplies and, in the context of DGs, it eases the issues of voltage regulation and 
change of power flow. However, ring operation mode might complicate the feeder 
protection issue that has been stated previously, caused by DGs interconnection in 
radial networks [35-37]. Thus, further research work should be carried out to 
indentify the protection requirements in ring operated networks with DGs. In this 
context, comprehensive study on factors which influence the transient stability of 
DGs during fault condition in ring operated network is necessary. Transient stability 
of DGs should be taking into consideration when developing a potential protection 
scheme that has the capability to ensure the continued operation of DGs during fault 
condition in a ring operated network. Additionally, only limited research work has 
been carried out to develop a potential protection scheme that is suitable for use in 
ring operated distribution networks with DGs [35]. 
 
The penetration of wind power based DGs into power system network has increased 
significantly. The total installed wind power capacity reached 159.2GW worldwide 
at the end of 2009[38] and it is expected that 12% of world’s electricity production 
will be from wind power by the year 2020[39]. In recent years, the technology of 
wind generation has been switched from fixed speed to variable speed and the 
advantages of variable speed operation of wind generators are reported in [40-
44].The impact of fixed speed induction generator (FSIG) based wind power plant on 
the operation of auto-reclosing scheme has been investigated in [16]. The variable 
speed induction generator, doubly fed induction generator (DFIG) has a different 
operational characteristic and transient response compared to FSIG [44-45]. It 
appears that no study has been conducted so far to investigate the impact of DFIG on 
the network protection issue, particularly on the operation of auto-reclosing schemes.  
 
According to G59 recommendation [46] the common practice adopted by utilities in 
the UK is to disconnect DGs immediately, once a network fault is detected, 
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irrespective of any type of fault, to prevent islanding operation and disruption of the 
operation of conventional auto-reclosing scheme [16]. However, with increased 
penetration of DGs into existing distribution networks, it is increasingly becoming 
important that DGs must support power networks during steady-state and fault 
conditions. It has been reviewed above that 80% of faults which occur in distribution 
networks are temporary and most of them are SLG. This should give a strong 
incentive to find ways for maintaining DGs in service during temporary SLG faults 
as far as possible, which is to the benefit of utilities, DG developers and customers.  
 
Investigation into the sustainability of different DG technologies during temporary 
faults on overhead distribution network should be carried out to (i) assess the 
possibility of preserving DGs in services as far as possible to optimise electric supply 
continuity and (ii) identify the requirements of auto-reclosing schemes in distribution 
networks with high penetration of DGs. By adapting a single-phase auto-reclosing 
(SPAR) scheme [47-50] used in a transmission network, DGs would be ensured to 
remain connected to the grid in the SLG fault event while only the faulty phase is 
tripped. The impact of the implementation of a SPAR scheme in distribution 
networks with distributed synchronous generators has been reported in reference [51]. 
DG based on induction generators whether FSIG or DFIG, were not covered in this 
research study. Substantial research has been done in the past to develop a novel fault 
identification and phase selection algorithm in conventional transmission lines [52-
56] to address the various limitations of conventional phase selector [47-50]. It 
appears that no research work has been carried out to investigate a fault identification 
and phase selection algorithm in existing overhead distribution networks that takes 
into consideration the operation of DGs during fault conditions. 
 
Another consideration is related to the adaptation of an appropriate dynamic DG 
model to thoroughly asses the transient performance of DGs during various network 
fault conditions which then facilitates the development of the adaptive fault 
identification and phase selection algorithm proposed in this research study. The 
importance of dynamic modelling of DGs in simulation studies related to network 
protection has been highlighted in [16, 27].   
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1.2   Research Objectives  
The aim of this research work is to examine the development of a new protection 
technique in distribution networks with DGs in dealing with the protection issues 
with particular emphasis on identifying new requirements for operating auto 
reclosing schemes in distribution networks with DGs that operated in radial and ring 
modes. This is followed by an investigation into the development of an adaptive fault 
identification and phase selection algorithm to be used in a novel SPAR scheme in a 
power system with DG.  
 
1.3 Thesis Chapter Outline  
The structure of the thesis is arranged to reflect the order of the activities that have 
been undertaken in this research work. Following is a brief description of the 
contents of each chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review on DG with particular emphasis on wind 
generation and on studying the characteristic of feeder protection in conventional 
rural distribution networks. It also examines the general topic of network protection 
issues due to interconnection of DGs and existing proposed solutions. The 
requirement for an auto-reclosing scheme in a distribution network with high 
penetration of DG has been indentified. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a comprehensive study into the factors that influence the transient 
stability of FSIG in the investigated medium voltage (MV) overhead distribution 
network that is operated in ring mode. It also presents the study to asses the 
sustainability of both FSIG and DFIG during temporary fault conditions in the 
investigated network. Moreover, the impact of both FSIG and DFIG on the operation 
of a SPAR scheme in the investigated network has been studied.  
 
Chapter 4 presents a study on the development of an adaptive fault identification and 
phase selection algorithm to be used in a SPAR scheme with DG. Comprehensive 
simulation analysis has been presented in this chapter to demonstrate how different 
types of SLG fault that occur in the investigated MV overhead distribution network 
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with DFIG can be indentified and then isolated from the network with the proposed 
method. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the details of the overall process of digital data processing and 
analysis. The whole process includes fault data analysis and fault data optimisation 
followed by the process of rule-based fault identification and a phase selection 
algorithm development and finally the process of verification that aims to check the 
robustness of the developed algorithm in all possible network operating conditions. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes with the scope of the research work that has been done and the 
contribution of the research project, followed by suggestions of possible future 
research work. 
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Chapter 2 Analysis of Distribution Network Protection Issues Due to 
Interconnection of Distributed Generation 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes DG technologies, with particular emphasis on wind power 
generators, and a review of the protection arrangements in conventional rural 
distribution networks. The main distribution network protection issues due to 
interconnection of DG and existing proposed solutions are then outlined. The impact 
of DG on the operation of conventional auto-reclosing schemes is examined. A new 
requirement for an auto-reclosing scheme, in order to maintain the operation of DG 
during network temporary fault condition, is indentified. 
 
2.2 Distributed Generation Technologies  
Distributed Generation (DG) or Embedded Generation (EG) refers to electric power 
generation embedded in a power network at distribution voltage levels and not 
centrally planned by utilities [7, 57-58]. DG can be categorised as renewable DG, 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) DG and storage based DG, according to the 
different type of generation technologies and energy resources used. Renewable 
energy based DG, such as medium and small hydro turbines with less than 10MW 
capacity, on-shore wind farms, biomass based generators, photo-voltaic (PV) 
systems and geothermal plant that can be found in high renewable energy resource 
sites [59]. Combined heat power (CHP) based DG or cogeneration refers to the 
power plant where either electricity or heat is generated as a by-product and they are 
mostly found in industrial sites. CHP power plants use biomass, geothermal and 
conventional fossil fuel as energy resources. Storage based DG or fuel cell 
technologies are systems where electricity is generated from electrochemically 
combining hydrogen and oxygen. 
 
The penetration of wind power based DG particularly in distribution networks, has 
increased significantly. The total installed wind power capacity reached 159.2GW 
worldwide at the end of 2009[38] and it is expected that 12% of world electricity 
production will be from wind power by the year 2020[39]. The development of this 
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new generation is driven by, (i) government environmental commitment to tackle 
climate change by generating electric power from  renewable energy resources, (ii) 
advances in new power generation and storage technologies and (iii) liberalization of 
the electricity market where the electricity customers are looking for the most 
reliable electricity supply. [57-58, 60-61]  
 
2.3 Configuration of Wind Turbine Generator (WTG) 
Detailed descriptions of different types of DG technologies can be found in the 
literature [7, 40-44]. This research focuses on the investigation of a novel protection 
algorithm in a distribution network with wind power generation. An emphasis will be 
placed on the common type of wind generators to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of them. Generally, both synchronous and asynchronous 
(induction) generators can be adopted as wind generators and can be operated either 
as fixed speed (by being directly connected to the grid bus) or variable speed (by 
connecting to the grid bus bar via the power electronic converters). The advantages 
of operating a generator with variable speed in wind power generation includes 
increased wind energy capture, improved system efficiency, improved power quality, 
improved transient response, reduced acoustic noise and reduced mechanical stress 
of the wind turbine generator (WTG) [44-45]. Most of the installed wind power 
plants are based on one of the following three types of WTG systems (i) fixed speed 
wind turbine with directly coupled  induction generator, (ii) variable speed wind 
turbine with double fed induction generator and (iii) variable speed wind turbine with 
direct driven synchronous generator.  
 
2.3.1 Fixed Speed Wind Turbine with Directly Coupled Induction Generator 
Figure 2.1 shows the configuration of a fixed speed wind turbine with directly 
coupled induction generator [44]. This type of wind turbine uses a squirrel cage 
induction generator with the stator winding directly connected to the grid. The 
generator speed varies between 1% and 2% of the rated speed. There is a gear box 
between the wind turbine and generator. This type of generator is robust and cheap 
because of the simple and relatively low cost construction. However, squirrel cage 
based FSIG demand reactive power from the grid and this is undesirable in a weak 
grid. Furthermore, the turbine is heavier and will sustains higher mechanical stress 
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because the energy from a gust of wind must be absorbed by the gear box and 
coupling. An additional capacitor bank is required for reactive power compensation.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Configuration of fixed speed wind turbine with directly coupled induction 
generator. 
 
2.3.2 Variable Speed Wind Turbine with Doubly Fed Induction Generator 
Figure 2.2 shows the configuration of a variable speed wind turbine with a doubly 
fed induction generator (DFIG) [44]. This type of variable speed wind turbine uses a 
wound rotor induction generator with the stator winding connected directly to the 
grid and the rotor is fed by a power electronic converter that enables the rotor 
frequency to vary within a designed range. The power electronic converter of DFIG 
only consumes 20% to 30% of the generator rated power compared to full rated 
conventional power electronic converter that is used in a variable speed wind turbine 
with direct drive synchronous generator. The turbine is lighter and sustains lower 
mechanical stress compared to a fixed speed wind turbine. The weakness of this 
variable speed type of wind turbine compared to a synchronous generator is the 
requirement of the gear box. Moreover, the power electronic converter of the DFIG 
is complex and expensive compared to a fixed speed wind turbine type.   
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Figure 2.2 Configuration of variable speed wind turbine with doubly fed induction 
generator. 
 
2.3.3 Variable Speed Wind Turbine with Direct Driven Synchronous Generator 
Figure 2.3 shows the configuration of variable speed wind turbine with direct driven 
synchronous generator [44]. This type of variable speed wind turbine uses a direct 
drive synchronous generator and the total generator power output is fed to the grid 
through a power electronic converter that provides a wide range of operating speed. 
The varying generator frequency is converted to constant grid frequency. This 
turbine type does not require any gear box. The weakness of this variable speed type 
of wind turbine is that a complex power converter and generator construction are 
required compared to the variable speed wind turbine with DFIG.  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Configuration of variable speed wind turbine with direct drive 
synchronous generator. 
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2.4 Network Configuration in Radial Distribution Network  
The configuration, operation and management of existing distribution networks are 
based on passive networks. The role of such networks is confined to transferring 
electricity from generation and transmission system to the load centres [1-3]. Under 
this situation, the main function of a distribution network is delivering good quality 
electricity with minimum amount of network control to the load centres at different 
voltage levels. Most distribution networks, particularly in rural areas are mainly 
designed to operate in radial mode without any accommodation for generating units.  
 
Figure 2.4 shows the schematic diagram of typical rural distribution network 
including wind power plant in the UK [1-5]. The 132 kV high voltage (HV) network 
is supplied from a bulk generation point.  Load connected at the medium voltage 
(MV) level at 33 and 11 kV are supplied from the HV network via 132/33 kV and 
33/11 kV distribution substations respectively. Both 132/33 kV and 33/11 kV 
distribution substations are equipped with two transformers, each of which are 
supplied from an independent circuit. In order to form a parallel connection the 
busbar disconnector between them would be closed. This arrangement improves the 
overall system reliability when one transformer breaks down, the busbar 
disconnector would be opened and the MV load can still be fully supplied from 
another circuit. Loads at low voltage (LV) 0.400 kV are connected along 11 kV 
primary feeder through pole mounted transformers at rating of 11/0.400 kV. The 
renewable type DGs such as wind power plants are mostly located in rural areas and 
usually embedded into distribution networks at medium voltage levels as shown in 
Figure 2.4. The wind power plant is connected at the end of the 11 kV feeder through 
a 0.690/11 kV transformer. 
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Figure 2.4  MV rural distribution network including wind power plant in the UK. 
 
The rural overhead network has a partially looped network configuration and 
interconnects with other networks supplied from adjacent primary substations [1,3]. 
During normal network conditions, the network is operated in radial mode by 
opening a disconnector at the appropriate point to improve system reliability and 
simplify system protection [1,3]. The remotely controlled disconnector is distributed 
along the 11 kV feeders. It is used along with protective devices such as circuit 
breakers and auto reclosers to improve the period of fault outage. After the circuit 
breaker at the substation is tripped and locked out, disconnectors located at both 
sides of the fault are instructed to open and isolate the fault section. The disconnector 
at the normally open point and substation circuit breaker are then ordered to close to 
restore power supplies to healthy sections.  
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In addition to network configuration, the system earthing arrangement affects the 
system protection. There are four methods of system earthing arrangements, isolated 
neutral, resonant earthing, impedance neutral earthing and solid earthing. The 132 
kV network has a mesh network configuration therefore multiple earthing points are 
needed and a solid earthing arrangement has been used. 33 kV networks in the UK 
use a different type of impedance earthing where neutral of the source transformer or 
the earthing transformer of the source transformer has a delta connection at 33 kV, 
the winding is earthed either via resistance, tuned arc suppression coil or reactor. 11 
kV networks use solid or neutral impedance earthing. 0.400 kV networks use the 
solid earthing method and there are multiple earthing points to ensure that individual 
exposure to minimum overvoltage levels dealing faults on electric appliances. [1, 62-
64]  
 
2.5 Overcurrent Protection Arrangement in MV Feeder  
The MV overhead feeder is protected using phase overcurrent fault and earth fault 
protection [3]. In a radial overhead feeder, power flows in one direction from the 
only power supply source to the loads tapped along the feeder section. During an 
overcurrent fault condition, the protective devices only need to sense the flow of 
overcurrent in one direction. The distance measurement and direction elements are 
not required in radial network protection, compared to transmission networks and 
heavy loaded urban distribution networks, where the flow of fault current is 
multidirectional, with more than one fault current supply source. Therefore, generally, 
radial feeders can be effectively protected from network faults with a non directional, 
time graded overcurrent protection scheme. In the MV networks with solid and low 
impedance earthing, the earth fault protection element can be integrated into a phase 
overcurrent protection device. In contrast, for a network earthed with a tuned arc 
suppression coil or isolated earthed, directional earth fault protection is required to 
detect the residual fault current, which is much lower than the load current. 
 
In radial distribution networks with overhead feeders, 80% of faults are temporary 
and most of them are single-line-to-ground (SLG) [2-3].  Thus, automatic restoration 
of electric supply after a network fault event is required to improve overall network 
reliability. The auto-reclosing scheme can be used to clear temporary faults and 
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isolate permanent ones to allow automatic restoration of the electrical power supply. 
Under the auto-reclosing scheme, a source circuit breaker with auto-reclosing or a 
pole mounted automatic recloser coordinated with a fuse, sectionliser and relay are 
used to clear temporary faults and isolate permanent faults to allow the automatic 
restoration of the electrical power supply [2-4]. 
 
A fuse is a protective device that can be installed at the main feeder or lateral feeder 
in overhead networks. It operates when the fault current heats up and melts the fuse 
link where TCC (time current characteristic) curves are used to describe the fuse link 
melting time. A fuse interrupts the fault current only once before it needs to be 
replaced. Thus, it is used in conjunction with automatic recloser to prevent damage 
during the event of a temporary fault and the extended time period of fault outages. 
[3, 65] 
 
A pole mounted automatic recloser is a compact protective device equipped with 
mechanism that can detect and interrupt the fault by carrying out a predetermined 
tripping and closing sequence to clear a temporary fault or isolate the permanent 
faulty section [1-4, 47]. It is used at a substation instead of a source circuit breaker 
with auto-reclosing for primary network protection. It can also be installed at a 
specific location at the main feeder for sectioning the long overhead line in order to 
coordinate with the source circuit breaker, to isolate the fault occurring towards the 
end of the feeder. Sufficient opening time or dead time setting is required to allow 
extinction of fault arc. The opening time before high-speed or instantaneous 
reclosing attempts varies from 0.2 s to 0.5 s [1]. In most of European countries, the 
opening time of 0.3 s had been used [66]. The opening time before time-delayed 
reclosing attempt can be more than 10 s [1]. Multiple reclosing attempts are required 
to ensure a fault is completely cleared from the network and it normally would be 
two high-speed follow by two time-delayed reclosing.  Figure 2.5 shows an example 
of a high speed reclosing operation of an automatic recloser with single reclose 
attempt. The fault inception is at t = 3 s and circuit breaker opens at t = 3.4 s and 
recloses successfully at t = 3.7 s, after which current goes back to normal load 
condition.  
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Figure 2.5 Operation principle of automatic recloser with high speed reclosing. 
 
Figure 2.6 shows an example of a common arrangement of automatic recloser and 
fuse at a radial network feeder [1, 65]. The automatic recloser (ARC) is located at the 
beginning of the main feeder and fuse F is located at the lateral feeder. The operation 
of ARC is based on a preset switching strategy. Coordination between ARC and F 
are used to clear the temporary fault and isolate permanently downstream of F. High-
speed reclosing of automatic recloser clears temporary fault and prevent the fuse link 
from melting. Time-delayed reclosing allows sufficient time for the fuse link to melt 
to isolate a permanent fault. 
 
Figure 2.6 Common arrangement of automatic recloser and fuse at radial network 
feeder. 
 
A Sectionaliser is a protective device that does not interrupt the fault current. It is 
normally used to coordinate with the automatic recloser in order to isolate faulty 
time(s) 
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sections in the feeder. The sectionaliser will automatically isolate the faulty sections 
in the feeder, once the automatic recloser, upstream, has interrupted the fault current.  
After a preset number of open and reclose operations of the recloser, the sectionaliser 
will then open during the dead time of the automatic recloser.  After the faulty 
section is isolated, the recloser closes and restores the power supply to the rest of the 
network. For a temporary fault, the sectionliser would reset once the automatic 
recloser is reclosed. [3, 65] 
 
2.6 Development of New Protection Technique in Distribution Network with 
DGs 
Traditionally, a distribution network is a passive and radially operated system. It is 
designed to mainly provide a good power delivery service with minimum network 
control and without accommodation of any generation unit. Continued penetration of 
DGs into existing distribution networks in recent years has resulted in bi-directional 
power flow and changes in the network voltage profile [6-11]. This in turn has an 
important impact on the operation of conventional feeder protection schemes that are 
designed based on the assumption of simple radial network operation. Typical 
network protection issues due to interconnection of DGs have been indentified and 
existing proposed solutions to these protection issues were reviewed. The impact of 
DGs on these protection issues is determined by the penetration level, the connection 
point in the distribution network and the DG technology being employed [8, 17].   
 
The interconnection of DGs may cause a significant increase in network fault levels 
and consequently makes upgrading protection devices with higher fault interrupting 
capacity a necessity and such devices are normally expensive. Alternatively, this 
issue can be solved by a solid state fault current limiter [22] or a superconducting 
fault current limiter [23]. During a three phase fault condition, synchronous 
generators provide a substantial fault current and increase the network fault level. In 
contrast, induction generators only contribute to network fault level during the short 
period immediately following the fault. The fault current contribution from DGs that 
are connected to the grid through a power electronic interface, e.g. fuel cells, can be 
limited by suitable control on the power electronic switches [7-8, 20]. 
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The fault current contribution from DGs also disrupts the time grading coordination 
on feeder protection, e.g., miscoordination between fuse-fuse [8, 20] or fuse-recloser 
[12, 14, 21]. Thus in reference [14], a procedure to achieve coordination between 
fuse-recloser in a network with DG has been suggested based on the application of a 
microprocessor-based recloser. Moreover, fault contribution from DGs may also 
cause the unnecessary tripping of healthy feeders [12, 15, 18, 21]. Non-directional 
overcurrent relays are mostly used in existing radial feeder protection [1-2]. In the 
case where the fault and DG are located at different feeders, the relay at the 
beginning of the DG’s feeder would trip as a significant amount of fault current 
flows to the faulty feeder. Thus, it is also suggested in [13-14] that directional 
elements are a necessity in protecting a distribution network with DG.  
 
Apart from that, maximum fault clearing time is also a concern in a distribution 
networks with DG. It is reported in [20, 27] that the critical clearing time (CCT), 
which determines the transient stability of the DG, is far less than the tripping time 
setting of conventional feeder protective devices. Therefore, to retain transient 
stability of DGs, the maximum fault clearing time needs to be reduced. The speed of 
fault clearance in existing distribution networks is not an important factor as it is in 
transmission networks where the system stability is involved. However, future 
distribution network will be expected to accommodate a significant proportion of 
DGs. The DGs need to remain in service as far as possible during a network fault 
condition in order to improve the system stability and reliability of power delivery. 
Thus, recently, intensive research activities have been carried out in the development 
of high speed protection techniques in distribution networks with DGs [24, 25-26].  
 
Bo et al. [24] proposed a non communication, accelerated protection technique that 
can be used in a power system with two end power sources, for instance a 
distribution network with DGs. Superimposed and sequence current signals are used 
to speed up the fault detection operation for faults that occur within the protected 
section and consequently initiate a trip signal to the circuit breakers at both ends of 
the section.  
 
Development of a high speed fault transient based-directional overcurrent protection 
method has been suggested in [25]. Each of the overcurrent relays in the network 
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detects the fault current transient directional signal during fault condition. The 
signals are then exchanged via a communication link between each of these relays to 
confirm the exact fault location so that the faulty section can be isolated from the rest 
of the network.  
 
In [26] it is proposed to replace conventional overcurrent relays with a high speed 
distance protection scheme in the urban distribution network to improve transient 
performance of DGs during network fault condition. Upgrading of the existing ring 
main unit (RMU) in the substation and replacing of existing relays with new 
microprocessor based-relays are needed for the proposed protection scheme. 
Renewable type of DGs, like wind power plant are mostly connected to rural 
networks. However, distance protection in rural networks with DGs is unfeasible due 
to (i) the requirement of additional voltage transformers to be installed in the network 
for voltage measurement which will add a financial burden and (ii) overhead network 
has long distribution lines and distance protection has low accuracy in protecting 
long network lines. 
 
Apart from the solutions proposed above, research work has also been carried out to 
develop a novel network protection scheme that is intended to maintain the continued 
operation of DGs during fault conditions [28-30]. Under the adaptive protection 
scheme proposed in [28], the network is divided into different protection zones with 
a reasonable balance of load and DGs. Each protection zone is separated by a circuit 
breaker which is equipped with a communication channel to check synchronization 
and auto-reclosing functions. A computer based-relay is installed at the main power 
distribution substation, to monitor power and current flow and control operation of 
the circuit breaker at each network protection zone. A fault location and protection 
scheme based on a multilayer perceptron (MLP) has been proposed in [29]. In this 
research work, the zone protection approach as suggested in [28] has been 
implemented in the investigated system. The fault type and fault location are 
determined at the main power substation using a MLP neural network approach. 
After that, a signal will be issued from the substation to isolate the faulty zone from 
the rest of the system. Under the protection schemes proposed in [28-29], the DG 
units located at other protected zones that are different than the faulty zone can 
continue the operation throughout the fault condition. However, implementation of 
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the proposed protection schemes in [28-29] can be costly because of the installation 
cost of a communication link between DGs and the distribution substation is 
expensive. A conventional circuit breaker and recloser needs to be upgraded to a 
microprocessor based-type, to allow intensive signal communication process. An 
adaptive network protection scheme based on wavelet transformation has been 
proposed in [30]. In SLG fault conditions, the wavelet coefficients of the transient 
fault currents that are measured at the main significant points of the network are 
analysed in order to determine the faulty section in the investigated network. The 
faulty section can be then isolated from the rest of the network. Due to the high fault 
detection speed, the DG units that are located at other sections other than the fault 
section, can remain in service as far as possible throughout the fault condition. The 
proposed method can be implemented in a distribution network with DG, without 
any communication medium. 
 
Unintentional islanding is another major issue in addition to the feeder protection 
issues stated above. Unintentional islanding refers to a condition where part of the 
public load becomes islanded with DGs caused by fault clearance upstream of the 
distribution feeder. Unintentional islanding is undesired due to its impact on the 
islanded load; personnel safety and islanded DGs [7-8, 66]. Loss of mains (LOM) 
protection refers to the protection relay which automatically detects such a condition 
and disconnects DGs from islanding operation [7-8, 19]. In the UK, a LOM 
protection scheme is a requirement for all grid connected DGs as stated in 
Association’s Engineering Recommendations G59/1[46]. LOM can be detected 
through passive, active and telecommunication based methods. Passive techniques 
are based on measuring and monitoring the system state, e.g significant changing in 
generator frequency and voltage. Rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) is a typical 
passive based LOM detection method [7]. However this passive method may cause 
nuisance tripping or can be fooled particularly for the islanding condition, where the 
local load almost matches the local DGs generation [7, 67]. An ANN based LOM 
relay is reported in [31]. This is the result of continuous research in this field aiming 
to improve the accuracy of existing passive techniques.  
 
The active techniques are based on actively interacting with the generator relay and 
utility system to get an indication of islanding operation, e.g., monitoring the 
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generator frequency. If the frequency drifts beyond a certain preset value, it is taken 
as an indication that islanding condition has occurred. [19- 20] 
 
A telecommunication based method i.e., intertripping scheme [19, 32] is superior 
compared to passive and active methods. But, installation of the intensive 
communication channels to be used for intertripping is far more expensive, compared 
to a LOM relay used in passive and active methods [32].  
 
Meanwhile, future distribution network are very likely to change from radial to ring 
in order to maximise the integration capacity of DGs [24, 33-35]. In a ring operated 
network, power flow through each feeder is more even compared to a radial network, 
power losses are reduced and the voltage rise due to connection of DGs can be 
limited [33-35].The ring operation mode can be realised by closing the ring 
connector that is normally opened at the end of two radial feeders [68]. There are 
advantages in adopting ring mode operation in future distribution networks but it 
could complicate the protection system of networks with integrated DGs [35-37]. For 
instance, the fault clearance speed, which is already an issue with regard to the 
connection of DGs in radial mode, might be more significant when the network is 
switched to operate in ring mode. Special consideration is required for feeder 
protection when operated in ring mode, particularly, the coordination between the 
relays that are installed on the ring feeders and the ring connector when a DGs is 
located at ring feeder. There is a possibility that the operating time of protective 
devices installed at such feeders may exceed the CCT limits of DGs which determine 
its stability. The consequence of exceeding the CCT would lead to unnecessary 
tripping of DGs. The factors influence the transient stability of DGs during fault 
condition in distribution network has been reported in [69], but mainly for radial 
operating mode and ring operating mode is not included in the research work. 
 
It can be concluded from the literature review that significant research has been 
carried out to tackle the protection issues due to interconnection of DGs. This include 
high speed transient based directional overcurrent protection [25], development of 
new protection algorithms, e.g., the adaptive zone protection scheme [28-29] and an 
ANN based LOM detection method [31]. However, only a few potential protection 
solutions proposed in [28-30] allow the continued operation of DGs during fault 
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condition as far as possible. In other research works reported above, the DGs 
connected downstream of the protective devices need to be disconnected before the 
1st reclose takes place to prevent islanding operation and disruption of the operation 
of conventional auto reclosing scheme [16].  
 
Additionally, it has been concluded from the literature review that further research 
work needs to be conducted to identify factors which influence transient stability of 
DGs in ring networks and accordingly develop a new protection scheme. Such 
scheme should have the capability to ensure the continued operation of DGs during 
fault conditions, in both radial and ring network. 
 
2.7 Impact of DGs on Operation of Conventional Auto-Reclosing Scheme  
Interconnection of DGs has significant impact on the operation of auto-reclosing 
scheme in a conventional distribution network. Apart from causing protection 
coordination problems between recloser and fuse as reviewed above, DGs also 
prevent successful reclosing by turning a temporary fault into a permanent one 
during the recloser opening time. This could cause the deterioration of reliability of 
the power supply. Besides that, DGs might cause out of phase reclosing between the 
islanded part and the network during the power restoration period and cause 
detrimental impact on DGs itself and network components. Under current utility 
practices, DGs must be tripped before the 1st attempt to reclose, (instantaneous 
reclosing) so that the usual fault clearance procedure can be carried out as before DG 
connection [46, 66]. There are also operating conflicts that may a rise between the 
auto reclosing scheme and LOM protection. The dead time setting might be too short 
and may not allow enough time for DGs to disconnect from the network [66]. Thus, 
high speed LOM detection is required to ensure proper coordination between LOM 
protection and the network auto reclosing scheme in order to trip DGs before the 1st 
reclose takes place. 
 
In recent years, the technology of wind generator has been switched from fixed speed 
to variable speed and the advantages of variable speed operation of wind generator 
are reported in [40-44]. The impact of fixed speed induction generator (FSIG) based 
wind power plant on the operation of an auto-reclosing scheme has been investigated 
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in [16]. The variable speed induction generator, doubly fed induction generator 
(DFIG), has different operational characteristics and transient response compared to 
FSIG [44-45]. It appears that no study has been conducted so far to investigate the 
impact of DFIG on the network protection issue, particularly on the operation of an 
auto-reclosing scheme.  
 
2.8 The Implementation of Single Phase Auto Reclosing (SPAR) Scheme in 
Distribution Network with DGs 
With increased penetration of DGs and customers demand for highly reliable power 
supply, the existing protection procedure of tripping DGs from the grid during all 
possible network fault conditions should be revised for the benefits of the utility as 
well as customers. Having in mind that 80% of these faults are temporary and 
extinguish themselves without external intervention [3-4], it becomes increasingly 
important that DGs remain in service during temporary fault events as far as possible 
in order to (i) improve overall system security by preventing loss of significant 
power caused by tripping of multiple DGs and (ii) improve the reliability of the 
power delivery system especially where DGs supply a load centre at the remote end 
of the feeder. In this perspective, investigation into the sustainability of different 
DGs technologies during temporary faults on overhead distribution networks should 
be carried out to (i) assess the possibility of preserving DGs in services as far as 
possible to optimise electric supply continuity and (ii) identify the new requirements 
of auto-reclosing schemes in distribution networks with DGs for effective temporary 
fault clearing.  
 
The detailed comparative analysis reported in [45, 70] shows that different DG 
technology types, which include DFIG, FSIG and conventional synchronous 
generator (CSG) have their own unique operational characteristic which affect their 
transient response during network fault conditions. These need to be taken into 
consideration in deciding the fault detection time and dead time settings in auto-
reclosing scheme. On the other hand, improvement in the existing auto-reclosing 
scheme in distribution network is required. Due to the fact that most temporary faults 
are unsymmetrical SLG, the single-phase auto-reclosing (SPAR) scheme which is 
currently used in transmission networks should be adapted in distribution networks 
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[47-50]. 3 phase auto reclosers are widely used in existing MV rural distribution 
network to prevent unbalanced loading on the network [1, 4]. The drawback of three-
phase reclosing is the temporary disconnection of all three phases of the faulted 
feeder from the rest of the network during all fault condition regardless of the type of 
fault. In the context of DG connection, the application of 3 phase auto reclosing in a 
conventional overhead distribution network will affect the operation of DGs during a 
temporary SLG fault condition. It would cause unnecessarily isolation of DGs from 
the grid. In contrast, a single pole recloser trips only the phase subjected to SLG fault 
conditions and initiates three pole reclosure for other types of network faults. The 
conventional phase selection relays used in both transmission and distribution 
networks are distance relay and relay based on voltage and current operation [47-48]. 
The development of an adaptive phase selection technique in existing transmission 
and distribution lines is reported in [52-56] to address the limitation of conventional 
phase selector [47-50] that are susceptible to the variation in operating system 
parameters, such as fault resistance, mutual coupling from adjacent parallel lines, etc.  
 
A phase selection technique based on fault generated high frequency noise and an 
ANN network has been proposed in [52]. The high frequency noise is obtained from 
a conventional capacitor voltage transformer in the transmission line. This approach 
will be costly to adapt in a power distribution network as a voltage transformer is not 
always available and furthermore the computational training of the ANN learning 
process is time consuming. A fuzzy logic based-fault phase selector that utilises the 
information of the magnitude of sequence components and angle between fault 
current phasors has been proposed in [53] to be used in a transmission network. The 
proposed method mainly determines the phase involved in SLG faults either 
involving the ground or not. Reference [54] proposes a phase selector based on series 
multiresolution morphological gradient (SMMG) transformation in the transmission 
network. In the proposed method, the power frequency fault components (PFFC) of 
the modular currents are extracted using an SMMG filter in order to indentify the 
faulty phase in the investigated system [54]. 
 
A fault identification technique based on a combination of a hybrid cause-effect 
network and fuzzy logic has been proposed in [55]. Under the proposed scheme, each 
of the fault events occurring in the investigated system are classified into one of five 
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groups as follows: SLG fault, double-line-to-ground (DLG) fault, line-line (LL) fault, 
three-line-to-ground fault and three-line fault. A fuzzy logic based-fault 
identification technique solely based on an analysis of the sequence components of 
the fault current phasors has been proposed in [56] for a conventional unbalanced 
distribution network. In the proposed method, the input parameters to the fuzzy 
based-fault classification module are (a) the phase angle between positive, negative 
and zero sequence components of the fault current phasors and (b) the ratio of the 
magnitudes of the sequence components of fault current phasors. The proposed 
method can indentify the phase or phases involved in an SLG fault, DLG fault, LL 
fault, three-line-to-ground fault and three-line fault.  
 
The literature review shows that no research work has been carried out to investigate 
fault identification and phase selection algorithms in existing overhead distribution 
networks that take into consideration the operation of DGs during fault conditions. 
Although earth fault (SLG fault) detection elements had been included in modern 
integrated protection devices used in existing distribution networks for a number of 
years, for instance modern pole mounted auto-recloser [71-72], the operation of DGs 
during fault conditions has not been taken into consideration when the settings of 
these protection devices are determined. The presence of multiple fault current 
sources in distribution networks poses difficulty in indentifying the fault type and 
location. Continued investigation into the development of a novel fault identification 
phase selection algorithm is essential to facilitate a high speed and accurate single-
phase operation in rural overhead networks with auto-reclosing scheme and DGs 
while maintaining the continued operation of DGs throughout the temporary SLG 
fault event. Therefore, this research project presents the development of an adaptive 
single phase fault identification and phase selection algorithm based on the analysis 
of symmetrical components and the phase angle of three-phase line currents 
measured at the relay point.  Additionally, adaption of an appropriate dynamic model 
of a wind turbine drive induction generator is necessary in this research project, to 
thoroughly asses the transient response of DGs in various network fault conditions in 
order to examine the possibility of preserving the operation of DGs in fault 
conditions. Moreover, the accurate transient response of DGs during post fault 
condition is essential to facilitate the development of the proposed high speed, 
accurate fault identification and phase selection algorithm. 
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Chapter 3 Protection Requirements for Maintaining Continued 
Operation of Integrated DG in Overhead Distribution 
Networks 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Nowadays, international standards and national grid codes specify requirements for 
DGs interconnection to distribution networks [73]. Examples of such include (i) 
IEEE Standard 1547 that provides a uniform standard for interconnecting DGs with 
electric power system [74] and (ii) Australian Standard AS 4777.1—2005 that 
specifies the installation requirement for interconnecting inverter based DGs  into  
the power grid in Australia [75]. According to the G59 recommendation [46] the 
common practice adopted by utilities in the UK is to disconnect DGs immediately 
once a network fault is detected to prevent islanding operation and disruption of the 
operation of conventional auto reclosing schemes [16]. However, with increased 
penetration of DGs into the existing power distribution networks and customer 
demand for a highly reliable power supply, it is significant for DGs to support the 
power network during steady-state and fault conditions. This chapter is therefore 
concerned with an investigation into the protection requirements for maintaining 
continued operation of DGs in a distribution network following fault condition. 
 
In order to increase the installation capacity of DGs, future distribution networks will 
be operated in ring operation mode compared to radial [24, 33-35]. Thus, an 
investigation is presented in this chapter to identify factors that influence the 
transient stability of DGs in overhead networks that are operated in ring mode. The 
study is intended to indentify the protection requirement for the continued operation 
of DGs during fault condition in a distribution network that is operated in ring mode. 
It is well known that 80% of faults on distribution networks are temporary which 
extinguish themselves without external intervention and most of them are single-line-
to-ground (SLG) faults [3-4]. Also included in this chapter is an investigation into 
the sustainability of different DG technologies during temporary faults, particularly 
SLG faults. The study is intended to indentify the protection requirements that allow 
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continued operation of DGs during fault conditions in a distribution network with an 
auto-reclosing scheme. 
 
3.2 Power System Model under Consideration 
The investigation presented in this chapter is based on modelling and simulation of a 
portion of a MV overhead distribution network with integrated DG under different 
system operating conditions using computational power systems simulation tool, 
PSCAD/EMTDC.  
 
3.2.1 PSCAD/EMTDC Simulation Tool 
EMTDC is a well-established power system analysis tool dedicated to simulation of 
transient and dynamic events [76-78]. EMTDC (Electromagnetic Transients 
including DC) represents and solves differential equations (for both electromagnetic 
and electromechanical systems) in the time domain [76-78]. PSCAD is a graphical 
user interface (GUI) for EMTDC. PSCAD allows the user to graphically assemble 
the circuits, run the simulations, analyse the results and manage the data in a 
completely integrated environment [79].   
 
The PSCAD/EMTDC component library has an extensive range of models for power 
system fault transient analysis purposes. These include programmable network faults 
and various network components such as transformer (with or without saturation 
effect). The dynamic behaviour of the DG can be simulated in detail using a torsional 
shaft model (multi mass model) with up to five individual masses. Moreover, the 
power electronic model facilitates the design of a power electronic converter, which 
is used in certain types of DG technologies, such as DFIG. A brief comparison of the 
most widely used power system simulation tools in transient fault analysis can be 
found in [80]. Other than that, the following models in the PSCAD/EMTDC 
component library have been found very useful in this research work.  
 
a. Basic protective component such as relay with different characteristics and 
circuit breakers with optional pre-insertion of resistance to simulate time 
delay for closing the breaker. 
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b. Digital signal processing components such as an online frequency scanner 
based on Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) that can determine the harmonic 
magnitude and phase of the input signal e.g., the current or voltage in the time 
domain. The component contains functions for both an anti aliasing filter and 
digital signal sampling in one block. A 6th order Butterworth low pass filter 
acts as an anti-aliasing filter.   
 
c. Various models of transmission line to represent cable and overhead lines. It 
includes the Bergeron line model with distributed parameters and PI section 
with lumped parameters. PI section is suitable for short line modeling and it 
can be adapted to model an overhead distribution line. 
 
d. Multiple numbers of squirrel cage induction machines with the same rating 
and characteristic can be modeled as a single unit by adjusting the machine 
parameters called “number of coherent machine” in the squirrel cage machine 
model. Simulating multiple machines coherently speeds up the simulating 
time.  
 
The users are also allowed to rewrite the source code of an existing library model or 
build a new model with the users’ own graphics and source code using FORTAN or 
C languages [76, 78]. The availability of extensive library components and advantage 
of creating customers own models facilitate the design of the fault identification and 
phase selection algorithm in this research work. 
 
3.2.2 Model of Wind Turbine Driven Induction Generator  
In this research project, adaption of an appropriate dynamic model of the wind 
turbine driven induction generator is necessary to thoroughly assess the transient 
response of DGs in various network fault conditions in order to examine the 
possibility of preserving the operation of DGs under fault conditions. Moreover, 
accurate simulation of the transient response of DGs during post fault conditions is 
essential to facilitate the development of the high speed and accurate fault 
identification and phase selection algorithm that will be presented in Chapter 4. The 
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importance of dynamic modelling of DG in simulation studies related to network 
protection issues has been highlighted in [16, 27].   
 
3.2.2.1 Fixed Speed Induction Generator (FSIG) 
A 0.6 MW wind turbine based-FSIG model has been developed to investigate factors 
that influence transient stability of DGs in ring operated networks.  The generator is 
modelled using a squirrel cage induction machine component. The single cage 
induction generator was implemented using the double cage induction machine 
model in PSCAD/ EMTDC component library, by setting the impendence value of 
the second cage at a very large value of 10 p.u. The machine parameters of the 0.6 
MW FSIG can be found in Appendix A1.   
 
2.0 MW wind turbine based FSIG has been developed to compare the sustainability 
of two types of wind turbine driven induction generators during network temporary 
fault. In order to compare the transient response of both DFIG and FSIG during fault 
condition in the study, both FSIG and DFIG are modelled using a wound rotor 
induction machine component. The machine parameter for 2.0 MW FSIG and DFIG 
can be found in Appendix A2.  
 
3.2.2.2 Doubly Fed Induction Generator (DFIG) 
The dynamic model of a 2.0 MW wind turbine driven DFIG developed in [81] has 
been adapted in this work. The machine parameter for the 2.0 MW DFIG can be 
found in Appendix A2. For the 2.0 MW DFIG model, a partial scale power converter 
that consists of the grid side power converter (GSC) and rotor side power converter 
(RSC) with their respectively control schemes, together with a DC link component 
are modelled appropriately. Figure 3.1 shows the schematic diagram of the 2.0 MW 
DFIG model. It consists of 2.0 MW wound rotor induction generator. The generator 
stator is connected directly to the grid. The generator rotor is connected to the 
network via back-to-back Pulse Width Modulated (PWM) power converters with a 
control scheme and an intermediate DC link capacitor.  
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Figure 3.1 Schematic diagram of doubly fed induction generator. 
 
Both the stator and rotor side power converters are controlled using a vector control 
technique, which allows decoupled control of both generator active and reactive 
power. The aim of the vector control scheme of the rotor side converter (RSC) is to 
control independently the active power and reactive power flow into the grid. The 
aim of vector control scheme of the grid side converter (GSC) is to keep the DC link 
voltage constant at a preset value regardless of the magnitude and direction of rotor 
power flow and control reactive power flow between the GSC and the grid. The 
detailed description of the vector control structure for RSC and GSC of the 2.0 MW 
DFIG is beyond the scope of this thesis and it can be found in [81]. The control 
strategy of the 2.0 MW DFIG is that at steady state condition, the generator absorbs 
modest reactive power from the grid while the generator terminal voltage is kept 
close to 1.0 pu.   
 
3.2.2.3 Mechanical Driven Train  
The actual mechanical driven train of the wind turbine consists of the rotor blade, 
high speed shaft, gear box, low speed shaft and generator rotor. As stated in [44] a 
two mass model or a system with two degree of freedom (2-DOF) is sufficient to 
represent the mechanical driven train of a wind turbine for power system transient 
study purposes. In the two mass model, the gear box and high speed shaft are 
assumed to be infinitely stiff and only the low speed shaft is modelled due to its 
softness [44]. Moreover, it has been reported [69] that the single mass model of the 
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FSIG introduces significant error in the value of the critical clearing time (CCT), 
whereby the single mass model results in greater CCT compared with the two mass 
model. In this research project, the mechanical driven train of the wind turbine is 
modelled using two masses J1and J2 are that connected by one spring element, K, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.2. J1 is the total mass of the wind turbine, low speed shaft and 
gear box, J2 is the mass of the generator rotor and K is the stiffness of the low speed 
shaft. The mechanical driven train of the wind turbine is modelled using the 
multimass component in the PSCAD/EMTDC component library. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Two mass model of mechanical driven train of wind turbine. 
 
3.2.2.4 Capacitor Bank 
The inclusion of a capacitor bank acts as a local source of reactive power for the 
FSIG.  This reduces the need for the reactive power consumed by the generator to be 
sourced from the grid. In this research project, the capacitor bank for both 0.6 MW 
and 2.0 MW FSIGs are rated at 30% of generator capacity as suggested in [45]. Both 
of the capacitor banks are modelled using the fixed value capacitor component in the 
PSCAD/EMTDC library. For the 2.0 MW DFIG, the reactive power is controlled by 
the integrated power converter, thus the need for the capacitor bank is eliminated.  
 
3.2.3 Simplified Model of Medium Voltage Distribution Overhead Network 
The power system model used in this study is shown in Figure 3.3 and it represents a 
typical medium voltage rural overhead distribution network in the UK [1-5]. The 
FISG or DFIG, is assumed to be connected at the end of feeder 1 to represent the 
interconnection of DG at the remote end of the distribution network.  
 
The grid is modelled by a voltage source with short circuit level of 1800 MVA and a 
distribution substation represented by a 10 MVA, 33/11 kV star/delta transformers. 
Each of the 0.5 MVA loads supplied by feeders 1 and 2 is connected to their 
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corresponding feeders though 0.5 MVA, 0.415/11 kV delta/star transformer. Other 
loads connected to other feeders in the system are lumped together and represented 
by a single load of 3MVA at feeder 3. It is assumed to be connected at the end of a 
feeder though a 3.0MVA, 0.415/11 kV delta/star transformer.  
 
The length of distribution lines 1 to 6 are assumed to be 5km and distribution line 7 
is 10km. The parameter of the distribution line ZL = °∠ 50.593664.0  Ω per km. Rf1 
and Rf2 are relays installed at the sources of feeder 1 and feeder 2 respectively. A 
ring connector, Rring, is installed at the end of feeder 2. Radial operation mode is 
implemented by opening connector Rring, whereas ring operation mode is 
implemented by closing it.  
 
Figure 3.3 Schematic diagram of investigated distribution network with wind 
generator. 
 
 
 
 31 
3.2.4 Determine Zero Sequence Line Impedance in the Investigated Power 
Distribution Network 
The importance of zero sequence impendence to determine unsymmetrical network 
fault has been reported in [82-84]. In this research work, the positive sequence 
impedance, ZL1 and negative sequence impedance, ZL2 of the distribution line are 
identical and ZL= ZL1= ZL2 = °∠ 50.593664.0  Ω per km. In the absence of detailed 
information about zero sequence impedance, Z0 the ratio of Z0 /Z1=2, as suggested in 
reference [84], has been used in the research work.  
 
3.3 Investigation into Factors affecting the Transient Stability of DG during 
Fault Condition in Distribution Network with Ring Operating Mode 
In the UK, the voltage rise issue has been identified as the main factor limiting the 
penetration level of DGs into distribution network in rural areas [9]. This issue 
however can be eased by operating the distribution network in ring mode rather than 
radial mode, with an appropriate protection strategy and voltage control [37, 68]. In 
this section, the impact of 0.6 MW wind turbine based FSIG on protective device 
settings in a ring feeder is reported. The factors influencing the generator CCT in a 
ring feeder during a three phase fault condition has been investigated. The aim of the 
study is to determine the feeder protection requirements in a ring network with FSIG 
in order to ensure proper coordination between protective devices in the ring feeder, 
so that the fault clearing time does not exceed the CCT, which ensures continued 
operation of FSIG after the faulted line section bas been detected and isolated. 
Similar studies the on factors which influence the CCT of FSIG in radial networks 
have been reported in [27, 69].  
 
The CCT of a DG can be defined as the maximum fault duration that a fault can 
remain a power network without having that DG loss its transient stability. The 
concept of CCT applied at synchronous generators (SG) and induction generators (IG) 
are different.  In the case of SG, during fault condition, the electrical power output, 
Pe reduces and leads to the acceleration of SG and the rotor angle, δ  increases. 
After fault clearance, the SG is said to remain stable, if δ increase below a maximum 
rotor angle that is known as critical clearing angle. Otherwise, if the δ continue to 
increase above the critical clearing angle, then the SG become unstable and the time 
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corresponding to the critical clearing angle is known as CCT of the SG. In the case of 
IG, during fault condition, the electromagnetic torque, Te reduces and leads to the 
acceleration of IG and rotor speed increases. After fault clearance, if the rotor speed 
slow down and generator retains its prefault condition, then the IG is said to remain 
stable. Otherwise, if the rotor speed continues to increase with the generator terminal 
experience sustained voltage dip, then the generator become unstable. Therefore the 
maximum fault clearing time required for the IG to retain to its prefault condition is 
known as CCT of IG. [27, 69, 85-86] 
 
3.3.1 Determination of FSIG’s CCT in Radial and Ring Mode Operations 
In order to determine the CCT of the installed FSIG, a three-phase-to-ground fault is 
applied at point F1 which is 1km from the 33 kV grid on feeder 2 (see Figure 3.3), 
once when the network is operated in radial mode and then in ring mode. The fault is 
assumed at t = 15 s into the simulation for a duration of 130 ms. The 0.6 MW FSIG 
is connected at the end of feeder 1 through a 1.0 MVA, 0.69/11 kV step up 
transformer. 
 
Figures 3.4 (a) to (g) show the variations of the machine parameters of the 0.6 MW 
FSIG following the fault condition in a radial network. Immediately after fault 
inception at t = 15 s, the terminal voltage dropped to less than 0.1 p.u as shown in 
Figure 3.4(a). This has caused the stator and rotor fluxes to drop, which results in 
reduction of active power as shown in Figure 3.4(b). The electromagnetic torque 
decreases upon the fault initiation as shown in Figure 3.4(c) and this can be 
explained using equation (3.1) as shown below [85-86].  
 
2KsVTe =          (3.1) 
 
K is a constant value that depends on the machine parameters and s is machine slip, 
which can be either –s or +s. The negative and positive signs indicate that, the 
machine is used as a generator and a motor respectively. V is the machine terminal 
voltage. The exact value of slip and terminal voltage prior to and during fault 
condition determines whether the electromagnetic torque is increased or decreased 
during fault conditions. As shown in Figure 3.4(d) the induction generator 
accelerates from -1.0% slip to about -13% slip while the terminal voltage falls from 
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96% to about 0.06%. Employing (3.1) the maximum value of electromagnetic torque 
during the fault condition can be calculated as below.  
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1 and 2 indicate prior and during fault conditions respectively. Te1 and V1 being 
chosen are -1.0 p.u and 0.96 p.u respectively, so the calculated Te2 is -0.051 p.u. The 
maximum electromagnetic torque obtained from the time domain simulation is                    
-0.045p.u (see Figure 3.4(c)). Figure 3.4(e) shows the variation of stator current 
following the fault inception. Figure 3.4(f) is the magnification of Figure 3.4(e) for 
the time period started from t = 14.9 s to t = 16 s. During fault condition, the initial 
fault current contribution from the 0.6 MW generator to the considered network fault 
at F1 reached 300% of full load current as shown in Figure 3.4(f).   
 
As shown in Figure 3.4(g), after fault clearance a high inrush current is drawn from 
the grid to re-establish the generator’s entire magnetic field which causes a 
significant amount of reactive power to be absorbed from the grid compared to the 
prefault condition. The initial fault current reaches 200% of full load current after 
fault clearance as shown in Figure 3.4(f). It was observed from Figure 3.4(b) to (e) 
and (g) that active power, electromagnetic torque, rotor speed, stator current and 
reactive power exhibit obvious decaying oscillation after fault clearance. This is 
because the exchange of power does not occur instantaneously due to the inductance 
in the machine winding and the inertia of the rotating mass [27, 85]. All of these 
parameters have successfully regained their pre-fault values after the clearance of the 
fault.  This result shows that the transient stability of the wind generator is 
maintained which means the CCT of the generator has not been exceeded.     
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(d) 
 
(e) 
 
(f) 
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(g) 
 
Figure 3.4 Transient performance of 0.6 MW FSIG following a three phase network 
fault with duration of 130 ms in radial network: (a) terminal voltage (b) 
active power (c) electromagnetic torque (d) rotor speed (e) stator current 
(f) stator current (magnification of figure (e)) and (g) reactive power.  
 
Figures 3.5(a) and (b) show variations of the generator’s terminal voltage and rotor 
speed in radial and ring networks. It was found that, the peak of rotor speed 
acceleration during fault condition in the ring network is slightly higher than the 
radial network; that is 1.130 p.u compared to 1.116 p.u. However, for the above 
network fault, the dynamic behaviour of DG after fault clearance is significantly 
better in the ring network compared to the radial network. The decay of oscillation in 
the terminal voltage and rotor speed is less significant in the ring network compared 
to the radial network. The machine parameters restore their prefault condition sooner 
in the ring network compared to the radial network. It was also found from this 
investigation that the generator can not retain its pre-fault condition when the fault 
duration is greater than 141 ms and 145 ms when the network operated as radial and 
ring respectively. These values are therefore considered as the generator’s CCT for 
their respective network of operation. This investigation has also shown that in order 
to prevent the tripping of the considered FSIG which is connected at the end of 
feeder 1, the fault at F1 must be cleared not greater than 141 ms and 145 ms for radial 
and ring network respectively.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3.5 Variation of (a) terminal voltage and (b) rotor speed of 0.6 MWFSIG 
following a three-phase-to-ground fault with duration of 130ms in ring 
and radial network. 
 
3.3.2 Effect of Network Operating Mode on the Generator’s CCT 
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of network configuration on the 
magnitude of the generator’s CCT. Radial and ring configurations have been 
considered in this study. The generator is connected at the end of feeder 1(see Figure 
3.3).  A three-phase-to-ground fault is applied to three locations, F1, F2 and F3, which 
are 1km, 5km and 10km from the 33 kV grid on feeder 2. The generator’s CCT at 
each of these fault locations has been determined. The corresponding results are 
summarised in Figure 3.6. This figure shows the values of generator’s CCT for the 
assumed faults at F1, F2 and F3 in ring mode operation compared to radial mode 
operation. This figure shows that the values of the generator’s CCT in ring mode at 
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the three different fault locations are not much different from each other. In contrast, 
in the case of radial operation, the value of the CCT related to each fault location is 
significantly different from one fault location to another. This is because the power 
flow in feeders operated in ring configuration is more evenly distributed compared 
the power flow when the feeders are operated in radial mode.  Thus, this effect shows 
on the flow of fault current.   
 
Figure 3.6 Effects of network operating mode on generator’s CCT. 
 
3.3.3 Effect of Generator’s Location on Its CCT value in Ring Network  
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of connecting generator at 
different locations along a network feeder, in a ring operated network, on the value 
of the generator CCT. Two locations have been considered, the first is 5km from 33 
kV grid on feeder 1 while the other is 15km from 33 kV grid on feeder 1. The 
corresponding results are summarised in Figure 3.7.  
 
This figure shows that generator’s CCT value increases as the generator’s location 
moves along feeder 1 from the 33kV grid. This observation is found to be true for all 
the considered fault locations at F1, F2 and F3. The figure also shows that the values 
of the generator’s CCT due to faults along feeder 2 varies over a wide range when 
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the generator is located at the beginning of feeder 1, which is 5km from 33 kV grid 
on feeder 1 compared to its location at the end of the same feeder, which is 15km 
from 33 kV grid on feeder 1.  
 
This can be explained with reference to Figure 3.8 and Table 3.1. Although the 
investigated system is operated in ring network operation, where the power flow is 
evenly distributed within the ring feeder, the current flow from the DG is divided 
into two currents IDG1 and IDG2 (see Figure 3.8 (a) and (b)). These currents are 
divided evenly during normal and fault network conditions when the DG is located at 
the end of the feeder compared to its location at the beginning of feeder. Table 3.1 
shows the average values of IDG1 and IDG2 current through phase a before and during 
a fault condition for fault at location F2 with fault duration of 120 ms. IDGN1 and 
IDGN2 are IDG1 and IDG2 currents through phase a before fault condition respectively. 
IDGF1 and IDGF2 are IDG1 and IDG2 currents through phase a during fault condition 
respectively.  It has been found that, the magnitudes of IDGN1 and IDGN2  are the same 
when the DG is connected at the end of the feeder compared to its connection at the 
beginning of the feeder. The difference between magnitudes of IDGF1 and IDGF2 is 
significantly less when the DG location is at end of the feeder compared to the DG 
location at the beginning of the feeder. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Effects of tripping sequence on generator’s CCT in ring network. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3.8 Schematic diagram of investigated distribution network with two different 
DG locations: (a) end of feeder 1and (b) beginning of feeder1. 
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Table 3.1 
Average value of phase a of IDG1 and IDG2 during normal and fault conditions for two 
different DG locations: (a) end of feeder 1and (b) beginning of feeder1. 
DG location 
IDG1 and IDG2 flow through phase a during 
normal and fault condition  
IDGN1(A) IDGN2(A) IDGF1(A) IDGF2(A) 
(a) end of feeder 1(15km from 33 
kV grid) 21 21 499 508 
(b) beginning of feeder 1 (5km 
from 33 kV grid) 31 49 465 502 
 
 
3.3.4 Effect of Multi-Generator and Their Equivalent on the CCT in Ring 
Network  
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of connecting more than one 
generator located at different network locations on the CCT of the generators under 
consideration. Two case studies have been considered. The first case study involves 
two generators G1 and G2 with rated values of 0.6 MW and 1.8 MW respectively. 
The first generator is connected at the end of the feeder through a 0.69/11 kV 
transformer while the second generator is connected directly at the 11 kV bus at the 
substation. In the second case study an equivalent generator, G3, with total rating of 
2.4 MW is connected directly to the 11 kV bus.   
 
G2 and G3 are represented in the model as 3 coherent machines and 4 coherent 
machines respectively. G2 and G3 is modelled using the machines parameters of G1. 
G2 is 3 times G1 and G3 is 4 times G1. Both G2 and G3 can be derived using the 
facilities within the PSCAD/EMTDC software call “modelling coherent machines” 
( see 3.2.1(d) ). It is used to find the parameters of the generator based on another 
generator with known parameters. Table 3.2 shows the inertia constants of the wind 
turbine and generator rotor, HT and HG respectively for G1, G2 and G3.  
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Table 3.2 
Inertia constant of wind turbine and generator rotor for G1, G2 and G3. 
Generator 
Inertia constant of wind turbine and generator rotor 
HT(s) HG(s) 
G1 3.2 0.5 
G2 3.2 1.5 
G3 3.2 2.0 
 
The corresponding results are summarised in Figure 3.9. This figure shows according 
to the results from the first case study that the CCT of G2 increases significantly with 
the fault location from F1 to F3 compared to that related to G1. This is because the 
current component IDG1 and IDG2 from G1 are more evenly divided compared to those 
associated with G2 (see figure 3.8(a) and figure 3.10).  The second case study, on the 
other hand reveals the CCT of G3 is generally greater than those due to G1 and G2. 
This is because the significant increase in the value of the inertia constant of the 
generator rotor has an appreciable effect on the CCT [69]. By increasing the value of 
HG from 0.5s to 1.5s, the CCT of G3 has increased significantly compared to those 
due to G1 and G2 at fault location F2 and F3.  The CCT of the three generators G1, 
G2 and G3 due to a fault at F1 are the lowest and they are close to each other. 
 
Figure 3.9 Effect of different generator location at generator’s CCT on ring network. 
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Figure 3.10 Schematic diagram of investigated distribution network with DG 
connected directly to 11 kV bus. 
 
3.3.5 Effect of Tripping Sequence of Protective Devices on Generator’s CCT in 
Ring Network 
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of the tripping sequence of the 
protective devices on the generator’s CCT in a ring network. Ring connector Rring 
and either feeder relay R1 or R2 should be tripped to isolate the faulted feeder from 
the rest of the network for any fault that occurs within the ring. A 2000 ms duration 
three-phase-to-ground fault, i.e., sustained fault, is assumed at F1 on feeder 2. Rring 
and R2 are required to open their associated circuit breakers to ensure (i) the isolation 
of the assumed fault on feeder 2 and (ii) the prevention of the tripping of the wind 
generator connected to feeder 1. Values tring and tF2 refer to tripping times of Rring and 
R2 respectively. Rring and R2 are operated according to two different tripping 
sequences; (a) tring greater than tF2 and (b) is tring lower than tF2. The same 
investigation is repeated for fault locations F2 and F3 on feeder 2. The corresponding 
results are summarised in Figure 3.11. This figure shows that the tripping in 
sequence (a) causes a decrease in the magnitude of the generator’s CCT with the 
fault location as it moves from F1 (beginning of Feeder 2) to F3 (end of Feeder 2), 
while the tripping sequence (b) causes an increase in generator CCT with fault 
location.  
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Figure 3.11 Effects of the tripping sequence on generator’s CCT in ring network. 
 
3.3.6 Effect of Opening the Ring at Different Locations on Generator’ CCT 
value in Ring Network 
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of opening the ring at different 
locations on the generator’s CCT. For the purpose of comparison two case studies 
have been considered. In case study 1 three circuit breakers RRing1, RRing2 , RRing3  are 
installed at three different locations in the ring feeder as shown in Figure 3.12. R2 
and RRing1,  RRing1 and RRing2, RRing2  and RRing3  are tripped to clear faults at F1, F2 and 
F3 respectively. However, in case study 2 only RRing3 is installed at line 6 (see Figure 
3.3) and consequently R2 and RRing3 need to be tripped to clear all faults at the three 
considered fault locations. F1 and F2 refer to 1km and 5km at feeder 2 while F3 refer 
to 1km at line 6. The corresponding results are summarised at Figure 3.13. This 
figure shows that the value of the generator’s CCT in each fault location is 
significantly different from each other when the system under investigated is 
operated as described in case study 1 compared to case study 2. Besides, the 
magnitude of the generator’s CCT increases with the fault location when system is 
operated according to case study 1. Figure 3.13 also reveals that for faults at F1, the 
value of the generator CCT in both case studies are very close to each other. It is also 
shown in this figure that longer fault clearance time can be allowed for faults 
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occurring at F2 and F3 when lines 5 and 6 are protected using ring connectors that are 
located at both ends of each line section.  
 
Figure 3.12 Schematic diagram of the investigated distribution network with ring 
connectors located at 3 locations in network. 
 
 
Figure 3.13 Effect of opening the ring connector at different network location on 
generator CCT. 
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The following can be concluded from the simulation results obtained in this 
investigation: 
 
a. The value of the generator’s CCT obtained and the overall response of the 
main machine parameters after fault clearance show that the transient stability 
of DG is improved in a ring network compared to a radial network. 
 
b. For fault events on the MV network with DGs located at an adjacent healthy 
feeder from the faulty feeder, the required fault tripping time of the protective 
relay on the faulty feeder to preserve the operation of DGs at healthy feeder 
during fault condition is significantly different between ring and radial mode 
of operations, for certain fault location e.g., F3 (see section 3.3.2). Thus, time 
graded protection coordination based on conventional directional overcurrent 
in ring network [3] might become incompatible with presence of DGs in a 
ring network. Apart from that, it was found in the case study whereby the 
feeder is divided into several line sections by installation of additional circuit 
breakers in the ring feeder, a longer time can be allowed to detect and isolate 
the faulty section during fault condition while maintaining the stability of the 
DG.  
 
c. Furthermore, optimisation of the generator location and tripping sequence 
needs to be taken into consideration when developing novel protection in a 
ring network with DGs in order to maintain the stability of DG, so that the 
operation of DG can be continued during fault condition. 
 
3.4 Investigation into the Sustainability of Different DG Technologies during 
Temporary Fault  
Due to the continued increase of penetration of DGs, it has become increasingly 
important that  the DG remain in service during network temporary fault events as 
far as possible in order to maximise the benefits of interconnection of DGs and 
increase the overall power delivery reliability. Investigation into the sustainability of 
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different DG technologies during temporary faults in overhead distribution network 
should be carried out to (i) assess the possibility of preserving DGs in service as far 
as possible to optimise electric supply continuity and (ii) identify the requirements of 
auto-reclosing scheme in distribution networks with high penetration of DGs. In this 
section, the dynamic behaviour of two different type of wind generation technologies, 
FSIG and DFIG, during various type of temporary fault in radial and ring operated 
networks has been assessed. This is followed by an investigation into the application 
of a Single-Phase Auto-Reclosing (SPAR) scheme in a distribution network with DG.  
 
3.4.1  Transient Performance of DFIG under Network Fault Condition 
In this section, the dynamic behaviour of 2.0 MW DFIG during network fault 
condition is evaluated. The power system under investigation is shown in Figure 3.3. 
In this study, the grid is represented by a voltage source with short circuit level of 40 
MVA to simulate a weak distribution network. The 2.0 MW DFIG is connected at 
the end of feeder 1 through a 2.5 MVA, 0.69/11 kV step up transformer. The detail 
of the other network parameters can be found in section 3.2.3. A three-phase-to-
ground fault is assumed at fault point F4 which is 1km (from the grid) on feeder 1 
when the network is operated in radial mode and then in ring mode. The fault is 
assumed at t = 35 s for a duration of 200 ms.  Figure 3.14(a) to (g) show the variation 
of main generator output parameters following the fault condition in the radial 
network. 
 
Immediately after the fault occurs at t = 35 s the generator terminal voltage drops as 
shown in Figure 3.14(a), and this causes the corresponding stator and rotor flux to 
drop, which results in a significant reduction in generator active powers as shown in 
Figure 3.14(b). The active power reduction activates the control scheme at the RSC 
and after approximately t = 35.1s, the magnitude of active power has been 
maintained at a fixed level. Meanwhile, as shown in Figure 3.14(c) and (d), changes 
in both electromagnetic torque and reactive power due to fault inception also activate 
the control scheme at the RSC. As the results of that, both of these parameters had 
been controlled at fixed level after t = 35.1 s. Due to the decoupling control of active 
and reactive power, variation of rotor speed will not be transferred to active power 
and electromagnetic torque. As shown in Figure 3.14(e), the rotor speed kept 
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increasing after fault inception while the active power and machine torque have been 
retained at a fixed level after t = 35.1 s, as shown respectively in Figure 3.14(b) and 
(c). 
 
The variation of rotor speed causes a rise of 40% in the magnitude of the DC link 
voltage as shown in Figure 3.14(f). This can be explained as follows: the DC link act 
as a storage element to provide the machine with the required reactive power so that 
the DFIG can generate sufficient active power [44-45]. In doing so, the current may 
be supplied or drawn from the rotor side converter and increase the DC voltage value 
[44-45]. As shown in Figure 3.14(g) after fault inception, a high transient rotor 
current is produced and flows towards the DC link. Because the generator terminal 
voltage drops immediately after the fault, the exchange of power between the DC 
link capacitor and the grid has been limited. Thus, the additional energy goes to 
charge the DC link capacitor and increase the DC link voltage to 40% of its prefault 
value, as shown in Figure 3.14(f).  
 
After the fault is cleared, the terminal voltage rises instantly. Both generator active 
power and electromagnetic torque regain their prefault value immediately. The rotor 
speed is restored to the prefault value approximately 10 seconds after fault clearance, 
as shown in Figure 3.15.  
 
 
(a) 
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(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
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(e) 
 
(f) 
 
(g) 
Figure 3.14 Transient performance of 2.0 MW DFIG following a three phase 
network fault with a duration of 200 ms in radial network: (a) terminal 
voltage (b) active power (c) electromagnetic torque (d) reactive power 
(e) rotor speed (f) DC link voltage and (g) rotor current . 
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Figure 3.15 Variation of generator rotor speed before and after fault inception. 
 
3.4.2  Comparison between Transient Performance of FSIG and DFIG in Radial 
and Ring Operated Network 
In order to compare the transient performance of 2.0 MW FSIG and DFIG for the 
considered network fault condition in section 3.4.1, the 2.0 MW DFIG, which is 
located at the end of feeder 1 in the investigated system shown in Figure 3.3, is 
replaced with the 2.0 MW FSIG. Figure 3.16(a) to (c) show the variation of 
generator’s terminal voltage, active power and rotor speed of the 2.0 MW DFIG in 
radial and ring network after fault inception. Figure 3.17(a) to (c) show the variation 
of generator’s terminal voltage, active power and rotor speed of the 2.0 MW FSIG in 
radial and ring network after fault inception.  
 
It can be seen from Figure 3.16(a) and (b) that, for the considered network fault, 
during fault inception period (from t = 35 s to t = 35.2 s), the dynamic behaviour of 
the DFIG is slightly better in the ring network compared to the radial network. The 
magnitude of voltage drop and active power after fault inception is slightly less in the 
ring network compared to the radial network. By contrast, it is shown in Figure 
3.17(a) and (b) that, the magnitude of voltage drop and active power for FSIG after 
fault inception has no significant difference in both ring and radial networks.  
 
During post fault period (from t = 35.2 s onward), it is shown in Figure 3.16(a) to (c) 
that, the dynamic behaviour of the DFIG in both radial and ring network has no 
significant difference. Figure 3.16(c) shows that oscillation pattern in the rotor speed 
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after fault clearance is similar both ring and radial operation modes. In contrast, it is 
shown in Figure 3.17(a) to (c) that, the dynamic behaviour of the FSIG after fault 
clearance is significantly better in the case of the ring network compared to the radial 
network. The rate of oscillation in terminal voltage, active power and rotor speed is 
less significant in the ring network compared to the radial network. The machine 
parameters restore their prefault conditions faster in the ring network compared to 
the radial network.  
 
Apart from that, it can be seen from Figures 3.16 and 3.17 that, for the considered 
network fault, the active power of the DFIG is considerably improved compared to 
that related to the FSIG in ring network. The minimum active power drop of the 
DFIG and FSIG during fault in the ring network is 0.3 p.u and 0.01 p.u respectively. 
After fault clearance, due to the action of the vector control scheme installed at the 
DFIG, the machine parameters restore their prefault conditions sooner for the DFIG, 
compared to the FSIG, in both ring and radial networks.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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(c) 
Figure 3.16 Variation of (a) terminal voltage, (b) active power and (c) rotor speed of 
2.0 MW DFIG following a three-phase-to-ground fault with duration of 
200 ms in ring and radial network. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b)  
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(c) 
Figure 3.17 Variation of (a) terminal voltage, (b) active power and (c) rotor speed of 
2.0 MW FSIG following a three-phase-to-ground fault with duration of 
200 ms in ring and radial network. 
 
It has been found in this investigation that, for the above fault condition, the DFIG 
can not retain pre-fault values when the fault duration is greater than 510 ms and 587 
ms in radial and ring respectively. On the other hand, FSIG can not retain its pre-
fault values when fault duration is greater than 229 ms and 278 ms. These values are 
therefore considered as the generator’s CCT for the DFIG and FSIG in radial and 
ring networks respectively. 
 
It can be concluded from the simulation results obtained in this investigation that, for 
a fault event located at the DG feeder, the transient performance of both the DFIG 
and FSIG is considerably improved in a ring network compared to a radial network. 
Furthermore, a longer fault clearance time is allowed while maintaining the transient 
stability, of both the DFIG and FSIG in a ring network compared to a radial network.  
It has been observed that, the DFIG has a better transient performance following a 
three-phase-to-ground fault condition, compared to the FSIG, in both radial and ring 
operated networks. The operation of DGs should be continue in fault condition to 
maximise the benefits of the DG interconnection. Operating FSIG in a network with 
radial mode will be considered as the worst case scenario in deciding the tripping 
time setting of circuit breakers.  
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3.4.3 Effect of Unsymmetrical Single-Line-to-Ground Fault Event on the 
Transient Stability of DG and Operation of G59 Protection  
Considering that 80% of faults on distribution networks are temporary and most of 
them are unsymmetrical single-line-to-ground (SLG) faults [3-4], it is becoming 
increasingly important that the DG should remain in service during temporary SLG 
faults as far as possible for the benefit of utilities, DG developers and customers. 
Meanwhile, the requirement in technical recommendation G59 [46] states that DGs 
need to be protected against over/under voltage during any abnormal network 
conditions to prevent islanding operation. Phase voltage fluctuation of DGs outside 
the limits of +/-10% for over 0.5 seconds is not permitted. The effect of 
unsymmetrical network faults on the transient stability of DGs and consequence 
operation of G59 has been reported in reference [87] for Conventional Synchronous 
Generator (CSG). Induction generators whether FSIG or DFIG, were not covered in 
this research study. The detailed comparative analysis reported in [45, 70] shows that 
different DG technology types have their own unique operational characteristics 
which will affect their transient response during network faults. These need to be 
taken into consideration when assessing the possibility of maintaining operation of 
DGs during unsymmetrical faults. Therefore, in this section, the effect of temporary 
SLG faults on the transient stability of FSIG and DFIG and the operation of G59 
protection is reported. The aim of this study is to investigate the sustainability of 
FSIG and DFIG during temporary SLG fault conditions, while complying with the 
under/over voltage protection requirements of G59.   
 
A three-phase symmetrical fault, phase a-b-c-to-ground fault (ABCG) and SLG fault, 
phase a-to-ground fault (AG) have been considered in this investigation to compare 
the effects of symmetrical and unsymmetrical faults on the dynamic behaviour of 
both FSIG and DFIG.  The fault is assumed at the fault point F4, which is 1km (from 
the grid) on feeder 1 of the investigated power system (see Figure 3.3), when the 
network is operated in radial mode and then in ring mode. The fault is assumed at t = 
35 s for a duration of 200 ms. The variation of terminal voltage, generator active 
power and rotor speed of the 2.0 MW DFIG following AG and ABCG faults in a 
radial network and a ring network are shown in Figure 3.18 and 3.19 respectively. 
The variation of terminal voltage, generator active power and rotor speed of the 2.0 
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MW FSIG following AG and ABCG faults in radial network and ring network are 
shown in Figure 3.20 and 3.21 respectively.  
 
It is shown in Figures 3.18 to 3.21 that, the transient performance of both FSIG and 
DFIG for the AG fault is much better compared to the ABCG fault condition.  The 
terminal voltage and active power drop is less and the rotor speed increases less 
during the AG fault compared to the ABCG fault condition. It can be observed from 
Figure 3.18(a) and 3.19(a) for the 2.0MW DFIG in both radial and ring network, the 
average voltage drop in AG fault condition is 33% of the generator terminal voltage 
prior to fault. It also shows in 3.20(a) and 3.21(a) that for 2.0MW FSIG in both radial 
and ring network, the average voltage drop in AG fault condition is 33% of the 
generator terminal voltage prior to the fault. 
 
Apart from that, it can be seen from Figure 3.18 and 3.19 that, due to the action of 
the vector control scheme installed at the DFIG, the observed machine parameters 
restore their prefault conditions immediately after fault clearance in both AG and 
ABCG fault events. By contrast, it can be seen from Figure 3.20 and 3.21 that 
significantly less time is needed for the observed parameters of FSIG to restore their 
prefault condition in the case of an AG fault compared to an ABCG fault condition.  
 
(a)  
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(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 3.18 Variation of (a) terminal voltage, (b) active power and (c) rotor speed of 
2.0 MW DFIG following a AG and ABCG fault with duration of 200 
ms in radial network. 
 
 
(a) 
 58 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 3.19 Variation of (a) terminal voltage, (b) active power and (c) rotor speed of 
2.0 MW DFIG following a AG and ABCG fault with duration of 200 
ms in ring network. 
 
 
(a) 
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(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 3.20 Variation of (a) terminal voltage, (b) active power and (c) rotor speed of 
2.0 MW FSIG following a AG and ABCG fault with duration of 200 ms 
in radial network. 
 
 
(a)  
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 (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 3.21 Variation of (a) terminal voltage, (b) active power and (c) rotor speed of 
2.0 MW FSIG following a AG and ABCG fault with duration of 200 ms 
in ring network. 
 
It can be concluded from the simulation results obtained in this investigation that a 
SLG fault is not critical compared to three phase symmetrical faults. Both FSIG and 
DFIG remain stable during a SLG fault condition although the voltage dip during a 
fault condition drops below the voltage limits specified in G59. It is significance to 
continue operate DGs in SLG fault condition, although the voltage drop under the 
Thus, if the operation of DG during fault conditions is permitted in the future, then, 
the current voltage limits of under/over voltage protection specified in G59 need to 
be justified. It has also been found in this investigation that the action of the control 
scheme installed on the DFIG has apparently improved the transient performance of 
DFIG compared to FSIG, particularly after fault clearance.   
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3.4.4 Impact of operation of SPAR on the Transient Performance of DG 
Most faults on distribution networks are temporary SLG faults [3-4] and not critical 
for DG’s transient stability according to the investigations reported in section 3.4.3. 
In this section, the impact of operation of SPAR as assessed based on the transient 
performance of DG following a SLG fault event is reported. As shown in Figure 3.22, 
the DG feeder, which is feeder 1 in the investigated power system, is divided into 
protection zones such that when a fault occurs at a certain protection zone it is 
cleared by the pair of circuit breakers that are located at the two ends of the line 
section defining the considered protection zone. For instance, an internal fault which 
occurs within line 1 is isolated by tripping both circuit breakers associated with 
R1and R11. It is assumed that there is no time delay between the tripping time of these 
circuit breakers. Apart from that, it is assumed that SPAR scheme is applied at feeder 
1 in the investigated power system. R1 to R33 are assumed to be relays equipped with 
a complex protection function that includes fault classification and phase selection 
schemes. R1 to R33 trips the phase subjected to SLG fault condition and initiates three 
phase reclosure for other types of network faults. Under this protection scheme, a DG 
connected at the end of feeder 1 will continue to operate during any SLG fault 
condition that occurs within line1, line 2 and line 3.  
 
Figure 3.22 Power system under consideration with DG feeder is protected using 
zone protection scheme. 
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3.4.4.1 Effect of Recloser Opening Time (To) on Dynamic Behaviour of DG 
during Temporary Fault Conditions 
In order to investigate the effect of recloser opening time (To) on the transient 
performance of DG,  a SLG fault, phase-a-to-ground (AG) fault is assumed at  F1 
1km along feeder 1, (see Figure 3.22) when the investigated system is operated in 
radial mode and then ring mode. The fault inception instant (FIT) is t = 35 s into the 
simulation for a fault duration of 0.6s.  
 
Three recloser opening times, To, for high speed reclose attempts have been 
considered in this investigation, being 0.5s, 1.0s and 2.0 s. Values of To were 
selected according to reference [1, 66]. The operating time sequence of circuit 
breakers associated with both R1 and R11 are shown in Table 3.3. Note that the circuit 
breakers take 0.2s to trips after fault inception.  To1 indicates circuit breaker opening 
time before 1st reclosing attempt. Note that To1 = To in this simulation study. CBOT1 
indicates the circuit breaker opening time instant before 1st reclosing attempt. CBRT1 
indicates the circuit breaker closing time instant for 1st reclosing attempt. The 1st 
reclosing attempt is assumed to be high speed reclosing. Figure 3.23 illustrates the 
operating time sequence of these circuit breakers.  
 
Table 3.3 
Operating time sequence of circuit breaker associated with both R1 and R11 for AG 
fault at 1km along feeder 1 for different To1. 
Fault 
duration 
FIT To1 CBOT1 CBRT1 
0.6 s 35 s 0.5 s 35.2 s 35.7 s 
0.6 s 35 s 1.0 s 35.2 s 36.2 s 
0.6 s 35 s 2.0 s 35.2 s 37.2 s 
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Figure 3.23 Illustration of the operating time sequence of circuit breaker associated 
with both R1 and R11. 
 
The simulation results are summarised in Figure 3.24 to 3.27. The effect of circuit 
breaker opening time setting, To1, on the dynamic behaviour of the 2.0 MW DFIG 
following an AG fault in radial and ring network are shown in Figure 3.24 and 3.25 
respectively. The effect of circuit breaker opening time setting To1 on the dynamic 
behaviour of 2.0 MW FSIG following an AG fault in radial and ring networks is 
shown in Figure 3.26 and 3.27 respectively.  
 
Figures 3.24 and 3.25 show that circuit breaker opening time setting, To1 has clear 
impact on the transient performance of the DFIG in a radial network compared to a 
ring network. It can be seen from Figures 3.24(a) and (b) that, when the investigated 
system is operated in radial mode, the generator terminal voltage and active power 
have reduced to 0.85 p.u and 1.7 MW respectively, during the circuit breakers 
opening time period, following fault isolation at t = 35.2 s, compared to their pre 
fault values of 0.9 p.u and 1.9 MW. Both of these parameters regain their prefault 
values only after reclosing of circuit breakers. The reclose time depends on To1. In 
contrast, it can be seen from Figure 3.25(a) that when the investigated system is 
operated in ring mode, during the circuit breaker open time period, after the fault is 
isolated, the drop of terminal voltage is not as bad as Figure 3.24(a). Figure 3.25(b) 
also shows that during the circuit breakers’ opening time period, following fault 
isolation, the generator active power recovered to prefault value immediately. It can 
be seen from Figures 3.24 (c) and 3.25(c) that, during the circuit breakers’ open time 
period, following fault isolation, the oscillation pattern of the rotor speed for the 
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three different values of To1 is significantly different in the case of radial operating 
mode compared to that related to the ring network.  
 
(a) terminal voltage  
 
 
(b) active power  
 
(c) rotor speed   
Figure 3.24 Effect of circuit breaker opening time setting To1 on the dynamic 
behaviour of 2.0 MW DFIG following a AG fault in radial network. 
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(a) terminal voltage 
 
 
(b) active power  
 
(c) rotor speed 
Figure 3.25 Effect of circuit breaker opening time setting To1 on the dynamic 
behaviour of 2.0 MW DFIG following a AG fault in ring network. 
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It can be seen from Figure 3.26 and 3.27 that, the effect of To1 on the transient 
behaviour of the FSIG for the considered fault is significant in the radial network 
compared to the ring network. Figure 3.26(a) shows that when the investigated 
system is operated as a radial network the magnitude of generator terminal voltage 
drop during the circuit breaker opening time after the fault isolation depends on the 
To1 setting. The worst case is when To1 = 2.0 s, where the voltage dropped from 0.98 
p.u prior to the fault to minimum 0.8 p.u. In contrast, Figure 3.27(a) shows that when 
the investigated system is operated as a ring network the terminal voltage drop 
during the opening time of circuit breaker is less significant compared to the radial 
network. The terminal voltage drops of different values of To1 are comparable to 
each other. Other then that, it can be seen from Figure 3.26 (c) and 3.27(c) that, the 
oscillation pattern of rotor speed at the three different values of To1 during the circuit 
breaker open time period, after fault isolation, are significantly different in the radial 
network compared to that related to the ring network operating mode.  
 
(a) terminal voltage  
 
 
(b) active power  
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(c) rotor speed  
Figure 3.26 Effect of circuit breaker opening time setting To1 on the dynamic 
behaviour of 2.0 MW FSIG following AG fault in radial network. 
 
(a) terminal voltage 
 
(b) active power 
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(c) rotor speed 
Figure 3.27 Effect of circuit breaker opening time setting To1 on the dynamic 
behaviour of 2.0 MW FSIG following  AG fault in ring network. 
 
It can be concluded from the simulation results obtained from this investigation that 
the effect of the recloser opening time (To) on the dynamic behaviour of FSIG is 
more significant compared to DFIG, particularly when the investigated system is 
operated in radial operating mode.  
 
3.4.4.2 Effect of Recloser Opening Time (To) on Transient Stability of DG 
In this simulation, the transient stability of DG is determined by assessing the main 
parameters of DG such as terminal voltage, active power and rotor speed. If these 
parameters regain their prefault values during the recloser opening time, after the 
fault is isolated, the generator will be considered as stable, otherwise it is unstable. In 
order to determine the effect of the recloser opening time (To) on the transient 
stability of DG for the considered network fault condition in section 3.4.4.1, an AG 
fault is applied at a further two fault locations of 7.5km and 14km which are located 
within line 2 and line 3 respectively on feeder 1. The operating time sequence of 
circuit breakers associated with R2 to R33 are identical to R1 and R11 and can be found 
in Table 3.3 in section 3.4.4.1. 
 
The simulation results are summarised in Table 3.4 where S indicates the generator is 
stable and U indicates the generator is unstable. It can be found in Table 3.4 that the 
2.0 MW DFIG remains stable throughout the fault and recloser opening time at all
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fault locations and under different To1 setting both in radial and ring networks. In 
contrast, FSIG become unstable in radial network at certain locations and To1 settings 
as follows: (i) fault located at 7.5km and To1 = 2.0 s, (ii) fault located at 14km and To1 
= 1.0 s and 2.0 s. This can be explained as follows: grid connected FSIG demand a 
certain amount of reactive power from the network [40, 44]. When the investigated 
system is operated in radial operation mode, reactive power flows only in one 
direction from the 33 kV grid to the 2.0 MW FSIG through feeder 1(see Figure 3.22). 
With phase a of the faulty section along feeder 1 become isolated from the network 
during an AG fault condition, the amount of reactive power received by the generator 
becoming not sufficient. Eventually, this affects the transient stability of the DG. In 
contrast, when the investigated power system is operated in ring operation mode, the 
reactive power flows in two directions, one from the 33 kV grid to the 2.0 MW FSIG 
through feeder 1 and the second one through feeder 2. With a single phase of the 
faulty section along feeder 1 being isolated from the network, the reactive power that 
flows from the 33 kV grid to the generator through feeder 1 ensures sufficient 
reactive power to keep the generator stable during the reclosing opening time. Apart 
from that, the action of the control scheme installed at the DFIG has the capability of 
controlling the reactive power demand during network fault conditions [40, 44]. 
Therefore, it is more robust and able to ride through the opening time of the recloser.  
 
Table 3.4 
The state of transient stability of 2.0 MW FSIG and DFIG ( S : generator is stable 
and U : generator is unstable) : Different values of To1 for AG fault at fault locations 
1km, 7.5km and 14km  along feeder 1. 
Fault 
Location To1 
radial ring 
FSIG DFIG FSIG DFIG 
1km 
0.5 s S S S S 
1.0 s S S S S 
2.0 s S S S S 
7.5km 
0.5 s S S S S 
1.0 s S S S S 
2.0 s U S S S 
14km 
0.5 s S S S S 
1.0 s U S S S 
2.0 s U S S S 
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The operating time sequence in Table 3.3 represents the successful reclosing shots 
due to a temporary fault event, where the fault is self-cleared before the high speed 
reclose attempt (before CBRT1).  Therefore, the following simulation study is 
concerned with the successful reclosing due to a temporary fault event where the 
fault is self-cleared before the time delayed reclose attempt. Table 3.5 shows the 
operating time sequence of the circuit breaker associated with R1 to R33. CBOT2 is 
the instant at which the circuit breaker opens before the 2nd reclosing attempt takes 
place. CBRT2 is the instant at which the circuit breaker closes at the 2nd reclosing 
attempt. Figure 3.28 illustrates the operating time sequence of the circuit breaker 
associated with R1 to R33.  
 
The 2nd reclosing attempt is assumed to be times delayed reclose. The opening time 
To1 for high speed reclose attempt being chosen in this simulation is 2.0 s and 
according to references [1, 66] this value represent the worst case for high speed 
reclose attempt. The Three values for the opening time To2 of 10 s, 30 s and 60 s for 
time delayed reclose attempt have been considered. According to simulation results 
shown in Table 3.4, the 2.0 MW FSIG is unstable at certain fault locations and 
values of To1 while the 2.0 MW DFIG remain stable at all considered fault locations 
and values of To1, therefore only  the DFIG is considered in this simulation study. 
 
Table 3.5 
Operating time sequence of circuit breaker associated with R1 to R33 for AG fault at 
1km, 7.5km and 14km along feeder 1 for different To1 and To2. 
Fault 
duration 
To1 To2 FIT CBOT1 CBRT1 CBOT2 CBRT2 
10 s 2.0 s 10 s 35 s 35.2 s 37.2 s 37.4 s 47.2 s 
10 s 2.0 s 30 s 35 s 35.2 s 37.2 s 37.4 s 67.2 s 
10 s 2.0 s 60 s 35 s 35.2 s 37.2 s 37.4 s 97.2 s 
 
 71 
 
Figure 3.28 Illustration of the operating time sequence of circuit breaker associated 
with R1 to R33.  
 
The simulation results are summarised in Table 3.6, where S indicates generator is 
stable and U indicates generator is unstable. It was found that, the 2.0 MW DFIG 
remained stable at all fault locations and values of To2 in both radial and ring network 
operation mode.  
 
Table 3.6 
The state of transient stability of 2.0 MW DFIG ( S : generator is stable and U : 
generator is unstable): Different value of To2 for AG fault at fault location of 1 km, 
7.5 km and 14km along feeder 1. 
Fault 
Location 
To1 To2 
DFIG 
Radial Ring 
1 km 
2.0 s 10 s S S 
2.0 s 30 s S S 
2.0 s 60 s S S 
7.5km 
2.0 s 10 s S S 
2.0 s 30 s S S 
2.0 s 60 s S S 
14km 
2.0 s 10 s S S 
2.0 s 30 s S S 
2.0 s 60 s S S 
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The following can be concluded from the simulation results obtained in this 
investigation: 
 
a. DFIG is more robust compared to FSIG.  With the action of the control 
scheme installed, the DFIG remains stable under different recloser opening 
time settings for high speed and time delayed attempts.  
 
b. With DGs permitted to operate in SLG fault condition, the type of DG 
technology and network operation mode need to be taken into consideration 
when deciding the recloser opening time. For instance, in the radial network 
with grid connected FSIG, if the faulty section is located far from the 
generator, then a longer recloser opening time setting can be applied.  
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Chapter 4: Development of the proposed Adaptive Rule-based Fault 
Identification and Phase Selection Algorithm for 
Maintaining the Continued Operation of DG 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Due to continued penetration of DGs into existing distribution networks, the tripping 
of DGs during network fault condition may affect the network stability and reliability. 
Operation of DGs should be maintained during network temporary faults as far as 
possible, in order to maximise the benefits of the interconnection of DGs and 
increase the reliability of the power supply service to consumers. Conventional three 
phase auto reclosers in distribution networks have become incompatible with the 
presence of DGs, because they interrupt the operation of the DG during network 
temporary single-line-to-ground (SLG) fault events and cause unnecessary 
disconnection of the DG. Therefore the application of a single-phase auto-reclosing 
(SPAR) scheme as been used in transmission networks should be considered in 
distribution networks with DG. In this context, the phase selection technique needs to 
be reliable to ensure the correct tripping of the faulty phase, to avoid the DG losing 
its transient stability. Other than that, the operating speed of the phase selector is also 
important. The phase selection process is required to be completed immediately in 
the post fault period before the tripping of the associated circuit breaker [49]. High 
speed operation of the phase selector can significantly reduce the tripping time of the 
circuit breaker, which will eventually minimise the possibility of having a DG lose 
its transient stability.  
 
This chapter presents the development of a high speed adaptive rule-based fault 
identification and phase selection algorithm to be used in the implementation of a 
SPAR scheme in power distribution networks with DG. The emphasis in this chapter 
will be placed on presenting the fault identification strategy and phase selection 
procedure. The fault identification strategy makes use of only the three line currents 
measured at the relay point. The waveform pattern of phase angle and symmetrical 
components of the three line currents during the transient period of the fault 
condition is analyzed using condition based-rules with an IF-THEN structure, in 
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order to determine the type of SLG fault. The phase selection procedures are outlined 
as follows: if a fault condition is detected and it is a SLG fault then the fault type will 
be indentified and the output signal of phase selector will indicate type the type of 
fault as SLG. Accordingly the tripping signal that ensures the tripping of only the 
faulty phase of the protected distribution line section is issued. Otherwise, if a fault 
condition is detected and subsequently indentified as a double-line-to-ground (DLG) 
or line to line (LL) and three phase symmetrical fault, then the output signal of the 
phase selector indicates the existence of a fault condition that requires the tripping of 
all three phases and subsequently a three-phase tripping signal is issued. The fault 
identification strategy and phase selection procedure are implemented and verified in 
the PSCAD/EMTDC power system software.  
 
4.2 Power System under Investigation  
The investigation presented in this chapter is based on the modelling and simulation 
of a portion of a MV overhead distribution network with integrated DG under 
different system operating conditions using the computational power systems 
simulation tool, PCAD/EMTDC.  The detailed description of PSCAD/EMTDC can 
be found in section 3.2.1.  
 
4.2.1 Dynamic Model of 2.0MW Wind Turbine Driven DFIG  
The adaptation of an appropriate dynamic DG model is essential to thoroughly asses 
the transient response of DGs during various network fault conditions which then 
facilitate the development of the adaptive fault identification and phase selection 
algorithm proposed in this research study.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, an investigation has been carried out to asses the 
possibility of preserving DGs in service during network temporary faults. Both fixed 
FSIG and DFIG are modelled in detail to thoroughly understand the transient 
response of the two different types of wind-driven generators during network 
temporary faults. It has been concluded from the investigation that DFIG has a better 
transient performance compared to FSIG during a network temporary fault. 
Consequently for the work that will be reported in this chapter, a 2.0MW DFIG 
model will be used to represent DGs that are interconnected to existing distribution 
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networks. In this research work a simulation model of DG based on doubly fed 
induction generator (DFIG) was adopted using PSCAD/EMTDC [81]. The detailed 
description of the DFIG generator can be found in section 3.2.2.2 and the machine 
parameters of the 2.0MW DFIG can be found in Appendix A2. 
 
4.2.2 11kV Rural Distribution Network Model 
The power system under investigation is shown in Figure 4.1.The grid is represented 
by a voltage source with short circuit level of 40MVA. The 2.0MW DFIG is 
connected at the end of feeder 1 through a 2.5MVA, 0.69/11kV step up transformer. 
The length of distribution line sections 1 to 6 is assumed to be 5km and distribution 
line section 7 is 10km. The parameter of the distribution line ZL = °∠ 50.593664.0  
Ω per km. The details of other network parameters can be found in section 3.2.3. 
 
Figure 4.1 Network configuration of investigated 11kV overhead network with DG. 
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4.2.3 Proposed Zone Protection Approach  
In order to preserve the operation of the DG during temporary fault condition and 
reduce the costly investment in additional protection devices to the investigated 
system, it is proposed in this research work to protect the feeder with DG using a 
zone protection approach and the feeder with load using an already existing 
conventional approach e.g.,  non directional overcurrent protection.   
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the DG feeder which is feeder 1 is divided into protection 
zones such that when a fault occurs in a certain protection zone, it is cleared by the 
pair of circuit breakers that are located at the two ends of the line section defining the 
considered protection zone. For instance, an internal fault which occurs within 
section 1 is isolated by tripping both circuit breakers associated with R1and R11. 
Meanwhile, other load feeders, such as feeder 2, are assumed to be protected using 
only conventional overcurrent relays located at the beginning of the feeder, Rf2. Any 
fault occurred at feeder 2 will cause the isolation of the whole feeder. It is assumed 
that SPAR is applied at feeder 1 in the investigated system. The phase selection 
technique proposed in this research work used in the SPAR scheme will be 
elaborated in the following section. Under the proposed protection scheme, DG 
connected at the end of feeder 1 can be maintained in service in the event of an SLG 
temporary fault.  
 
With efficient DG placement and effective new adaption in both network voltage 
control and network protection, there is a possibility that distribution networks in 
future will be operated in ring rather than radial mode in order to increase the 
penetration of DG [24, 33-35]. The proposed protection scheme can effectively be 
applied in conventional networks that switch from radial to ring operation mode.  
Once the fault is successfully detected at the DG feeder, the ring connector Rring is 
opened and then the zone protection approach is applied to isolate the faulty section 
from the network. 
 
4.3 Fault Identification Strategy 
A detailed analysis of the fault current can provide essential information about the  
nature of the fault. In the proposed method, the following parameters have been used 
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to identify types of fault (i) the phase angle differences between line currents and (ii) 
the ratio of sequence components.  
 
4.3.1 Phase Angle Difference between Line Current  
The analysis of variation in phase angle difference between line currents Ia, Ib and Ic 
during fault conditions has been found useful in detecting faulty phase. A phase 
selection technique based on the phase angle criterion of the line currents has been 
proposed recently in [53] to identify SLG fault. The phase angle differences between 
line currents are defined in equation (4.1) to (4.3) 
 
ba IIAB ϕϕϕ −=         (4.1)   
                                                 
cb IIBC ϕϕϕ −=        (4.2)  
 
ac IICA ϕϕϕ −=                                                                                  (4.3) 
 
Where ABϕ = phase difference between Ia and Ib 
            BCϕ = phase difference between Ib and Ic  
             CAϕ = phase difference between Ic and Ia 
 
4.3.2 Ratio of Sequence Components  
Analysis on the sequence components of line currents Ia, Ib and Ic has been found 
useful for the detection of unbalanced condition in power systems, for instance 
unsymmetrical fault events [82-84]. Fault classification in relaying, based on the 
analysis of sequence components, has been proposed in recently published work [53, 
56, 89]. Equations (4.4) to (4.6) show the relationship between sequence components 
and line currents. The derivation of Equations (4.4) to (4.6) can be found in [82]. 
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1 cba IaaIII ++=                (4.4) 
 
)(
3
1 2
2 cba aIIaII ++=              (4.5) 
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1
0 cba IIII ++=              (4.6) 
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Where  
(i) 0,21, III  are positive, negative and zero sequence current components with 
phase a as reference. 
(ii)  a is an operator which gives a phase shift of 120º so °∠= 1201a  and 
°∠= 24012a . 
 
Ratios of the magnitude of sequence current components are defined in equations 
(4.7) and (4.8).  
 
1
0
01 I
IR =          (4.7) 
 
1
2
21 I
IR =                                           (4.8)                 
 
 
For unsymmetrical line fault, the positive, negative and zero sequence network 
currents I1, I2 and I0, have a particular relationship depending on the type of fault. 
Equation (4.8) to (4.10) show the relationship between sequence components in SLG 
fault, DLG and LL  respectively. The derivation of Equations (4.8) to (4.10) can be 
found in [82]. 
 
021 III ==           (4.8) 
0021 =++ III                       (4.9) 
 ,21 II −= 00 =I                                                                                             (4.10) 
The presence of positive, negative and zero sequence components in a particular fault 
event indicate that it is either a SLG or a DLG fault. The simulation work conducted 
in [88] shows that the ratio of sequence component I0/I1 and I2/I1 is higher for a SLG 
fault compared to a DLG fault in a transmission  network.  
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4.3.3 Preprocessing of Line Current Measurements 
In general, the three phase line current measurements generated during fault 
condition are non-sinusoidal. They contain harmonic components and an 
exponentially decaying DC component, in addition to the current signal at the 
fundamental frequency [90]. Thus, the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) algorithm can 
be used to remove higher harmonic components and to attenuate the DC component 
in the generated line currents. The application of the FFT algorithm in digital 
protection for a power system has been reported in [91].  
 
In this research project, the FFT algorithm has been used to extract the three phase 
line currents signals at the fundamental frequency and the sampling rate chosen for 
the FFT is 64 sample/cycle. The symmetrical components of the three phase line 
currents at the fundamental frequency are then obtained based on the simple 
transformation equations shown in (4.4) to (4.6). The component called the on-line 
frequency scanner (FFT) in the PSCAD/EMTDC library [79] is used to preprocess 
the current signals before conducting a detailed analysis on the line currents and 
symmetrical components to demonstrate how the proposed fault identification 
algorithm can be used to identify SLG faults.  
 
4.3.4 Simulation Test and Result  
Intensive simulation tests were carried out to demonstrate how equations (4.1) to (4.3) 
and (4.7) to (4.8) are used to identify the type of SLG fault. Firstly, a simulation test 
was conducted to analyse the variation of φAB, φBC, φCA and the ratios R01 and R21 
for different types of SLG faults. Then, a sequence of simulation tests were 
conducted to (a) distinguish between fault and normal network conditions, (b) 
distinguish between SLG and DLG faults and (c) identify SLG from LL and 
symmetrical three phase faults. Finally, development of the relevant condition rule-
based table was undertaken based on the simulation results.  
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4.3.4.1 Determine Variation of φAB, φBC, φCA, Ratios R01 and  R21 during SLG 
Faults  
A phase-a-to-ground (a-g) fault is assumed at 1km from the grid in the investigated 
power system (see Figure 4.1) which is initiated at t = 34.998s  for a period of one 
cycle. Since the fault occurred within section 1 that is protected by relays R1 and R11, 
the current measurements of relay R1 and R11 are collected. The test was repeated 
with phase-b-to-ground (b-g) and phase-c-to-ground (c-g).  
 
Figure 4.2(a) to (c) show variation of φAB, φBC and φCA, for a-g, b-g and c-g faults 
respectively based on the derivation of line current measured at relay R11. Note that 
φAB, φBC and φCA are represented by the blue, green and red colours respectively in 
Figure 4.2(a) to (c).  
 
The variation of φAB, φBC and φCA in these figures during transient period 
following assumed fault conditions are then analyzed to find the relationship between 
the type of SLG fault and phase angle differences between line currents. The value of 
φAB, φBC and φCA, prior to fault occurrence are approximately 120 ۫, -240 ۫ and 120۫ 
respectively. However, depending on the type of SLG fault these values deviate from 
their pre-fault values, i.e., either increase or decrease immediately after fault 
inception. The maximum and minimum value of φAB, φBC and φCA in these figure 
are significantly different when compared to each other, e.g., it is shown in Figure 
4.2(a) that the maximum value of φCA is approximately 300 ۫  while in both of Figure 
4.2(b) and (c) the maximum value of φCA are approximately 130 ۫ and 120۫ 
respectively. Additionally these figures reveal that, depending on the type of SLG 
fault, each of the φAB, φBC and φCA waveforms may  cross the 0 ۫-axis at  a particular 
time instant, e.g., it can be seen from Figure 4.2(a) under a-g fault condition that,  
φAB, φBC and φCA have all crossed  the 0 ۫-axis. However, it is shown in Figure 4.2(c) 
that, only φCA has crossed the 0۫-axis. 
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(a) a-g fault  
 
(b) b-g fault  
 
(c) c-g fault  
Figure 4.2 Variation of φAB(blue waveform), φBC (green waveform)and φCA (red 
waveform) in SLG faults (based on line current measurement of relay 
R11). 
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The analysis of the three parameters φAB, φBC and φCA can be done more precisely 
with better accuracy from the data table. Table 4.1 shows the data points of φAB, 
φBC and φCA versus time corresponding to a-g fault in Figure 4.2(a) from t = 34.996 
s to t = 35.016 s. The minimum data point of parameters φAB, φBC and φCA can be 
used as one of the criterion to identify the type of SLG fault.  As shown in Table 4.1, 
in this fault case, the exact minimum point of φBC, minφBC =-321.4750۫ occurred at t 
= 35.0095 s. Note that the data points of φAB, φBC and φCA at t = 35.0095 s  are 
highlighted in Bold in Table 4.1. The data points of φAB and φCA, datapointφAB and 
datapointφCA corresponding to minφBC are 73.2498۫ and 248.2252۫۫۫ respectively, and 
datapointφCA > datapointφAB > minφBC.. Therefore the following statement has been 
concluded from analysis of the data point in Table 4.1 : φBC= -321.4750 ۫  and φCA > 
φAB > φBC  at t = 35.0095 s .Note that, the values of φAB, φBC and φCA shown in 
Table 4.1 have been derived from values of φIa , φIb  and φIc that shown in Table 1 in 
Appendix B. φAB, φBC and φCA has been derived from φIa , φIb  and φIc  using 
equations (4.1) to (4.3).  φIa , φIb  and φIc are the phase angles of the line current a, b 
and c obtained from relay R11 in the investigated system shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 
The value of φAB, φBC and φCA prior and following a-g fault corresponding to 
figure 4.2(a) from t = 34.996 s to t = 35.016 s. 
Time (s) Phase angle difference between line currents 
φAB ( ۫ ) φBC ( ۫ ) φCA ( ۫ ) 
34.9960 122.0805 -242.3458 120.2653 
34.9965 122.1788 -242.2745 120.0958 
34.9970 122.2769 -242.2341 119.9572 
34.9975 122.3637 -242.2124 119.8487 
34.9980 122.4536 -242.1904 119.7368 
34.9985 122.4150 -242.1452 119.7302 
34.9990 122.3183 -242.0902 119.7719 
34.9995 122.3945 -242.0879 119.6934 
35.0000 122.6797 -242.1549 119.4752 
35.0005 123.2159 -242.3086 119.0927 
35.0010 123.3624 -242.1529 118.7904 
35.0015 123.1483 -241.6541 118.5058 
35.0020 122.5603 -240.8628 118.3026 
35.0025 121.6108 -239.8946 118.2838 
35.0030 120.0445 -238.7762 118.7317 
35.0035 118.5880 -238.2587 119.6707 
35.0040 116.7709 -238.0437 121.2727 
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35.0045 114.6435 -238.2917 123.6482 
35.0050 112.3451 -239.4160 127.0709 
35.0055 108.9679 -242.9527 133.9848 
35.0060 106.1902 -247.7355 141.5453 
35.0065 103.2221 -255.0889 151.8668 
35.0070 100.0721 -265.7603 165.6882 
35.0075 96.6973 -279.8658 183.1684 
35.0080 91.6398 -300.2819 208.6421 
35.0085 87.1135 -312.4270 225.3134 
35.0090 81.3837 -319.7414 238.3576 
35.0095 73.2498 -321.4750 248.2252 
35.0100 59.7563 -315.5290 255.7728 
35.0105 21.2514 -284.6766 263.4252 
35.0110 -18.8066 -249.1866 267.9932 
35.0115 -43.7256 -228.2165 271.9421 
35.0120 -56.2936 -219.1930 275.4866 
35.0125 -63.1738 -215.5935 278.7673 
35.0130 -68.1173 -214.8372 282.9545 
35.0135 -70.0299 -216.0273 286.0572 
35.0140 -70.9036 -218.2743 289.1779 
35.0145 -70.9575 -221.4180 292.3755 
35.0150 -70.3570 -225.3403 295.6973 
35.0155 -68.7866 -231.5130 300.2996 
35.0160 -67.2444 -236.5470 303.7914 
 
Figure 4.3(a) to (c) show the variation of ratios R01 (blue waveform) and R21(green 
waveform) for a-g, b-g and c-g faults based on line currents measured at relay R11. 
Note that ratios R01 and R21 are illustrated as blue and green curves in Figure 4.3(a) 
to (c). The values of both ratio R01 and R21 prior to fault are 0۫. After fault inception, 
the values of both ratios R01 and R21 increase significantly regardless of the type of 
SLG fault. The existence of ratios R01 and R21 in a-g, b-g and c-g faults indicates 
that the considered faults are unsymmetrical and involve the ground.   
 
(a) a-g fault  
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(b) b-g fault 
 
(c) c-g fault  
Figure 4.3 Variation of ratios R01(blue waveform) and R21(green waveform)in SLG 
faults ( based on line current measurement of relay R11 ). 
 
4.3.4.2 Determination Variation of φAB, φBC , φCA  and Ratios R01 and R21 
during DLG Faults  
In this section, the variation of φAB, φBC and φCA and ratios R01 and R21 for DLG 
are assessed in order to distinguish between (i) fault and normal conditions and (ii) 
SLG and DLG faults. This is important because other type of faults such as LL faults 
and three phase symmetrical faults can be easily determined using R01 defined by 
equation (4.7).  Phases a and b to ground (a-b-g) fault is assumed at 1km from the 
grid and the fault is initiated at t = 34.998s for a duration of 1 cycle. The test was 
repeated with phases b and c to ground (b-c-g) and phases c and a to ground (c-a-g) 
faults. Figures 4.4 (a) to (c) show the variation of φAB, φBC and φCA for a-b-g, b-c-g 
and c-a-g faults based on the three phase currents measured at relay R11. It was found 
from these figures that, after fault inception, the value of φAB, φBC and φCA deviate 
from their values prior to the fault. The variation of φAB, φBC and φCA for a-b-g, b-
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c-g and c-a-g faults are significantly different when compared to the a-g , b-g and c-g 
faults shown in Figure 4.2. Thus, by analysing the difference between the variation 
of φAB, φBC and φCA during the transient period for SLG and DLG fault cases, SLG 
faults can be distinguished from DLG faults.  
 
(a) a-b-g fault  
 
(b) b-c-g fault  
 
(c) c-a-g fault  
Figure 4.4 Variation of φAB (blue waveform), φBC (green waveform) and φCA (red 
waveform) in DLG faults (based on line current measurement of relay 
R11). 
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Figures 4.5(a) to (c) show the variation of ratios R01 (blue waveform) and R21 (green 
waveform) for a-b-g, b-c-g and c-a-g fault. The existence of ratios R01 and R21 in the 
case of a-b-g, b-c-g and c-a-g faults indicate that the considered faults are 
unsymmetrical and involve ground.  It will be concluded in Figures 4.5 and 4.3 the 
following: The values of ratio R01 and R21 for both SLG and DLG do not remain 
constant during the transient period of fault condition. Furthermore, the waveform 
pattern of ratio R01 and R21 in both SLG and DLG are very similar to each other 
during the transient period in fault condition. Therefore it is not considered as an 
effective parameters to distinguish between SLG and DLG during the transient 
period of the fault condition. However, according to research work reported in [88], 
if current measurement is collected during steady state of fault condition, i.e., a 
couple of cycles after fault inception, then the magnitude of ratio R01 and R21 is 
generally higher in SLG than DLG, so it can be used to distinguish between SLG and 
DLG cases. 
 
(a) a-b-g fault 
 
(b) b-c-g fault  
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(c) c-a-g fault  
Figure 4.5 Variation of R01(blue waveform) and R21(green waveform)in DLG faults 
(based on line current measurement of relay R11 ). 
 
4.3.4.3 Determination Variation of φAB, φBC, φCA, Ratios R01 and R21 during 
LL and Symmetrical Three Phase Faults  
In this section, the variation of φAB, φBC, φCA and ratios R01 and R21 for LL and 
symmetrical three phase faults are assessed in order to (i) distinguish between fault 
and normal network conditions and (ii) indentify SLG from LL and symmetrical 
three phase faults. A simulation test is conducted whereby a phase a and b and c (a-b-
c) fault is assumed at 1km from the grid. The fault is initiated at t = 34.998s with a 
duration of 1 cycle. The test was repeated with three types of LL fault, which are 
phase a to b (a-b), phase b to c (b-c) and phase c to a (c-a).    
 
Figures 4.6 (a) to (d) show the variation of φAB (blue curve), φBC (green curve)and 
φCA (red curve) for a-b, b-c, c-a and a-b-c faults based on the three phase currents 
measured at relay R11. These figures reveal that the values of φAB, φBC and φCA 
prior to fault are approximately 120 ۫, -240۫ and 120۫ respectively. Depending on the 
type of fault, these values deviate from their pre-fault values, i.e., either increase or 
decrease immediately after fault inception.  
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(a) a-b fault  
 
(b) b-c fault  
 
(c) c-a fault  
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(d) a-b-c  fault  
Figure 4.6 Variation of φAB (blue waveform), φBC (green waveform)and φCA (red 
waveform) in LL and three phase systematical faults (based on line 
currents measurement of relay R11). 
 
Figures 4.7(a) to (d) show the variation of ratios R01 (blue waveform)and R21(green 
waveform) for a-b, b-c, c-a and a-b-c faults based on the three phase currents 
measured at relay R11. It can be seen from these figures that the magnitude of the 
ratio R01 remains approximately equal to zero prior to and after the occurrence of a 
fault in all type of fault condition. The value of the ratio R21 in a three phase 
symmetrical fault is less than 1 and it can be negligible compared to LL faults which 
continue to increase after fault inception.    
 
(a) a-b fault  
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(b) b-c fault 
 
(c)c-a fault  
 
(d) a-b-c fault  
Figures 4.7 Variation of ratios R01(blue waveform)and R21 (green waveform)in LL 
and three phase symmetrical faults (based on line current measurement 
of relay R11 ). 
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The following can be concluded from the analysis of the five considered parameters 
φAB, φBC, φCA and the ratios R01 and R21 presented in Figures 4.2 to 4.7:  
 
a. After fault inception, the values of φAB, φBC and φCA deviate from their pre-
fault values of approximately 120 ۫ , -240 ۫ and 120۫ respectively by a magnitude 
which depend on the type of fault. Therefore, parameters φAB, φBC and φCA 
can be used to differentiate between normal and fault conditions for all types 
of faults. 
 
b. By anlaysing the variations of φAB, φBC and φCA after fault inception 
distinctive characteristic can be indentified for each fault type. The maximum 
and minimum values of φAB, φBC and φCA in each fault case together with 
the existence of zero-crossing point (0۫-axis crossing) of φAB, φBC and φCA 
can be used as a useful criterion to indentify the type of fault. Finally, 
parameters φAB, φBC and φCA can be used to differentiate SLG and DLG 
fault.  
 
c. The existence of ratios R01 or R21 after the occurrence of fault conditions can 
be used as a useful criterion to indentify faults that involve of the ground. 
Ratio R01 can be used, in conjunction with  φAB, φBC and φCA, to indentify 
LL and  three phase symmetrical faults.  
 
4.3.5 Construction of Condition-Based Rules for SLG Fault Identification 
Table 4.2 shows the condition-based rules that have been constructed to indentify the 
type of SLG. The “IF-THEN” condition-based rules are constructed based on the 
analysis of the five waveforms of the five parameters, φCA, φAB, φBC and the ratios 
R01 and R21 obtained from each of the fault cases shown in Figures 4.2 to 4.7 and the 
data points of these five parameters in each of these fault cases.  
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Table 4.2 
 Conditional rules based on analysis of waveforms in Figures 4.2 to 4.7. 
Fault 
type Rule 
a-g 
If (φCA > φAB > φBC)  and ( φBC < -300۫ ) and (R01 and R21 > 1)  
then (output = a-g) 
 
b-g 
If ( φCA > φBC > φAB ) and (φBC < 0۫ ) and (R01 and R21 > 1) 
then (output = b-g) 
c-g 
If (φAB > φCA > φBC ) and ( φCA < 0۫ ) and  (R01 and R21 > 1) 
then (output = c-g) 
fault 
exist  
If (φAB < 115۫۫  or  φAB > 125 ۫ ) and (φBC <-245 ۫۫  or  φBC > -235۫ ) and 
( φCA <115۫۫  or   φCA >125 ۫ )  
then ( output = fault exist) 
no fault  
If ( 115 ۫۫ ≤ φAB ≤ 125 ۫ ) and (-245 ۫۫ ≤ φBC ≤ -235 ۫ ) and  
(115۫۫ ≤ φCA ≤ 125 ۫ )  
then (output = no fault) 
 
As shown in Table 4.2, both of the input statements in the ‘IF-THEN’ condition-
based rules i.e, (φCA > φAB > φBC) and (φBC < -300 ۫ ) used to indentify a-g fault, 
are constructed based on the analysis of the criterion of the minimum value of φBC. 
It can be seen in Figure 4.2, that the minimum value of φBC is definitely less than -
300۫ and the exact minimum value found in the datapoints for φBC in a-g fault case is 
-327.7450 ۫ (see table 4.1).  The value of -300 ۫ has been used in “IF-THEN” rule in 
Table 4.2 instead of -327.4750۫ . This is because the fault detection time of a-g can be 
improved slightly using the value of -300 ۫ instead of -327.4750۫ . As shown in Table 
4.1, the first data point of φBC after -300۫  is -300.2819 ۫ which is recorded at                 
t = 35.008 s and the minimum data point of φBC, -327.4750 ۫ recorded at t = 35.0095 s. 
Therefore at t = 35.008 s, both of the input statements: ( φCA > φBC > φAB ) and 
( φBC < -300 ۫ )in ‘IF-THEN’ rules should be fulfilled to classify the fault  as a-g and 
consequently the output statement (output = a-g) is executed.  
 
It is also shown in Table 4.2 that one of the two input statements in the ‘IF-THEN’ 
condition-based rules i.e., (φBC < 0۫ ) used to indentify a b-g fault, is based on the 
analysis of criterion of 0۫-axis crossing point that was found on the φBC waveform in 
the case of a b-g fault. It can be seen in Figure 4.2(b) that φBC cross 0۫-axis at 
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approximately t = 35.01 s and according to the data points for fault case b-g  shown 
in Table 4.3 below whereby the first data point that corresponds to the 0۫-axis 
crossing by φBC for b-g fault case is -8.6495۫ which occurred at t = 35.0105 s. Note 
that the data points for φAB, φBC and φCA  at t = 35.0105 s are highlighted in bold in 
Table 4.3. Therefore, at t = 35.0105 s, the two input statements i.e., ( φCA > φBC > 
φAB ) and (φBC < 0۫ ) in ‘IF-THEN’ condition-based rule should be fulfilled to 
classify the fault as a b-g fault which leads to the execution of the output statement 
(output = b-g). The criterion of 0۫-axis crossing point has also been used to identify a 
c-g fault as shown in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.3 
Data point of φAB, φBC and φCA corresponding to b-g fault in Figure 4.2(b) from t = 
35.004 s to t = 35.016 s. 
Time (s) Phase angle difference between line current 
φAB ( ۫ ) φBC( ۫ ) φCA( ۫ ) 
35.0040 146.3764 -255.7650 109.3886 
35.0045 -204.2915 101.6654 102.6261 
35.0050 -193.2623 98.7673 94.4950 
35.0055 -177.3043 94.2073 83.0969 
35.0060 -165.9593 90.0032 75.9560 
35.0065 -155.9866 84.9242 71.0624 
35.0070 -147.2754 78.8524 68.4230 
35.0075 -140.0352 71.2558 68.7794 
35.0080 -132.4550 57.7155 74.7395 
35.0085 -128.0355 44.5139 83.5216 
35.0090 -124.4746 29.4175 95.0571 
35.0095 -121.5938 14.5811 107.0127 
35.0100 -119.2232 2.2792 116.9440 
35.0105 -116.5118 -8.6495 125.1612 
35.0110 -114.4143 -12.9366 127.3509 
35.0115 -111.7766 -15.0543 126.8309 
35.0120 -108.1065 -15.8089 123.9155 
35.0125 -103.0018 -15.7716 118.7734 
35.0130 -94.1079 -15.3808 109.4887 
35.0135 -86.8996 -15.3749 102.2745 
35.0140 -79.9836 -15.8511 95.8347 
35.0145 -73.8260 -16.8902 90.7162 
35.0150 -68.7098 -18.5019 87.2117 
35.0155 -63.5231 -21.4986 85.0217 
35.0160 -60.7179 -24.3044 85.0223 
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Since the rules in Table 4.2 are mainly constructed to indentify SLG type faults,  
other type of faults such as LL, DLG and three phase symmetrical faults are all 
classified as ‘fault exist’. They have been indentified using the common 
characteristics of  φCA, φBC and φAB during normal and fault condition for all fault 
types considered in this investigation,. It can be seen from Figure 4.2 to 4.7 that, 
during normal network condition, φCA, φBC and φAB are approximately 120 ۫ , -240۫ 
and 120۫  and after fault inception, these values will either increase or decrease 
depending on the type of fault. After careful analysis of the data points related to 
each type of fault under consideration, it has been noticed that, the variation of 
values of φCA, φBC and φAB during normal condition is between ±  5۫ of the average 
values of 120 ۫, -240 ۫ and 120۫ respectively. In order to discriminate the normal network 
operating condition from network fault condition accurately, the upper and lower 
tolerance limits of ±  5۫ added to each of these values, as shown in  the three 
statements in ‘IF-THEN’ rules to identify other faults type i.e., (φAB < 115 ۫۫  or  
φAB > 125 ۫ ) and (φBC <-245 ۫۫  or  φBC > -235۫ ) and ( φCA <115۫۫  or  φCA >125۫ ).  
 
4.4 Phase Selection Procedure of Adaptive Rule-based Phase Selector   
The condition-based rules shown in Table 4.2 are transformed into Fortran source 
code [92-94] and then integrated into a new component model built in 
PSCAD/EMTDC to test the validity of the rules.  
 
Figure 4.8 shows schematic diagram of the adaptive phase selector module built with 
the PSCAD library blocks and Fortran source code based on the condition-based 
rules in Table 4.2. The adaptive phase selector module has three input current signals 
Ia, Ib and Ic , which constitute the line currents measured at the protective device in 
the power system under consideration. After preprocessing these three input current 
signals, five parameters φAB, φBC and φCA and the ratios R01 and R21 are derived. 
The task of preprocessing the input current signals is carried out using the on-line 
frequency scanner (FFT) in the PSCAD library. The five parameters are then fed into 
the block with Fortran source code based on the condition-based rules shown in 
Table 4.2. The output signals from the module are assigned the values ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, 
‘4’and ‘5’ which corresponding to a-g, b-g, c-g, fault exist  and no fault  conditions.  
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The phase selection procedure can be outlined as follow: the proposed phase selector 
firstly indentifies ‘fault exist’ and ‘no fault’ conditions by issuing ‘4’ or ‘5’. This can 
be achieved by assessing the φAB, φBC and φCA and the ratios R01 and R21 that are 
derived from the input current signals, Ia, Ib and Ic . Later on, if input current signal 
into the phase selector is obtained from the SLG fault case, the output signal will turn 
from ‘4’ or ‘5’ to ‘1’, ‘2’or ‘3’ depending on the type of SLG fault. Otherwise, if the 
input current signals are due to other fault condition such as DLG, LL and three 
phase symmetrical fault, then the output signal  will remain at ‘4’.  
 
 
Figure 4.8  Schematic diagram of adaptive rule based phase selector. 
 
Figures 4.9 (a) to (d) illustrate the output tripping signals of the adaptive phase 
selector module corresponding to a-g, b-g, c-g and b-c-g fault cases. It was found in 
these figures that the output signal after fault inception at t = 34.998 s drops from ‘5’ 
corresponding to ‘no fault’ condition to ‘4’ which corresponds to ‘fault exist’. The 
output signal then dropped  from ‘4’ to ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ respectively in Figures 4.9(a) 
to (c) corresponding to a-g, b-g and c-g fault types. Figure 4.9(d) shows that output 
signal corresponding to b-c-g fault case, because it is not one of the SLG fault, the 
output signal remains at ‘4’ to indicate fault exist.  
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Other than that, it can be seen from Figure 4.9(a) to (d) that the time for successful 
fault detection varies with the type of SLG fault. The speed of fault detection is 
subjected to the criteria being used to construct the condition-based rules in Table 4.2. 
The decision whether to trip only the faulty phase or all three phases can then be 
decided using the output signal of the phase selector at a certain time instant after 
detecting the ‘fault exist’ condition. In this investigation, it was found from the 
simulation results shown in Figure 4.9s (a) to (d) that the type of SLG fault can be 
successfully detected within a period of one cycle after fault inception, therefore the 
output signal of the phase selector to either trip a single phase or three phases is 
decided one cycle after detecting the condition ‘fault exist’. In this context, an 
additional timer is required to count the time of one cycle starting from the time 
instant where the ‘fault exist’ condition is detected.   
 
 
(a) output signal of ‘1’ indicate a-g fault 
 
 
(b) output signal of ‘2’ indicate b-g fault 
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(c) output signal of ‘3’ indicate c-g fault 
 
(d) output signal of ‘4’ indicate other fault  
Figure 4.9 Output signal of adaptive phase selector after the following fault condition 
being detected: (a) a-g fault, (b) b-g fault, (c) c-g fault and (d) b-c-g fault. 
 
4.5 Fault Data Generation using PSCAD/EMTDC   
The condition-based rules shown in Table 4.2 are valid for a SLG fault with a fault 
resistance Rf = 0Ω that occurs within line section 1 from the 33kV grid (see Figure 
4.1). Depending upon the network configuration, fault resistance, fault section, fault 
inception angle (FIA), the variation of the considered five parameters particularly 
φAB, φBC and φCA, during the transient period might have a significant difference in 
certain fault cases. Consequently, this will affect the performance of the adaptive rule 
based phase selector discussed in section 4.4. Figure 4.10 shows variations of φAB, 
φBC and φCA due to a b-g fault assumed at 2.5km from 33kV grid with a different 
fault resistance. The variation of φAB, φBC and φCA shown in Figure 4.10(a) and (b) 
have a distinctive difference when compared to each other. Figure 4.10(a) is due to a 
b-g fault with Rf = 0Ω and fault location = 2.5 km from 33kV grid (see Figure 4.1). 
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φBC crossed 0 ۫-axis at approximately t = 34.012 s and the phase selector discussed in 
section 4.4 can successfully indentify the fault type as ‘b-g’. In contrast, Figure 
4.10(b) shows variations of φAB, φBC and φCA due to a b-g fault with Rf = 5Ω and 
fault location = 2.5 km from the 33kV grid. Although in this case, the fault is also 
assumed within line section 1, the figure clearly shows that φBC does not cross the 0۫-
axis. Thus, the fault type of this fault case has been classified by phase selector as 
‘fault exist’, due to the fact that the criterion of 0 ۫-axis crossing point of φBC used to 
construct the statement in the ‘IF-THEN’ condition-based rules to identify a b-g fault 
(see section 4.3.5) does not exist in this particular fault case. In this context, the 
classification of ‘fault exist’ by the phase selector is incorrect. 
 
 
(a) b-g fault at 2.5km from 33kV grid, Rf = 0Ω 
 
(a) b-g fault at 2.5km from 33kV grid, Rf = 5Ω 
Figure 4.10 Variation of waveform φAB (blue waveform), φBC(green waveform)  
and φCA(green waveform) due to b-g fault assumed at 2.5km from 
33kV grid with different fault resistance. 
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Sufficient fault data is necessary to simulate a practical distribution network with 
system operating conditions that are varied all the time. Intensive simulation tests 
were carried out in PSCAD/EMTDC to generate fault data under different system 
operating conditions. This  included different network operating mode (radial and 
ring), faults at different sections ( various locations within sections 1, 2 or 3) , 
different fault resistances, Rf ( 0 and 5Ω) , different fault inception angles, FIA ( 0۫ 
and 90۫ ) and network loading level ( full load or half load). The scenarios used for 
generating data are summarized in Table 4.4. A total of 2592 SLG fault cases have 
been simulated. Note that: 
a. FIA has been defined from the positive going zero crossing instant of phase-a 
current. 0۫  and 90۫ fault inception angles are corresponding to t = 34.998 s and 
t = 35.003 s in the generated fault cases.  
b. The term ‘full load’ indicates the originally loading shown at each feeder in 
the investigated network (see Figure 4.1 in section 4.2.2). The term ‘half 
load’ indicates that the loading of all these feeders have been reduced to 50% 
of the ‘full load’ uniformly.  
 
Table 4.4 
Scenarios used for generating 2592 of SLG fault cases in PSCAD/EMTDC. 
Relay under consideration  R1 to R33 along feeder 1 
fault type 
a. phase a to ground fault 
b. phase b to ground fault  
c. phase c to ground fault   
fault location 
a. line section 1: 1km, 2.5km and 4km 
b. line section 2: 6km , 7.5km and 9km 
c. line section 3: 11km 12.5km  and 14km 
fault resistance, Rf 
a. 0Ω  
b. 5Ω 
fault inception angle, FIA a. 0۫  b. 90۫ 
network loading level a. full load (FL)   b. half load (HL) 
network configuration a. radial b. ring 
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In addition to the requirement of generating sufficient simulation fault data, a more 
effective method is needed to process and analysis the large volume of fault data, so 
that the unique characteristic of each investigated SLG fault case can be found and 
eventually the fault type of each fault case can be indentified correctly. In this 
context, several software programmes have been developed mainly using C ++, to 
handle the data processing, analysing and testing, in order to effectively manage the 
large volume of collected fault data and extract the useful information required for 
the construction of the proposed rule-based fault identification and phase selection 
algorithm. The detailed digital data processing followed by the fault identification 
and phase selection algorithm construction and verification will be elaborated on 
Chapter 5. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The simulation results obtained from this investigation indicate that the proposed 
condition rule-based fault identification and phase selection algorithm can 
successfully indentify the type of SLG fault during fault condition. It has been found 
that the fault type can be indentified within a cycle after the fault inception. The 
detection time depends on the criterion being used to construct the rule-based fault 
identification algorithm. The high speed capability of fault detection which is 
characteristic of the proposed algorithm would facilitate high speed operation of the 
phase selector. This would satisfy the main requirement of maintaining transient 
stability of a grid connected DG.  
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Chapter 5: Digital Data Processing and Testing of the Proposed 
Adaptive Rule-based Fault Identification and Phase 
Selection Algorithm 
 
  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the digital data processing and testing adopted in the 
development of the proposed rule based fault identification and phase selection 
algorithm, whose aim is to maintain the continued operation of DG during SLG 
faults. Several software modules have been developed mainly using the C ++ 
language [95-98] to efficiently handle the massive fault data processing, followed by 
the fault identification and phase selection algorithm construction and verification. 
For the convenience of the reader while reading chapter 5, the power system under 
investigation that was shown in Figure 4.1, Chapter 4, has been reproduced in Figure 
5.1. In this figure, the length of distribution line sections 1 to 6 is assumed to be 5km 
and the distribution line section 7 is 10km. 
 
Figure 5.1 Network configuration of investigated 11kV overhead network with 
DG.( reproduced from Figure 4.1 in section 4.2.2 at Chapter 4) 
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5.2 Digital Fault Data Processing  
As reported in section 4.5 in Chapter 4, a total of 2592 cases of SGL have been 
simulated using PSCAD/EMTDC to collect sufficient fault data to represent a 
practical system. These fault cases needed to be analysed accurately so that useful 
information could be extracted from each of the fault cases for the construction of the 
fault identification algorithm later on. The data processing of 2592 fault cases poses 
a certain degree of difficulty if it is handled manually and furthermore the end result 
can not be guaranteed to be accurate. Therefore, computer intervention in the data 
processing of 2592 cases is necessary. Several software programmes have been 
developed using C++ to handle automatically the main tasks of fault data processing. 
The tasks include: storage and retrieval fault cases, analysis of fault cases to find the 
key information which characterize the fault case under consideration and finally 
construction and verification of the fault identification and phase selection algorithm 
using fault cases.  
 
5.3 Fault Data Storing and Retrieving  
Each of the fault cases generated from PSCAD/EMTDC is given  unique name e.g., 
R11-Ra-FL0R0D-AG-12.5km, where ‘R11’ refers to current measurement obtained 
from relay R11 ( see the Figure 5.1), ‘Ra’ refers  to radial network operating mode 
(while ‘Ri’ refers to ring network operating mode), ‘FL’ refers to full load of the 
network loading level (while ‘HL’ refers to half load), ‘0R’ refers to Rf = 0Ω (while 
‘5R’ refers to Rf =5Ω) , ‘0D’ refers to FIA ( fault inception angle) = 0۫ ( while ‘90D’ 
refers to FIA = 90 ۫ )  and ‘AG’ refers to a-g fault ( while ‘BG’ refer to b-g fault and 
‘CG’ refer to c-g fault), ’12.5KM’ refers to the fault location at 12.5km along feeder 
1 from 2MW DFIG that is located at the end of feeder 1 ( see the Figure 5.1 ). Fault 
location 12.5km is in section 1.  
 
Each fault case consists of data points from the five parameters, φAB, φBC, φCA, R01 
and R21 that are used in the proposed fault identification strategy described in section 
4.3 in Chapter 4. The data window for each of these parameters consists of 55 data 
points corresponding to 55 samples which define the window of collected data. The 
2592 fault cases are all saved in a Folder called “Case Database A”. Then, each of 
the fault case in this folder was analysed in the fault data analysis process that will be 
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explained in section 5.4 subsequently. The results of the fault data analysis process 
are then saved in a File called “Case Database B”. After that, the fault data in this file 
is subjected to an optimisation process which will be explained in section 5.5 later on. 
The optimisation process is intended to extract key fault features which can uniquely 
characterize each of the fault cases after being retrieved from the Case Database B 
file. The results of fault data optimisation process are then saved in a file called 
“Case Database C”. The data is saved in Case Databases A, B and C in a text file 
format type called tab delimited file (.txt) format. The latter is used to ensure easy 
access of the data fro the analysing processes in the subsequent algorithm 
development, testing and verification. The process of storage and retrieval fault data 
from Case Data A, B and C can be summarised in flow chart shown in Figure 5.2 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Flow chart illustrate the process of storage and retrieval fault data from 
Case Data A, B and C.  
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Figure 5.3 (a) to (c) below shows the procedure for transferring the fault data of a 
fault case generated in the PSCAD environment into a  text file form, which is saved 
in Case Database A. The fault data saved in Case Database B and C will be discussed 
in sections 5.4 and 5.5 respectively.  
 
As shown in Figure 5.3 (a), firstly the fault data is exported from PSCAD into Excel 
by copying the data points collected within the required investigated time interval to 
the clipboard and then pasting them into Excel. As shown in Figure 5.3(b), the fault 
data is then displayed in comma separated value (.csv) format in the Excel 
environment so that graphs corresponding to each of the fault cases can be created 
and included in the thesis. Figure 5.3(c) shows that the data points are finally pasted 
directly into Notepad, saved as tab delimited file (.txt) format and saved in Case 
Database A. data points of each of the fault case for the 2592 fault cases under 
consideration in “.txt” format can be found in Appendix C. 
 
 
(a) data points within measured data window are copied into clipboard and then 
exported from PSCAD to Excel. 
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(b) display of data points in a fault case in (.cvs) format together with corresponding 
graphs using Excel. 
 
(c) display of data points in a fault case in (.txt) format using Notepad. 
 
Figure 5.3 The procedure of transferring fault data generated in PSCAD environment 
into a text file format. 
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5.4 Fault Data Analysis  
The aim of analysing fault data cases is to determine common parameters of interest, 
i.e., max and min values, and to identify the features of each fault case. A total of 38 
elements that represent the features of each fault case have been indentified. These 
elements are stored in a vector X where X = {x1, x2,…., xi,….,xm}, i = 1, 2, 3,…, m. 
xi is the ith element in vector X and m = 38. They are selected from a total of 275 data 
points which constitute the total collected data points within a window for a 
particular fault case. 
 
5.4.1 Selection of xith Elements of Vector X  
The selection of 38 elements which form the parameters of X are based on several 
dominant criterions which have been identified after carefully studying each of five 
variations, φAB, φBC, φCA, R01 and R21. The criterion that have been considered are 
as follows:   
a. maximum and minimum data point of φAB, φBC and φCA 
b. predefined crossing variations of φAB, φBC and φCA which respect to 0۫- axis and 
150۫-axis. 
c. maximum values of  ratios R01 and  R21.  
 
5.4.1.1 Maximum and Minimum Values of φAB, φBC and φCA 
The maximum and minimum data points of the three input parameters φAB, φBC and 
φCA are considered as very powerful criterions that can be used to identify SLG type 
faults. In each fault case, the maximum and minimum values of each of the input 
parameters φAB, φBC and φCA have been selected. In addition to that, the values of 
the other two input parameters corresponding to maximum and minimum values of 
the considered parameter have also been selected. This can be explained as followed 
with reference to Table 5.1. The data points of fault case R33-Ra-FL0R90D-CG-1km 
that are shown in Table 5.1 are taken from t = 35.0035 s to 35.065 s, which is the 
time period where the maximum value of φBC  has occurred. The maximum values 
of φBC, maxφBC  = 100.0703۫ occurred at t = 35.0065 s. Note that the values of φAB , 
φBC and φCA  at t =35.0065 s are highlighted in Bold in Table 5.1. The values of 
φAB and φCA, corresponding to maxφBC are -211.5989۫ and 111.5286۫۫۫. Accordingly, 
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the values 100.0703۫, -211.5989 ۫ and -111.5286۫۫۫ have been included in the vector X 
corresponding to this fault case. Note the considered fault case i.e., R33-Ra-
FL0R90D-CG-1km refers to the c-g fault (based on the line current measurement of 
relay R33 in Figure 5.1) assuming the following fault and network operating 
conditions:  Rf = 0Ω , FIA = 90۫ (corresponding to the fault inception time of 35.003 
s), fault location = 1km from the 2MW DFIG (within section 3), network 
configuration = radial network, loading condition = full load. Figure 5.4 shows the 
corresponding waveforms φAB, φBC and φCA for the period which cover pre-fault 
and fault conditions starting from t = 34.9965 s to t = 35.0235 s.  
Table 5.1 
The data point of φAB, φBC and φCA corresponding to fault case: R33-Ra-
FL0R90D-CG-1km, from t = 35.0035 s to t = 35.007 s. 
Time (s) Phase angle difference between line current 
φAB φBC φCA 
35.0035 121.7454 -240.6852 118.9397 
35.0040 122.6972 -242.0295 119.3323 
35.0045 124.4991 -244.2246 119.7255 
35.0050 127.4380 -246.9422 119.5042 
35.0055 133.6458 -251.4807 117.8349 
35.0060 140.1972 -255.4900 115.2928 
35.0065 -211.5989 100.0703 111.5286 
35.0070 -201.7983 95.2305 106.5678 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Waveforms of  φAB (blue waveform) , φBC (green waveform) and φCA 
(red waveform)  corresponding to the fault case: R33-Ra-FL0R90D-CG-
1km, stretching from t = 34.9965 s to t = 35.0235 s. 
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5.4.1.2 The Predefined Crossing Values of φAB, φBC and φCA 
The predefined crossing values of φAB, φBC and φCA refer to the 0۫-axis crossing 
and the 150۫-axis crossing values of φAB, φBC and φCA.  
 
In the fault data analysis process, 0 ۫-axis crossing values is defined as the first data 
point, being observed after the input parameters φAB, φBC and φCA cross 0 ۫-axis. For 
0۫-axis crossing, the first data point can be either a positive or negative value, 
depending on the oscillation pattern of φAB, φBC and φCA, either from a positive 
going 0 ۫-axis crossing or negative going 0 ۫-axis crossing. This can be explained with 
reference Figure 5.5 that shows the fault case R22-Ri-HL5R90D-CG-7.5km,  plotted 
from t = 34.9965 s to t = 35.0235 s . This figure shows that first value of data point 
of φAB ( blue waveform) after it crosses the 0۫-axis is -178.9094 ۫ as φAB is going from 
positive to negative at the crossing point. Meanwhile, φBC (green waveform) crosses 
0۫-axis twice within the considered time interval. At the first crossing, φBC goes from 
negative to positive at where the 1st data point after a 0 ۫-axis crossing is -128.2861 ۫. At 
the second crossing, φBC goes from positive to negative where the 1st data point after 
the 0۫-axis crossing is -3.6769 ۫.  It is also shown in this figure that, φCA (red 
waveform) does not cross 0 ۫-axis within the considered time interval, which means 
that φCA in this fault case does not have a data point that shows the criterion of 0 ۫-
axis crossing. Note the considered fault case i.e., R22-Ri-HL5R90D-CG-7.5km 
refers to c-g fault (based on line current measurement of relay R22 in Figure 5.1) 
assuming the following fault and network operating condition:  Rf = 5Ω , FIA = 90۫ 
(corresponding to the fault inception time of 35.003 s) , fault location = 7.5km from 
2MW DFIG (within section 2) , network configuration = ring network, loading 
condition = half load. 
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Figure 5.5 Waveforms φAB (blue waveform), φBC ( green waveform) and φCA (red 
waveform) corresponding to the fault case: R22-Ri-HL5R90D-CG-7.5km 
for the time interval, from t = 34.9965 s to t = 35.0235 s. 
 
Table 5.2 shows the fault data points corresponding to this fault case for the fault 
time interval from t = 35.0025 s to t = 35.0230 s. Table 5.2 shows that the 1st data 
point after the 0۫-axis crossing by φAB is  a negative value which is -178.9094 ۫ at        
t = 35.017 s and the corresponding values φBC, and φCA are 128.2861۫  and 50.6233۫. 
Note that in table 5.2, the data points of φAB, φBC and φCA at t =35.0170 s are 
highlighted in Bold. Although φBC crosses the 0۫-axis twice within the investigated 
time interval of this fault case, only its first time 0۫-axis crossing has been considered 
and consequently only the 1st data point after this first crossing point together with 
corresponding values of φAB and φCA have been considered and therefore used as 
elements in vector X. Therefore the values of -178.9094 ۫, 128.2861۫ and 50.6233۫ have 
been included as elements in vector X corresponding to this fault case. 
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Table 5.2 
The data point of φAB, φBC and φCA corresponding to fault case:  
R22-Ri-HL5R90D-CG-7.5km, from t = 35.0025 s to t = 35.0230 s. 
Time (s) Phase angle difference between line current 
φAB φBC φCA 
35.0025 123.1734 -240.7625 117.5891 
35.0030 122.8786 -240.5697 117.6910 
35.0035 123.0324 -241.1069 118.0745 
35.0040 123.7519 -243.0824 119.3305 
35.0045 124.9250 -245.5260 120.6010 
35.0050 126.5205 -247.5361 121.0155 
35.0055 129.7994 -249.2865 119.4871 
35.0060 133.2322 -250.1398 116.9076 
35.0065 137.0594 -250.5285 113.4691 
35.0070 141.0667 -250.3725 109.3058 
35.0075 145.3834 -249.6450 104.2616 
35.0080 151.1399 -248.1304 96.9904 
35.0085 155.0025 -246.5425 91.5400 
35.0090 158.2403 -244.5294 86.2891 
35.0095 160.6859 -242.0281 81.3423 
35.0100 162.1586 -238.9191 76.7605 
35.0105 162.2303 -233.5427 71.3124 
35.0110 160.3909 -228.1893 67.7984 
35.0115 156.6747 -221.3300 64.6553 
35.0120 151.4759 -213.3123 61.8364 
35.0125 145.0252 -204.4391 59.4139 
35.0130 135.4003 -192.2029 56.8026 
35.0135 130.4805 -185.7055 55.2250 
35.0140 128.8538 -182.8546 54.0008 
35.0145 130.3616 -183.5025 53.1409 
35.0150 134.0766 -186.5933 52.5167 
35.0155 142.6765 -194.6474 51.9708 
35.0160 152.3507 -204.0610 51.7103 
35.0165 164.8445 -216.1429 51.2984 
35.0170 -178.9094 128.2862 50.6233 
35.0175 -157.8343 108.1856 49.6487 
35.0180 -123.7470 75.8078 47.9392 
35.0185 -99.2917 52.8539 46.4378 
35.0190 -79.7075 34.8779 44.8296 
35.0195 -64.8728 21.6919 43.1809 
35.0200 -53.4831 11.9376 41.5455 
35.0205 -41.7519 2.2915 39.4604 
35.0210 -34.3753 -3.6769 38.0522 
35.0215 -27.7538 -9.0471 36.8009 
35.0220 -22.1720 -13.4721 35.6441 
35.0225 -17.7309 -16.8420 34.5729 
35.0230 -13.1569 -20.1711 33.3280 
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It has been observed that in certain fault cases none of the variables φAB, φBC and 
φCA cross the 0 ۫-axis. For example in the fault cases shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, it 
can be seen that none of the three parameters φAB ( blue waveform) , φBC ( green 
waveform) and φCA ( red waveform) crosses the 0۫-axis.  
 
Note that the fault case shown in Figure 5.6 is R22-Ra-FL5R90D-AG-9km which 
refers to an a-g fault (based on line current measurement of relay R22 in Figure 5.1) 
assuming the following fault and network operating condition:  Rf = 5Ω , FIA = 90۫ 
(corresponding to the fault inception time of 35.003 s), fault location = 9km from the 
2MW DFIG (within line section 2), network configuration = radial network, loading 
condition = full load. Note that the fault case shown in Figure 5.7 is R11-Ra-
FL5R0D-BG-12.5km which refers to a b-g fault (based on line current measurement 
of relay R11 in Figure 5.1) assuming the following fault and network operating 
condition: Rf = 5Ω, FIA = 0۫ (corresponding to the fault inception time of 34.998 s), 
fault location = 12.5km from 2MW DFIG (within section 1), network configuration 
= radial network, loading condition = full load.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 Waveforms φAB (blue waveform), φBC (green waveform) and φCA(red 
waveform) corresponding to fault case: R22-Ra-FL5R90D-AG-9km, for 
the time interval from t = 34.9965 s to t = 35.0235 s. 
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Figure 5.7 Waveforms φAB (blue waveform) , φBC (green waveform) and φCA (red 
waveform) corresponding to fault case: R11-Ra-FL5R0D-BG-12.5km, for 
the time interval from t = 34.9915 s to t = 35.0185 s. 
 
After careful study of Figures 5.6 and 5.7, a new α -axis has been identified where 
α is equal to 150۫. Therefore 150۫-axis crossing values have been defined as the first 
data point being observed after the input parameters φAB or φCA have crossed the 
150۫-axis. This is because, it has been noticed in significant amounts of fault cases 
with Rf = 5Ω that either φAB, or φCA crosses 150 ۫-axis instead of the 0 ۫-axis e.g., φCA 
(red waveform) have crossed 150۫-axis in the fault case shown in Figure 5.5 while 
φAB (blue waveform) have crossed 150 ۫-axis in the fault case shown in Figure 5.6. 
Table 5.3 shows the fault data points corresponding to the fault case R22-Ra-
FL5R90D-AG-9km for the fault period from t = 35.002 s to t = 35.011 s. It is shown 
in Table 5.3 that the 1st data point immediately after  φCA crosses the 150۫-axis is 
equal to 152.7106۫ at t = 35.009 s and the corresponding values of φAB, and φBC are 
92.9024۫  and -245.6130 ۫. Note that in Table 5.3, the data points of φAB, φBC and 
φCA at t =35.009 s are highlighted in Bold. Therefore 92.9024۫, -245.6130 ۫ and 
152.7106۫ have been included as elements in vector X related to this fault case. 
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Table 5.3 
The data point of φAB, φBC and φCA corresponding to fault case:  
R22-Ra-FL5R90D-AG-9km, for the time interval from t = 35.0020 s to t = 35.0110 s. 
Time (s) Phase angle difference between line current 
φAB (  ۫ ) φBC( ۫ ) φCA( ۫ ) 
35.0020 122.2656 -241.3189 119.0533 
35.0025 122.1898 -241.2302 119.0403 
35.0030 121.9300 -241.0009 119.0709 
35.0035 121.5814 -240.7463 119.1648 
35.0040 120.3118 -240.0693 119.7575 
35.0045 118.1690 -238.8747 120.7058 
35.0050 115.5610 -237.4411 121.8800 
35.0055 111.8960 -236.1263 124.2303 
35.0060 108.9142 -235.7721 126.8579 
35.0065 105.8373 -236.0153 130.1780 
35.0070 102.8008 -236.8672 134.0664 
35.0075 100.0115 -238.2929 138.2814 
35.0080 96.7758 -241.0004 144.2246 
35.0085 94.6869 -243.3328 148.6459 
35.0090 92.9024 -245.6130 152.7106 
35.0095 91.4250 -247.5677 156.1428 
35.0100 90.2379 -248.9744 158.7365 
35.0105 89.0304 -249.7527 160.7222 
35.0110 88.3108 -249.4330 161.1222 
 
Table 5.4 shows the fault data points corresponding to the fault case R11-Ra-
FL5R0D-BG-12.5km defined during the interval from t = 34.9970 s to t = 35.006 s. 
Table 5.4 shows that the 1st data point following the crossing of 150۫-axis by φAB is 
153.4043۫ at t = 35.0045 s and the corresponding values of φBC, and φCA are -
262.7650۫  and 109.3607 ۫. Note that in Table 5.4, the data points of φAB, φBC and 
φCA at t =35.0045 s are highlighted in Bold. Therefore 153.4043۫, -262.7650 ۫ and 
109.3607۫۫ have been included as elements in vector X related to this fault case. 
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Table 5.4 
The data point of φAB, φBC and φCA corresponding to fault case 
: R11-Ra-FL5R0D-BG-12.5km, for time interval from t = 34.9970 s to t = 35.006 s. 
Time (s) Phase angle difference between line current 
φAB( ۫ ) φBC ( ۫ )  φCA( ۫ ) 
34.9970 121.5033 -242.4665 120.9633 
34.9975 121.6277 -242.5110 120.8833 
34.9980 121.7532 -242.5740 120.8209 
34.9985 121.9519 -242.6804 120.7285 
34.9990 122.3942 -243.1335 120.7393 
34.9995 122.8806 -243.9064 121.0258 
35.0000 123.4759 -244.8636 121.3877 
35.0005 124.6741 -246.4973 121.8232 
35.0010 126.0377 -248.0668 122.0292 
35.0015 128.0592 -249.8818 121.8226 
35.0020 130.7722 -251.8798 121.1076 
35.0025 134.0153 -253.9271 119.9118 
35.0030 139.1056 -256.5329 117.4273 
35.0035 143.5979 -258.5341 114.9362 
35.0040 148.4774 -260.7038 112.2264 
35.0045 153.4043 -262.7650 109.3607 
35.0050 158.2217 -264.5609 106.3391 
35.0055 164.0313 -266.7325 102.7012 
35.0060 167.4715 -268.5160 101.0444 
 
 
5.4.1.3 Maximum Data Point of Ratios R01 and R21 
The maximum values of ratios R01 and R21 were found to be useful indicators for 
confirming that a fault case involves a ground connection. Consequently, the 
maximum values of ratios R01 and R21, R01max and R21max respectively, within the 
considered time interval of a particular fault case, have been included in the vector X 
that corresponding to that fault case.  
 
It was found in section 4.3, Chapter 4 that in all generated fault cases, prior to fault, 
values of ratios R01 and R21 are zero but after fault inception, ratios R01 and R21 have 
increased significantly from almost zero to maximum values R01max and R21max. The 
magnitude of both R01max and R21max were found to vary for the considered fault cases. 
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show the variation of ratios R01 and R21 corresponding to fault 
cases R33-Ri-HL5R0D-CG-4km and R33-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-4km respectively. As 
shown in Figure 5.8, R01max (blue waveform) and R21max (green waveform) in fault 
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case R33-Ri-HL5R0D-CG-4km are 1.2391 and 0.5150 respectively. Therefore 
1.2391 and 0.5150 have been included as elements in vector X related to this fault 
case. As shown in Figure 5.9, R01max (blue waveform) and R21max (green waveform) 
in fault case R33-Ri-HL5R0D-CG-4km are 3.4954 and 0.1596 respectively. 
Therefore 3.4954 and 0.1596 have been included as elements in vector X 
corresponding to this fault case. It can be concluded from Figures 5.8 and 5.9 that the 
fault in both of the considered fault cases has a connection between phase c and the 
ground, i.e., which occurred at the same fault location which is 4km from the 2MW 
DFIG. However, due to differences in other network parameters such as fault 
inception time, network configuration and network loading condition, it has been 
found that the magnitudes of R01max (blue waveform) and R21max  (green waveform) 
are significantly difference for the two fault cases. Note that: 
 
a. R33-Ri-HL5R0D-CG-4km refers to c-g fault (based on line current measurement 
of relay R33 in Figure 5.1) assuming the following fault and network operating 
condition: Rf = 5Ω, FIA = 0۫ (corresponding to the fault inception time of 34.998 
s), fault location = 4km from the 2MW DFIG (within section 3), network 
configuration = ring network, loading condition = half load. 
 
b.  R33-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-4km is refer to c-g fault (based on line current 
measurement of relay R33 in Figure 5.1) with following fault and network 
operating condition: Rf = 5Ω, FIA = 90۫ (corresponding to the fault inception time 
of 35.003 s), fault location = 4km from the 2MW DFIG (within section 3), 
network configuration = radial network, loading condition = full load. 
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Figure 5.8 Waveform ratio R01(blue waveform) and R21 (green waveform) 
corresponding to fault case: R33-Ri-HL5R0D-CG-4km, for the time 
interval from t = 34.9915 s to t = 35.0185 s. 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Waveform ratio R01(blue waveform) and R21 (green waveform) 
corresponding to fault case: R33-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-4km , for the time 
interval form t = 34.9965 s to t = 35.0235 s. 
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5.4.2 Determination of All Elements of Vector X  
As explained in section 5.4.1, the considered dominant criterions of φAB, φBC, φCA , 
R01 and  R21 found in each of the fault cases such as maximum and minimum values 
of φAB, φBC and φCA are used as elements xi, of vector X.  In Table 5.5, each 
element, xith is corresponding to a particular dominant criterion, e.g., element x1 
corresponds to maxφAB, x2 corresponds to φBCmaxφAB etc. The definition of all the 
dominant criterions given in table 5.5 is detailed below:  
 
1. maxφAB   =  the data point of φAB with a maximum value within the investigated 
time interval.  
2. φBCmaxφAB = the data point of φBC corresponds to maxφAB within the 
investigated time interval.  ( which means φBCmaxφAB  is picked at the same time 
instant as maxφAB)  
3. φCAmaxφAB = the data point of φCA corresponds to maxφAB within the 
investigated time interval. ( which means φCAmaxφAB is picked at the same time 
instant as maxφAB) 
4. maxφBC = the data point of φBC with a maximum value within the investigated 
time interval.  
5. φABmaxφBC = the data point of φAB corresponds to maxφBC within the 
investigated time interval.  
6. φCAmaxφBC = the data point of φCA corresponds to maxφBC within the 
investigated time interval.  
7. maxφCA = the data point of φCA with a maximum value within the investigated 
time interval. 
8. φABmaxφCA = the data point of φAB corresponds to maxφCA within the 
investigated time interval.  
9. φBCmaxφCA = the data point of φBC corresponds to maxφCA within the 
investigated time interval. 
10. minφAB = the data point of  φAB with a minimum value within the investigated 
time interval.  
11. φBCminφAB = the data point of φBC corresponds to minφAB within the investigated 
time interval.  (which means φBCminφAB is picked at the same time instant with 
minφAB) 
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12.  φCAminφAB = the data point of φCA corresponds to minφAB within the 
investigated time interval. ( which means φCAminφAB is picked at the same time 
instant with minφAB) 
13. minφBC = the data point of  φBC with a minimum value within the investigated 
time interval.  
14. φABminφBC = the data point of φAB corresponds to minφBC within the investigated 
time interval.   
15.  φCAminφBC = the data point of φCA corresponds to minφBC within the 
investigated time interval.  
16. minφCA = the data point of  φCA with a minimum value within the investigated 
time interval.  
17. φABminφCA = the data point of φAB corresponds to minφCA within the investigated 
time interval.   
18.  φBCminφCA = the data point of φBC corresponds to minφCA within the 
investigated time interval. 
19. 0۫-crossingφAB = the first data point after φAB crosses the 0 ۫-axis within the 
investigated time interval. 
20. φBC0۫-crossingφAB = the data point of φBC corresponding to 0 ۫-crossingφAB within 
the investigated time interval. ( which means φBC0۫-crossingφAB is picked at the same 
time instant with 0۫-crossingφAB) 
21. φCA0۫-crossingφAB = the data point of φCA corresponds to 0 ۫-crossingφAB within the 
investigated time interval. ( which means φCA0۫-crossingφAB is picked at the same 
time instant with 0۫-crossingφAB) 
22. 0۫-crossingφBC = the first data point after φBC crosses the 0۫-axis within the 
investigated time interval. 
23. φAB0۫-crossingφBC = the data point of φAB corresponds to 0 ۫-crossingφBC within the 
investigated time interval.  
24. φCA0۫-crossingφBC = the data point of φCA corresponds to 0۫-crossingφBC within the 
investigated time interval.  
25. 0۫-crossingφCA = the first data point after φCA crosses the 0۫-axis within the 
investigated time interval. 
26. φAB0۫-crossingφCA = the data point of φAB corresponds to 0 ۫-crossingφCA within the 
investigated time interval.  
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27. φBC0۫-crossingφCA = the data point of φBC corresponds to 0۫-crossingφCA within the 
investigated time interval.  
28. 150۫-crossingφAB = the first data point after φAB crosses the 150 ۫-axis within the 
investigated time interval. 
29. φBC150۫-crossingφAB  = the data point of φBC corresponds to 150۫-crossingφAB within 
the investigated time interval. ( which means φBC150۫-crossingφAB  is picked at the 
same time instant with 0۫-crossingφAB) 
30. φCA150۫-crossingφAB = the data point of φCA corresponds to 150۫-crossingφAB within 
the investigated time interval. ( which means φBC150۫-crossingφAB  is picked at the 
same time instant with 0۫-crossingφAB) 
31. 150۫-crossingφBC = the first data point after φAB crosses the 150۫-axis within the 
investigated time interval. 
32. φAB150۫-crossingφBC  = the data point of φAB corresponds to 150۫-crossingφBC within 
the investigated time interval.  
33. φCA150۫-crossingφBC  = the data point of φAC corresponds to 150 ۫-crossingφBC within 
the investigated time interval.  
34. 150۫-crossingφCA = the first data point after φCA crosses the 150۫-axis within the 
investigated time interval. 
35. φAB150۫-crossingφCA  = the data point of φAB corresponds to 150۫-crossingφCA within 
the investigated time interval.  
36. φBC150۫-crossingφCA  = the data point of φBC corresponds to 150 ۫-crossingφCA within 
the investigated time interval.  
37. maxR01 = the data point of ratio R01  with a  maximum value within the 
investigated time interval. 
38. maxR21 = the data point of ratio R21  with a maximum value within the 
investigated time interval. 
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Table 5.5 
Element, xi  in predefined parameter vector  X and the corresponding dominant 
criterion. 
dominant criterion element xi dominant criterion element xi 
1. maxφAB x1 20. φBC0۫-crossingφAB x20 
2. φBCmaxφAB x2 21. φCA0۫-crossingφAB x21 
3. φCAmaxφAB x3 22. 0۫-crossingφBC x22 
4. maxφBC x4 23. φAB0۫-crossingφBC x23 
5. φABmaxφBC x5 24. φCA0۫-crossingφBC x24 
6. φCAmaxφBC x6 25. 0۫-crossingφCA x25 
7. maxφCA x7 26. φAB0۫-crossingφCA x26 
8. φABmaxφCA x8 27. φBC0۫-crossingφCA x27 
9. φBCmaxφCA x9 28. 150۫-crossingφAB x28 
10. minφAB x10 29. φBC150۫-crossingφAB x29 
11. φBCminφAB x11 30. φCA150۫-crossingφAB x30 
12. φCAminφAB x12 31. 150۫-crossingφBC x31 
13. minφBC x13 32. φAB150۫-crossingφBC x32 
14. φABminφBC x14 33. φCA150۫-crossingφBC x33 
15. φCAminφBC x15 34. 150۫-crossingφCA x34 
16. minφCA x16 35. φAB150۫-crossingφCA x35 
17. φABminφCA x17 36. φBC150۫-crossingφCA x36 
18. φBCminφCA x18 37. maxR01 x37 
19. 0۫-crossingφAB x19 38. maxR21 x38 
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Table 5.6 shows the value of elements of vector X extracted from the fault case R22-
Ra-FL5R90D-CG-9km. Note that all of the xi where i = 1,2,3,….,38 are extracted 
from the 275 data points within the investigated time interval of this fault case as 
shown in Table 5.7. Figure 5.10(a) shows the variation of φAB (blue waveform), 
φBC(green waveform), φCA(red waveform)  and Figure 5.10(b) shows R01 (blue 
waveform) and  R21 (green waveform) related to this fault case represented by the 
data points shown in Table 5.7. Note that fault case R22-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-9km 
refers to a c-g fault (based on line current measurement of relay R22 in Figure 5.1) 
assuming the following fault and network operating condition: Rf = 5Ω, FIA = 90۫ 
(corresponding to the fault inception time of 35.003 s), fault location = 9km from the 
2MW DFIG (within section 2), network configuration = radial network, loading 
condition = full load.  
 
As shown in Table 5.6, for this fault case x1 = 162.8822, x2 = -277.8458 and x3 = 
64.9635.  According to Table 5.5, x1 corresponds to dominant criterion maxφAB, x2 is 
corresponding to dominant criterion φBCmaxφAB and x3 corresponds to dominant 
criterion φCAmaxφAB. Therefore, x1 = 162.8822 means that 162.8822 is the data point 
of φAB with a maximum value that can be found within the investigated time interval. 
As shown in Table 5.7, the maximum value of φAB is 162.8822۫ within the 
investigated time interval and 162.8822۫ occurred at t = 35.0165 s (data point no.41). 
The variable x2 = -277.8458 means that -277.8458 ۫ is the data point of φBC  picked at 
the t = 35.0165 s (data point no.41) when the maximum value of φAB, 162.8822۫ is 
found. The variable x3 = 64.9635 means that 64.9635۫  is the data point of  φCA that 
picked at t = 35.0165 s (data point no.41) when maximum value of φAB, 162.8822۫  is 
found. The other values of  xi shown in Table 5.6 are determined in a similar way. 
 
In addition to that, it is shown in Table 5.6 that for the value of certain elements       
xi = 0 e.g., where i = 25, 26 and 27, which means the element has “no value”. 
According to Table 5.5, variable x25 = 0۫-crossingφCA, x26 =  φAB0۫-crossingφCA and x27 =  
φBC0۫-crossingφCA.  Thus, x25 = 0 means the 1st data point after φCA crosses the 0۫-axis 
can not be found within the investigated time interval related to this fault case.  This 
is because, as shown in Figure 5.10, in this fault case φCA does not cross the 0۫-axis 
within the investigated time interval. This also leads to, x26 = 0 and x27 = 0 due to x25 
= 0. This is similar for values x31 to x36.  
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It was also found in Figure 5.10(a) that, φBC (green waveform) crosses the 0۫-axis  
twice within the investigated time interval, from t = 34.9965 s to t = 35.0235 s. As 
explained in the previous section (section 5.4.1) that although in certain fault cases 
the three parameters φAB,  φBC or φCA may cross  the 0۫-axis more than once within 
the investigated time interval, only the first crossing is considered. Therefore, in this 
fault case, only the 1st data point after the first 0۫-axis by φBC and the corresponding 
φAB and φCA are considered as elements of vector X related to this fault case.   
 
Table 5.6 
Elements of vector X for  fault case R22-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-9km: element ith x and 
the corresponding data point. 
xi data point xi data point 
x1 162.8822 x20 123.4099 
x2 -227.8458 x21 63.7109 
x3 64.9635 x22 123.4099 
x4 123.4099 x23 -187.1208 
x5 -187.1208 x24 63.7109 
x6 63.7109 x25 0 
x7 120.1083 x26 0 
x8 121.9345 x27 0 
x9 -242.0428 x28 150.6946 
x10 -187.1208 x29 -249.5113 
x11 123.4099 x30 98.8167 
x12 63.7109 x31 0 
x13 -251.8394 x32 0 
x14 144.2360 x33 0 
x15 107.6034 x34 0 
x16 43.7724 x35 0 
x17 -20.5434 x36 0 
x18 -23.2290 x37 2.1484 
x19 -187.1208 x38 0.2053 
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Table 5.7  
Data point of φAB, φBC ,φCA, R01and R21corresponding to  
fault case: R22-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-9km, from t = 34.9965 s to t = 35.0235 s. 
data  
point 
no. time (s) 
phase angle difference between line 
current 
ratio sequence 
component of line 
current  
φAB( ۫ ) φBC( ۫ ) φCA( ۫ ) R01 R21 
1 34.9965 121.9345 -242.0428 120.1083 0.0000 0.0002 
2 34.9970 121.9912 -242.0084 120.0173 0.0000 0.0002 
3 34.9975 122.0358 -241.9878 119.9520 0.0000 0.0002 
4 34.9980 122.0682 -241.9612 119.8930 0.0000 0.0002 
5 34.9985 122.0715 -241.9287 119.8572 0.0000 0.0002 
6 34.9990 122.0617 -241.8779 119.8163 0.0000 0.0002 
7 34.9995 122.0467 -241.8065 119.7597 0.0000 0.0002 
8 35.0000 122.0372 -241.7163 119.6791 0.0000 0.0002 
9 35.0005 122.0525 -241.5781 119.5256 0.0000 0.0002 
10 35.0010 122.0996 -241.4742 119.3746 0.0000 0.0002 
11 35.0015 122.1866 -241.3843 119.1977 0.0000 0.0002 
12 35.0020 122.2656 -241.3189 119.0533 0.0000 0.0002 
13 35.0025 122.1898 -241.2302 119.0403 0.0000 0.0002 
14 35.0030 121.9300 -241.0009 119.0709 0.0000 0.0004 
15 35.0035 122.0116 -241.1315 119.1199 0.0000 0.0004 
16 35.0040 122.5784 -241.9528 119.3744 0.0001 0.0004 
17 35.0045 123.5395 -243.1768 119.6373 0.0005 0.0005 
18 35.0050 124.9063 -244.4683 119.5619 0.0016 0.0005 
19 35.0055 127.6422 -246.3131 118.6710 0.0051 0.0005 
20 35.0060 130.4095 -247.9222 117.5127 0.0098 0.0004 
21 35.0065 133.5170 -249.4748 115.9578 0.0170 0.0007 
22 35.0070 136.8505 -250.7191 113.8685 0.0273 0.0012 
23 35.0075 140.1766 -251.5022 111.3256 0.0410 0.0017 
24 35.0080 144.2360 -251.8394 107.6034 0.0648 0.0029 
25 35.0085 146.9574 -251.6231 104.6657 0.0866 0.0042 
26 35.0090 149.1961 -250.9288 101.7328 0.1115 0.0060 
27 35.0095 150.6946 -249.5113 98.8167 0.1391 0.0081 
28 35.0100 151.3047 -247.2579 95.9532 0.1688 0.0109 
29 35.0105 150.5092 -242.7711 92.2619 0.2100 0.0155 
30 35.0110 148.5941 -238.1950 89.6009 0.2410 0.0196 
31 35.0115 145.7726 -232.7210 86.9485 0.2706 0.0240 
32 35.0120 142.5343 -226.8386 84.3043 0.2977 0.0285 
33 35.0125 139.1940 -220.9641 81.7700 0.3219 0.0332 
34 35.0130 134.9090 -213.5742 78.6652 0.3496 0.0406 
35 35.0135 133.1483 -209.5516 76.4033 0.3666 0.0457 
36 35.0140 133.4626 -207.6693 74.2067 0.3810 0.0492 
37 35.0145 135.7482 -207.8844 72.1362 0.3949 0.0509 
38 35.0150 139.5045 -209.6533 70.1488 0.4113 0.0515 
39 35.0155 146.8216 -214.5455 67.7240 0.4421 0.0500 
40 35.0160 154.1417 -220.3767 66.2350 0.4760 0.0470 
 124 
41 35.0165 162.8822 -227.8458 64.9635 0.5222 0.0435 
42 35.0170 -187.1208 123.4099 63.7109 0.5825 0.0408 
43 35.0175 -175.7107 113.2894 62.4212 0.6577 0.0394 
44 35.0180 -157.8971 97.2968 60.6003 0.7800 0.0405 
45 35.0185 -142.3964 83.2344 59.1620 0.8864 0.0438 
46 35.0190 -125.3417 67.6671 57.6746 1.0032 0.0495 
47 35.0195 -107.6930 51.5379 56.1551 1.1280 0.0576 
48 35.0200 -90.8175 36.1973 54.6202 1.2580 0.0682 
49 35.0205 -71.2718 18.6979 52.5739 1.4349 0.0858 
50 35.0210 -59.1875 8.1340 51.0535 1.5667 0.1016 
51 35.0215 -48.6639 -0.9679 49.6318 1.6975 0.1194 
52 35.0220 -39.3879 -8.9290 48.3168 1.8253 0.1396 
53 35.0225 -31.9868 -14.9838 46.9706 1.9404 0.1604 
54 35.0230 -24.6662 -20.4590 45.1252 2.0696 0.1866 
55 35.0235 -20.5434 -23.2290 43.7724 2.1484 0.2053 
 
 
(a)  
 
(b)  
Figure 5.10 Variation of (a) φAB (blue waveform), φBC (green waveform) and 
φCA( red waveform) and (b) ratio R01( blue waveform) and R21(green 
waveform) of fault case: R22-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-9km from  t = 34.9965 
s to t = 35.0235 s. 
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In this research work, the fault data analysis process is carried out by a specifically 
developed C++ software module. The task of the whole fault data analysis 
processing, that includes retrieving each fault case from a folder called “Case 
Database A”, followed by analyse of the fault data of that particular fault case, 
extracting the related elements of vector X and finally saving elements xi, i = 
1,2,3,….,38, corresponding to all fault cases under consideration in a file called 
“Case Database B”. Vector X relating to all fault cases have been stored together in a 
single “.txt” file so that time can be efficiently used in the process of retrieving data 
from file “Case Database B” for subsequent optimisation process. The values of 
elements xi of vector X of 2592 fault cases under investigation can be found in 
Appendix D. Note due to the space limitation, appendix D is stored in the attached 
CD-ROM.  
 
5.5 Optimisation Process   
The aim of the fault data optimization process is to determine the minimum number 
of elements of vector X that is sufficient to distinguish each fault case from the 
others in the total of 2592 fault cases. The application of an optimization process has 
resulted in an optimized vector Xoptimise with 26 elements such that Xoptimise ={x1, 
x2,….,xk,…., xm}, k =1, 2, 3,…, m. xk is the kth feature and m = 26. Development of 
Xoptimise is described in the following two sections. 
 
5.5.1 Development Vector Xc based on the Elements of Vector X 
The 38 elements of vector X related to any fault case are arranged to form a new 
vector called Xc.  This can be explained using Table 5.5 in section 5.4.2 and Table 
5.8 below. A 13 elements vector Xcj ,where j = 1,2,3,….,13 elements has been 
formed from the 38 elements shown in Table 5.5. Each of the vector from element 
Xc1 to Xc12 contains those sequentially elements from Table 5.5,  e.g., Xc1  = {x1 , x2 , 
x3}, Xc2  ={x4 , x5 , x6} etc, where x1 , x2 , x3 are the first three elements in  Table 5.5 
which are interrelated to each other. x1 is the data point of φAB with a maximum 
value that occurred at the time instant, t within the investigated time interval. While 
x2 and x3 are the corresponding values of φBC and φCA at time instant, t. Xc13 is the 
vector that is formed from the last two element xi in vector X as shown in Table 5.5 
where Xc13  ={x37 , x38}. x37  and x38 are also interrelated to each other  where both of  
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x37  and x38 are the only two variables within the 38 variables that have been selected 
base on the dominant criterion of ratios R01and R21. 
 
Table 5.8 
Vector Xcj and their corresponding element xi. 
Xcj element xi 
Xc1 x1 , x2 , x3 
Xc2 x4 , x5 , x6 
Xc3 x7 , x8 , x9 
Xc4 x10 , x11 , x12 
Xc5 x13 , x14 , x15 
Xc6 x16 , x17 , x18 
Xc7 x19 , x20 , x21 
Xc8 x22 , x23, x24 
Xc9 x25 , x26, x27 
Xc10 x28 , x29, x30 
Xc11 x31 , x32, x33 
Xc12 x34 , x35, x36 
Xc13 x37, x38 
 
 
5.5.2 Determination of an Optimised Vector Xoptimise based on Vector Xcj   
The first two elements in vector Xcj in Table 5.8 in section 5.5.1, Xc1 and Xc2 are used 
to form another vector Xcc where Xcc ={Xc1, Xc2}. The Xcc = {Xc1, Xc2}of each fault 
case in “Case Database B” file is to be compared with the corresponding Xcc = {Xc1, 
Xc2} of the rest of 2591 fault cases stored in the same file. This can be explained as 
follows with reference to the following Table 5.9.  In Table 5.9, XccFN refers to vector 
Xcc of Nth fault case, where N = 1, 2, 3,…., 2591. XccF1 refers to the Xcc ={Xc1, Xc2} 
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corresponding to the 1st fault case, XccF2 refers to the Xcc ={Xc1, Xc2} corresponding 
to the 2nd  fault case etc. As shown in this table, XccFN is compared to XccF(N+1), 
XccF(N+2), XccF(N+3), ….,XccF2592 e.g.,  XccF1 compared to XccF2, XccF3,…….. XccF2592, which 
means that Xcc = {Xc1, Xc2} of the 1st fault case compared to Xcc ={Xc1, Xc2} related 
to the 2nd fault case, 3rd fault case,…., 2592th  fault case. Then, XccF2 is compared to 
XccF3, XccF4, XccF5,….,XccF2592, which means Xcc ={Xc1, Xc2}of the 2nd  fault case is 
compared to Xcc ={Xc1, Xc2} related to the 3rd fault case, 4th fault case,…., 2592th  
fault. The comparison process is repeated until XccF2591 is compared to XccF2592 which 
means Xcc = {Xc1, Xc2} of the 2591th fault case is compared to Xcc = {Xc1, Xc2} of the 
2592th fault case.  
Table 5.9 
The sequence of comparing Xcc of each of fault case with the corresponding Xcc of 
other fault cases under consideration. 
N XccFN XccF(N+1), XccF(N+2),….,XccF(2592) 
1 XccF1 XccF2, XccF3,....,XccF2592 
2 XccF2 XccF3, XccF4,….,XccF2592 
3 XccF3 XccF4, XccF5,….,XccF2592 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
2591 XccF2591 XccF2592 
 
The vector Xoptimise is formed based on Xc1 and Xc2  in Xcc = {Xc1, Xc2} if the pair  Xc1 
and Xc2 are found to successfully discriminate each of the fault case from all of other 
fault cases in the comparison process. Note that Xc1 = {x1 , x2 , x3} and   Xc2 = {x4 , x5 , 
x6} as shown in Table 5.8 in the previous section 5.3.1 so Xcc = {Xc1, Xc2}= { x1 , x2 , 
x3, x4 , x5 , x6 }. Thus, if each of the fault cases from the 2592 fault cases can be 
uniquely distinguished using Xcc = {Xc1, Xc2}in the comparison process, then 
Xoptimise  = { x1 , x2 , x3, x4 , x5 , x6 } is formed. The comparison process can be 
explained as followed: if all the variables in Xcc = {x1, x2 , x3, x4 , x5 , x6}of a 
particular fault case are found to be identical to all variables in Xcc = {x1 , x2 , x3, x4 , 
x5 , x6}of any other fault cases under consideration, then Xc1 and Xc2  has 
unsuccessfully discriminated a fault case from the other fault case under 
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consideration. Otherwise the Xc1 and Xc2 has successfully discriminated a fault case 
from other fault cases under consideration. This can be explained as followed by 
demonstrating how Xc1 and Xc2 in Xcc of the two fault cases R22-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-
9km and R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km are compared.  
 
According to Table 5.6 in previous section 5.4.2 for fault case R22-Ra-FL5R90D-
CG-9km, Xc1 ={x1, x2, x3}={162.8822, -227.8458 , 64.9635} and Xc2 = {x4, x5, 
x6}={123.4099, -187.1208, 63.7109} respectively. According to Table 5.10 below 
for fault case R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km, Xc1 ={134.7765, -272.2805, 137.5040} 
and Xc2 ={80.9110, -219.0675, 138.1565}respectively. Note that elements xi and 
their corresponding data points shown in Table 5.10 are extracted from Table 1 in 
Appendix E. Table 1 consists of the data point of φAB, φBC, φCA and the ratio R01 
and R21 within investigated time interval related to fault case R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-
7.5km. Note that R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km refer to refers to b-g fault (based on 
line current measurement of relay R22 in Figure 5.1) assuming following fault and 
network operating conditions: Rf = 5Ω, FIA = 0۫ (corresponding to the fault inception 
time of 34.998 s), fault location = 7.5km from the 2MW DFIG (within section 2), 
network configuration = ring network, loading condition = half load. 
 
The values of Xc1 and Xc2 in Xcc of these two fault cases are summarised in the 
following Table 5.11. In this table, F1 referd to R22-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-9km and F2 
refer to R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km. Each of the ith element, xi related to these fault 
cases have upper and lower tolerance limits of ± 5 e.g., as shown in Table 5.12, x1 
for fault case R22_CG_6KM_5R_90D_R_FL is 162.8822 , so the upper and lower 
tolerance limit are 167.8822 and 157.8822.  Table 5.12 shows the upper and lower 
tolerance limits of all xi elements of Xc1 and Xc2 in forming Xcc of these two fault 
cases. In this table, F1 refers to R22-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-9km and F2 refers to R22-Ri-
HL5R0D-BG-7.5km. If the lower or upper limits of a particular xi element 
corresponding to F1 overlaps with a particular xi element corresponding to F2 then, 
both of these elements are said to be identical. It was found in this Table 5.12 that, -
232.8458 < x2 <-222.8458 corresponding to fault case F1 and -224.0675< x5 <-
214.0675 corresponding to fault case F2. It can be seen that, the upper tolerance limit 
of x2   corresponding to fault case F1 is overlapping with lower tolerance limit of x5    
corresponding to fault case F2. Thus, the value of x2 corresponding to the fault case 
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F1 are said to be identical to x5 corresponding to fault case F2. In addition to that, it 
was found only x2  in fault case F1 which is identical to x5 in fault case F2. Thus, 
fault case F1 and F2 are said to be successfully distinguished. 
 
Table 5.10 
Elements of vector X for fault case R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km: element ith x and 
the corresponding data point. 
variable x data point variable x data point 
x1 134.7765 x20 80.9110 
x2 -272.2805 x21 138.1565 
x3 137.5040 x22 80.9110 
x4 80.9110 x23 -219.0675 
x5 -219.0675 x24 138.1565 
x6 138.1565 x25 0 
x7 138.1565 x26 0 
x8 80.9110 x27 0 
x9 -219.0675 x28 0 
x10 -219.0675 x29 0 
x11 80.9110 x30 0 
x12 138.1565 x31 0 
x13 -272.2805 x32 0 
x14 134.7765 x33 0 
x15 137.5040 x34 0 
x16 0.5548 x35 0 
x17 -41.7975 x36 0 
x18 41.2427 x37 1.7564 
x19 -219.0675 x38 0.8403 
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Table 5.11 
Element ith x and the corresponding data point related to the fault cases: R22-Ra-
FL5R90D-CG-9km (F1) and R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km (F2). 
xi in Xc1 and Xc2 
fault case 
F1 F2 
x1 162.8822 134.7765 
x2 -227.8458 -272.2805 
x3 64.9635 137.5040 
x4 123.4099 80.9110 
x5 -187.1208 -219.0675 
x6 63.7109 138.1565 
 
 
Table 5.12 
Lower limit and upper limit of element ith x in Xc1 and Xc2 related to the fault cases: 
R22-Ra-FL5R90D-CG-9km (F1) and R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km (F2). 
xi in Xc1 and Xc2 
lower  limit and upper limit of xi 
fault case F1 fault case F2 
x1 157.8822< x1<167.8822 129.7765< x1<139.7765 
x2 -232.8458< x2<-222.8458 -277.2805< x2<-267.2805 
x3 59.9635< x3<69.9635 132.5040< x3<142.5040 
x4 118.4099< x4<128.4099 75.9110< x4<85.9110 
x5 -192.1208< x5<-182.1208 -224.0675< x5<-214.0675 
x6 58.7109< x6<68.7109 133.1565< x6<143.1565 
 
However if  Xcc ={Xc1, Xc2} fails to discriminate a fault case from other fault cases 
under consideration, the comparison process will be repeated using different 
combinations to formed two Xc . This can be explained with the following Table 5.13.  
In this table, XcN refers to Nth of Xc shown in Table 5.8 in the previous section 5.5.1 
where N =1,2,3,….,11 and {XcN, Xc(N+1)}, {XcN, Xc(N+2)}, {XcN, Xc(N+3)},….,{XcN, 
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Xc12} refer to possible combinations of Xcc beginning with XcN, e.g., where N =1, 
XcN = Xc1 and combination formed with two Xc where one of them is Xc1 and the 
other are Xc(N+1) and N = 1,2,3,….,11 are {Xc1, Xc2}, {Xc1, Xc3}….,{Xc1, Xc12}. 
When {XcN, Xc(N+1)} fails to discriminate a fault case from other fault cases under 
consideration, then {XcN, Xc(N+2)},….,{XcN, Xc12} will be used in the comparison 
process, e.g., if comparing Xc1 and  Xcc ={Xc1, Xc2} fails to discriminate a fault case 
from other fault cases under consideration, then each of {Xc1, Xc3}, {Xc1, 
Xc4},...,{Xc1, Xc12} is used in the comparison process. Then, the comparison process 
will be repeated if required with all possible combinations of Xcc beginning with Xc2 , 
Xc3,.....,Xc11. Note that only Xc1 to Xc12 have been involved in  comparison process. 
The variables x37 and x38 in Xc13 have to be included in Xoptimise without going through 
the comparison process. This is because x37 and x38 are reflecting the characteristics 
of a network fault event which involves a ground connection. Consequently, both of 
these variables are necessary to be included as main data to construct the proposed 
fault identification algorithm in this research work. 
 
Table 5.13 
All possible combinations with two Xc to be used in comparison process.  
N XcN {XcN, Xc(N+1)}, { XcN, Xc(N+2)},….,{ XcN, Xc12} 
1 Xc1 {Xc1, Xc2}, { Xc1, Xc3},….,{ Xc1, Xc12} 
2 Xc2 {Xc2, Xc3}, { Xc2, Xc4},….,{ Xc2, Xc12} 
3 Xc3 {Xc3, Xc4}, { Xc3, Xc5},…., { Xc1, Xc12} 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
11 Xc11 { XcN, Xc12} 
 
If the above process fails to discriminate a fault case from the other fault cases under 
consideration, then the comparison process is repeated by forming vectors with three 
Xc if necessary. The worst condition is where the comparison process involves 
formation of vectors that contains all twelve Xc as shown in Table 5.8 of the section 
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5.5.1. The overall comparison process described in this section in order to obtain 
Xoptimise can be summarised in flow chart shown in Figure 5.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11  Flow chart illustrate the comparison process to obtain Xoptimise. 
 
In this research work, it has been found that a vector Xcc with combination of eight 
Xc which is Xcc= {Xc1, Xc2, Xc7, Xc8, Xc9, Xc10, Xc11, Xc12} can successfully 
distinguish each of the fault case saved in folder “Case Database A”. According to  
Table 5.8 in the section 5.5.1 Xc1 = x1, x2, x3,  Xc2 = x4, x5, x6,  Xc7 = x19 , x20 , x21,  Xc8 
= x22 , x23, x24, Xc9 = x25 , x26, x27, and Xc10 = x28 , x29, x30, Xc11 =  x31 , x32, x33, Xc12 =   
x34 , x35, x36. Thus, Xcc = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x19 , x20 , x21, x22 , x23, x24, x25 , x26, x27, 
x28 , x29, x30, x31 , x32, x33, x34 , x35, x36} where the total number of elements xk in Xcc 
is equals to 24. This vector therefore represents the optimised vector Xoptimise but 
without including the effect of x37 and x38 which can be included in Xoptimise to 
complete its formation. Thus, Xoptimise ={ x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x19 , x20 , x21, x22 , x23, 
x24, x25, x26, x27, x28 , x29, x30, x31, x32, x33, x34 , x35, x36, x37, x38}. The correspondence 
between elements of the optimised vector Xoptimise and those in vector X is shown in 
Table 5.14.  
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Table 5.14 
Elements xk in parameter set of  Xoptimise and the corresponding xi. 
element xk in  Xoptimise element xi corresponding to xk in  Xoptimise 
xk1 x1 
xk2 x2 
xk3 x3 
xk4 x4 
xk5 x5 
xk6 x6 
xk7 x19 
xk8 X20 
xk9 X21 
xk10 X22 
xk11 X23 
xk12 X24 
xk13 X25 
xk14 x26 
xk15 x27 
xk16 x28 
xk17 x29 
xk18 x30 
xk19 x31 
xk20 x32 
xk21 x33 
xk22 x34 
xk23 x35 
xk24 x36 
xk25 x37 
x k26 x38 
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The optimisation process is complex and time consuming, it is almost impossible to 
carry out manually, which would probably lead to a wrong optimisation vector 
Xoptimise. Therefore it is concluded that computerization of the process is an essential. 
In this research work, the optimisation process is carried out with a specifically 
developed computer software module using C++. The task of the optimisation 
process includes retrieving elements xi corresponding to each of fault case from 
“Case database B” followed by conducting comparison process to extract elements xk 
of Xoptimise and finally saved these elements xk in a file called “Case Database C”. 
Elements xk corresponding to all fault cases are saved together in a single txt. file in 
order to so that sufficient time can be reduced in process of retrieving data from Case 
Database C for the construction of fault identification algorithm subsequently.  
 
The value of elements xk of Xoptimise of 2592 fault cases under investigation can be 
found in Appendix F. The completed algorithm and graphical user interface (GUI) 
for fault data analysis and optimisation process can be found in Appendix G. Note 
that due to the space limitation, appendix F and G are stored in the attached CD-
ROM.  
 
5.6 Development of Rule-based Fault Identification  
The elements, xk in Xoptimise, corresponding to each of the fault case saved in “Case 
Database C” file have been used as the main data in the development of the rule-
based fault identification algorithm proposed in this research work. This can be 
explained by demonstrating how the condition based-rules have been developed to 
identify R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km based on the following Table 5.15 that shows (i) 
elements xk , (ii) dominant criterions of parameters φAB, φBC, φCA and ratios R01 and 
R21 corresponding to elements xk and (iii) the data points corresponding to elements 
xk for this fault case. The detailed description of each selected dominant criterion of 
parameters φAB, φBC, φCA and ratios R01 and R21 shown in Table 5.15 below can be 
found in Table 5.5 in previous section 5.4.2.  Note that, the elements xi  of vector X 
for fault case R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km and their corresponding data points can be 
found in Table 5.10 in the previous section 5.5.2. 
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Table 5.15 
Vector Xoptimise of fault case R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km: dominant criterion and 
data points corresponding to xk. 
elements xk 
in  Xoptimise 
dominant criterion 
corresponding to xk 
data points corresponding to xk in fault cases 
R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km 
xk1 maxφAB 134.7765 
xk2 φBCmaxφAB -272.2805 
xk3 φCAmaxφAB 137.5040 
xk4 maxφBC 80.9110 
xk5 φABmaxφBC -219.0675 
xk6 φCAmaxφBC 138.1565 
xk7 0۫-crossingφAB -219.0675 
xk8 φBC0۫-crossingφAB 80.9110 
xk9 φCA0۫-crossingφAB 138.1565 
xk10 0۫-crossingφBC 80.9110 
xk11 φAB0۫-crossingφBC -219.0675 
xk12 φCA0۫-crossingφBC 138.1565 
xk13 0۫-crossingφCA 0 
xk14 φAB0۫-crossingφCA 0 
xk15 φBC0۫-crossingφCA 0 
xk16 150۫-crossingφAB 0 
xk17 φBC150۫-crossingφAB 0 
xk18 φCA150۫-crossingφAB 0 
xk19 150۫-crossingφBC 0 
xk20 φAB150۫-crossingφBC 0 
xk21 φCA150۫-crossingφBC 0 
xk22 150۫-crossingφCA 0 
xk23 φAB150۫-crossingφCA 0 
xk24 φBC150۫-crossingφCA 0 
xk25 maxR01 1.7564 
xk26 maxR21 0.8403 
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Table 5.16 shows the ‘IF-THEN’ condition-based rules that have been developed to 
identify fault case R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km.  A total of 26 ‘IF-THEN’ condition-
based rules have been developed. The input to each statement in the ‘IF-THEN’ rules 
was fulfilled so that the final output statement can be executed. This can be outlined  
as followed : the statement in rule number 2 is executed after the statement in rule 
number 1 is fulfilled and the process is repeated until  the  statements in rule number 
26 is fulfilled then, the final output statement (OUTPUT = R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-
7.5km) will be executed. Each of the input statements in ‘IF-THEN’ condition rule is 
said to be fulfilled if the value of each dominant criterion of parameters φAB, φBC, 
φCA and ratios R01 and R21 is found to be within the upper and lower limits of 
variable xk. This can be explained as follows: there are two conditions to be satisfied 
in the ‘IF-THEN’ statement of rule number 1. There are IF  (maxφAB >134.7765 -5) 
AND (maxφAB < 134.7765 +5). With maxφAB ,which is data point of φAB with 
maximum value of fault case R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km has been found to be 
134.7765 (see Table 5.10 in section 5.5.2) which falls within the upper and lower 
limits of xk1 = 134.7765. Therefore, rule 1 is said to be fulfilled and consequently 
rule 2 will be executed. The condition-based rules shown in Table 5.16 are then 
transformed into a rule-based fault identification algorithm written with C++ source 
code. 
 
Table 5.16 
 ‘IF-THEN’ condition-based rules constructed based on Table 5.15 to identify fault 
case R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km. 
number of 
rules ‘IF-THEN’ condition rules 
1 
IF (maxφAB >134.7765 -5) AND (maxφAB < 134.7765 +5) 
THEN 
2 
IF  (φBCmaxφAB <-272.2805 -5) AND (φBCmaxφAB > -272.2805 +5) 
THEN 
3 IF (φCAmaxφAB > 137.5040 -5) AND (φBCmaxφAB < 137.5040 +5) THEN 
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4 IF (maxφBC >80.9110 -5 ) AND (maxφBC <80.9110 +5) THEN 
5 IF  (φABmaxφBC < -219.0675 -5) AND (φABmaxφBC >-219.0675 +5) 
THEN 
6 IF (φCAmaxφBC > 138.1565 -5) AND (φCAmaxφBC < 138.1565 +5) 
THEN 
7 IF (0 ۫-crossingφAB <-219.0675 - 5) AND (minφAB > -
219.0675+5) THEN 
8 IF  (φBC0 ۫-crossingφAB > 80.9110 -5) AND (φBCminφAB  <80.9110 +5) 
THEN 
9 IF (φCA0 ۫-crossingφAB > 138.1565 -5) AND (φCAmaxφBC < 138.1565 
+5) THEN 
10 IF (0 ۫-crossingφBC >80.9110 -5 ) AND (maxφBC <80.9110 +5) 
THEN 
11 IF (φAB0۫-crossingφBC <-219.0675 - 5) AND (minφAB > -219.0675+5) 
THEN 
12 IF (φCA0 ۫-crossingφBC > 138.1565 -5) AND (φCAmaxφBC < 138.1565 
+5) THEN 
13 IF (0 ۫-crossingφCA = 0 ) THEN 
14 IF (φAB0۫-crossingφCA = 0) THEN 
15 IF (φBC0۫-crossingφCA = 0 ) THEN 
16 IF (150 ۫-crossingφAB = 0 ) THEN 
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17 IF (φBC150۫-crossingφAB = 0) THEN 
18 IF (φCA150۫-crossingφAB = 0 ) THEN 
19 IF (150 ۫-crossingφBC = 0) THEN 
20 IF (φAB150۫-crossingφBC = 0 ) THEN 
21 IF (φCA150۫-crossingφBC = 0 ) THEN 
22 IF (150 ۫-crossingφCA = 0) THEN 
23 IF (φAB150۫-crossingφCA = 0 ) THEN 
24 IF (φBC150۫-crossingφCA = 0) THEN 
25 IF (R01  > 0.1 ) THEN 
 
26 IF  (R21  > 0.1) THEN 
OUTPUT = R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km 
 
 
The example of condition-based rules shown in Table 5.16 above is used to indentify 
types of SLG faults. The following two condition- based rules with “IF-THEN” 
statements shown in the following Table 5.17 are added to the developed rule-based 
SLG fault identification algorithm to distinguish the normal network operating 
conditions and other network fault conditions. In this table, rule number 1 is used to 
identify normal network operating conditions and rule number 2 is used to identify 
the existence of a network fault condition. The input statements for both of rules 1 
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and 2 shown in Table 5.17 are developed based on the analysis of parameters φAB, 
φBC and φCA in normal network and fault conditions that have been reported in 
Chapter 4 section 4.3. The rules shown in Table 5.17 are evaluated before the rules in 
Table 5.16. 
  
Table 5.17 
‘IF-THEN’ condition-based rules constructed based on analysis reported in Chapter 
4 section 4.3 to identify fault case normal network condition and fault condition. 
number 
of rules ‘IF-THEN’ condition rules 
1 
IF ( 115 < φAB < 125 ) and (-245 < φBC < -235 ) 
and (115 < φCA < 125 ) THEN  
OUTPUT = NO FAULT 
2 
IF (φAB < 115 or φAB > 125 ) and (φBC <-245 ۫ or φBC > -235 ۫ )  
and ( φCA <115 or   φCA >125 ۫) THEN  
OUTPUT = FAULT EXIST 
 
In this research work, the process to develop a fault identification algorithm is 
carried out with a specifically developed computer software module using C++. The 
tasks of the whole process of constructing a fault identification algorithm include: 
retrieving elements xk from “Case Database C” file and developments of ‘IF-THEN’ 
condition-based rules based on the elements xk.  
 
5.7 Development of Phase Selection Algorithm  
As reported in Chapter 4, section 4.2.2, the DG feeder in the investigated power 
system is protected with a proposed zone protection approach. The feeder therefore is 
divided into protection zones such that when a fault occurs at a certain zone, it is 
cleared by the pair of circuit breakers that are located at the two ends of the 
considered section. For instance, it is shown in schematic diagram of the investigated 
system in Figure 5.1 that section 1 is protected with relays R1 and R11 located at the 
two ends of this section. A fault that occurs at any location within section 1 e.g., 
either 1km, 2.5km or 4km from 33 kV grid within the section 1 will cause the 
tripping of the two circuit breakers associated with R1 and R11 that contain a phase 
selector built with the proposed fault identification and phase selection algorithm. 
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The fault identification algorithm reported in the previous section 5.6 was developed 
mainly to indentify each of the SLG fault cases under consideration. The 
development of the phase selection algorithm elaborated in this section is for 
identifying the protection zone at which the fault occurs and also to indentify the 
faulty phase of a particular SLG fault case that has been detected. This applies if the 
fault case is an internal fault that may occur within section 1, 2 or 3 at the DG feeder 
(see Figure 5.1) so that the pair of relays protected that particular section can activate 
their associated circuit breakers to isolated the faulty phase within that protection 
section from the rest of the network under investigation. Note that the DG feeder is 
divided into three protection zones, sections 1, 2 and 3. Section 1 is protected with 
relays R1 and R11 while section 2 is protected with relays R2 and R22 and section 3 is 
protected with relays R3 and R33. 
 
All fault cases under consideration are classified into nine categories that reflect (i) 
the type of SLG fault either a-g , b-g or c-g fault and (ii) the protected zone in terms 
of section 1, 2 or 3 at the DG feeder, as shown in Table 5.18 below. The fault case 
related to the fault event occurred at section 1 in the investigated system has been 
classified into one of the categories from C1 to C3 depending on fault type, e.g., fault 
case R11-Ri-HL5R0D-AG-12.5km will be classified into C1 that indicates ‘AG fault 
at section 1’ which means the fault case is an a-g fault occurred at the section 1 of the 
protected zone. Note that, R11-Ri-HL5R0D-AG-12.5km refers to a-g fault (based on 
the line current measurement of relay R11 in Figure 5.1) assuming the following fault 
and network operating conditions:  Rf = 5Ω , FIA = 0۫ (corresponding to the fault 
inception time of 34.998 s), fault location = 12.5km from the 2MW DFIG (within 
section 1) , network configuration = ring network, loading condition = half load. The 
fault case related to the fault event occurred at section 2 in the investigated system 
has been classified into one of the category from C4 to C6. The fault case related to 
the fault event occurred at section 3 in the investigated system has been classified 
into one of the category from C7 to C9. The content in Table 5.18 is transformed into 
phase selection algorithm written in C++ source code. The completed fault 
identification and phase selection algorithm can be found in Appendix H in the 
attached CD-ROM.  
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Table 5.18 
The nine fault categories of 2592 fault cases under consideration.  
fault categories description 
C1 AG at section 1 
C2 BG at section 1 
C3 CG at section 1 
C4 AG at section 2 
C5 BG at section 2 
C6 CG at section 2 
C7 AG at section 3 
C8 BG at section 3 
C9 CG at section 3 
 
The phase selector of each the relays located at the DG feeder (see Figure 5.1 
Chapter 5) is assumed to be installed with the standard completed set of rule-based 
fault identification and phase selection algorithms. Therefore, a user control interface 
is assumed on each of the relay units at the DG feeder to preset the relay location, 
e.g., R1, before the installation to ensure correct discrimination of the faulty section. 
Only the pair of relays assigned to protect the faulty section responds to the results 
from fault identification and phase selection algorithm and consequently indicate the 
fault categories shown in Table 5.18. For instance, if an a-g fault occurs at 11km 
from the 2.0MW DFIG, after indentifying the fault case and fault category using the 
proposed fault identification and phase selection algorithm within the phase selector 
of each relays located at the DG feeder, only relays R1 and R11, located at both ends 
of section 1, will respond to the output results of the phase selector. Consequently, 
relay R1 and R11 will issue a tripping signal to their corresponding circuit breakers to 
isolate phase “a” of section 1 at the DG feeder from the network.  
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5.8 Verification of Fault Identification and Phase Selection Algorithm   
In the verification process, the five parameters φAB, φBC, φCA, ratios R01 and  R21 of 
each  fault case saved in the “Case Database A” folder are fed into a test module that 
contains the condition rule-based fault identification and phase selection algorithm, 
that has been developed in the previous section 5.6 and 5.7 to test the validity of the 
algorithm. The output signal from the test module that indicates (i) fault detection 
time and (ii) fault categories (see Table 5.18) are displayed graphically in the 
graphical user interface (GUI) of the test module which has been developed with 
Delphi source code [99-101]. The verification process can be summarised in flow 
chart shown in Figure 5.12 below.  
 
 
Figure 5.12 Flow chart illustrate the verification process of developed fault 
identification and phase selection algorithm. 
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In this research work, the verification process is carried out with a specifically 
developed computer software module using C++. The tasks in the process include: 
retrieving data from “Case Database A” folder, followed by feeding the five 
parameters φAB, φBC, φCA, R01 and R21 of each fault case into the test module and 
displaying the input signal and output signal of the test module in the GUI test panel. 
The completed verification test algorithm can be found in Appendix H. It is 
combined with the completed rule-based fault identification and phase selection 
algorithm in Appendix H. GUI test panel can also be found in Appendix H in the 
attached CD-ROM.  
 
5.9 Graphical User Interface (GUI) Test Panel 
Figure 5.13 shows the graphical user interface (GUI) of the test module which was 
developed using Delphi source code, for easy access of the end user to the 
verification process reported in section 5.6. There are three graphical windows in the 
developed GUI test panel. The top and middle graphical windows display the input 
signals to the test module and the bottom graphical window displays the output 
signal of the test module. The top graphical window displays input signals φAB (red 
waveform), φBC (blue waveform) and φCA (black waveform). The middle graphical 
window displays the ratios R01 (red waveform) and R21(blue waveform). The bottom 
graphical window displays the output signal from the test module that indicates (i) 
fault detection time and (ii) fault category. In this particular figure, the top and 
middle graphical windows show variations of the five parameters obtained from fault 
case R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km. The bottom graphical window shows the output 
signal corresponding to this fault case. According to the verification process shown 
in Figure 5.10, the phase selection procedure can be outlined as follows: the rule 
based fault identification algorithm will firstly indentify a ‘fault exist’ or ‘no fault’ 
condition (see condition-based rules in Table 5.17) by issuing an output signal of ‘0’ 
or ‘12’ respectively. This is achieved by assessing φAB, φBC, φCA , R01 and  R21 of 
the this fault cases. If the ‘fault exist’ condition is found, the output signal will turn 
from ‘12’ down to  ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ….,’9’ depending on the fault category which 
indentifies the faulty section and SLG fault type. Note that numerals ‘1’ to ‘9’, 
displayed in the bottom graphical window of the GUI test panel are corresponding to 
C1  to C9  in Table 5.18. The fault detection time refers to the time instant when the 
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output signal turns from ‘12’ corresponding to a ‘fault exists’ condition, to ‘1’ to ‘9’ 
that indicates the fault category.  
 
In addition to the graphical windows, two text windows have been included in the 
GUI. The top test window display the file names of all 2592 fault cases under 
consideration, and the file name of a particular fault case that has been loaded for the 
verification test is highlighted in blue, i.e., R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km.  The bottom 
text window displays a summary of the result obtained from the verification test. The 
information included in this text window are (i) the file name of each input fault case 
being verified. i.e., Tested Fault Case = R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km (ii) output 
results of test module that consisting of the fault detection time and the fault category 
i.e., Detected Fault Category = C5 (BG at section 2) and Fault Detection Time =  
35.0185 s.  
 
 
Figure 5.13 Display of output and input signal of test module in GUI test panel.  
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5.10 Verification Test Results  
The complete verification test to indentify each of the fault cases, from the total of 
2592, has been conducted. The proposed fault identification and phase selection 
algorithms have successfully indentified each of the fault cases and fault categories. 
Due to space limitation, the verification test results are shown in Appendix H in CD-
ROM. Note that all fault cases under consideration have been loaded into the upper 
text window of the GUI test panel shown in Appendix G. The reader can assess the 
verification test result corresponding to a particular fault case by click on that file 
name displayed in the upper text window in the GUI test panel, so that the output  
test results will be displayed in the three graphical windows and bottom text window 
in the GUI test panel.The test results shown in following sections are used to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the developed rule-based fault identification and 
phase selection algorithm operating over wide range of network operating condition 
and fault conditions. Note that the fault cases chosen for testing are picked randomly 
to reflect the different network scenarios e.g., different fault resistance and network 
loading levels that have been considered in this research work (see Table 4.4 ,section 
4.5, Chapter 4).  
 
5.10.1 Different Type of SLG Faults  
Figure 5.14(a) to (c) show fault cases of three different SLG faults including AG, BG 
and CG fault. The network operating condition and network fault condition remain 
the same for all three fault cases where fault location = 9km from the 2MW DFIG 
(section 2), fault inception = 0۫, fault resistance = 0Ω, network operating condition = 
radial network operating mode and network loading level = full loading. 
 
5.10.2 SLG Faults occurred at different Fault Sections 
Figure 5.15(a) to (c) show fault cases that occurs at the middle of three different 
sections: section 1(12.5km from the 2MW DFIG), section 2 (7.5km from the 2MW 
DFIG) and section 3(2.5km from the 2MG DFIG). The other network operating 
condition and network fault conditions remain the same for all three fault cases 
where fault type = BG fault, fault inception = 0۫, fault resistance = 0Ω, network 
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operating condition = ring network operating mode and network loading level = half 
loading. 
 
5.10.3 SLG Fault with different Fault Resistances 
Figure 5.16(a) to (b) show fault cases with two different fault resistances of 0Ω and 
5Ω. The other network operating condition and network fault condition remain the 
same for all three fault cases where fault type = CG fault, fault inception = 0۫, fault 
location = 14km from 2MG DFIG (within section1), network operating condition= 
radial network operating mode and network loading level= full loading. 
 
5.10.4 SLG Fault with different Fault Inception Angle  
Figure 5.17(a) to (b) show fault cases that occur at two different fault inception 
angles 0 ۫ and 90۫. The other network operating condition and network fault condition 
remain the same for all three fault cases where fault type = CG fault, fault resistance 
= 5Ω, fault location = 4km from the 2MW DFIG (within section 3), network 
operating condition= ring network operating mode and network loading level = half 
loading. 
 
5.10.5 SLG Fault with different Network Operating Mode 
Figure 5.18(a) to (b) show fault cases that are for two different network operating 
modes, i.e., radial and ring operating modes. The other network operating condition 
and network fault condition remain the same for all three fault cases where           
fault type = AG fault, fault inception = 90 ۫, fault location = 7.5km from the 2MW 
DFIG (within section 2), fault resistance = 0Ω and network loading level = full 
loading. 
 
5.10.6 SLG Fault with different Network Loading Level  
Figure 5.19(a) to (b) show fault cases for two different network loading levels, i.e., 
load and half load. The other network operating condition and network fault 
conditions remain uniform for all three fault cases where fault type = BG fault, fault 
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inception = 0۫, fault location = 2.5km from the 2MW DFIG (within section 3), fault 
resistance = 5Ω, network operating condition = ring network operating mode.  
 
 
Figure 5.14(a) fault cases: R22-Ra-FL0R0D-AG-9km, fault detection time: 35.008 s 
fault categories: C4 (AG at section 2).  
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Figure 5.14(b) fault cases: R22-Ra-FL0R0D-BG-9km, fault detection time: 35.004 s 
fault categories: C5 (BG at section 2).  
 149 
 
Figure 5.14(c) fault cases: R22-Ra-FL0R0D-CG-9km, fault detection time: 35.0175 s 
fault categories: C6 (CG at section 2). 
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Figure 5.15(a) fault cases: R11-Ri-HL0R0D-BG-12.5km, fault detection time: 
35.003 s fault categories: C2 (BG at section 1). 
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Figure 5.15(b) fault cases: R22-Ri-HL0R0D-BG-7.5km, fault detection time: 
35.0025 s fault categories: C5 (BG at section 2). 
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Figure 5.15(c) fault cases: R33-Ri-HL0R0D-BG-2.5km, fault detection time: 35.002 
s fault categories: C8 (BG at section 3). 
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Figure 5.16(a) fault cases: R11-Ra-FL0R0D-CG-14km, fault detection time: 35.014 s 
fault categories: C3 (CG at section 1). 
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Figure 5.16(b) fault cases: R11-Ra-FL5R0D-CG-14km, fault detection time: 35.0175 
s fault categories: C3 (CG at section 1). 
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Figure 5.17(a) fault cases: R33-Ri-HL5R0D-CG-4km, fault detection time: 35.008 s 
fault categories: C9 (CG at section 3). 
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Figure 5.17(b) fault cases: R33-Ri-HL5R90D-CG-4km, fault detection time: 35.0075 
s fault categories: C9 (CG at section 3). 
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Figure 5.18(a) fault cases: R22-Ra-FL0R90D-AG-7.5km, fault detection time: 
35.0165 s fault categories: C4 (AG at section 2). 
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Figure 5.18(b) fault cases: R22-Ri-FL0R90D-AG-7.5km, fault detection time: 
35.016 s fault categories: C4 (AG at section 2). 
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Figure 5.19(a) fault cases: R33-Ri-FL5R0D-BG-2.5km, fault detection time: 35.0025 
s fault categories: C8 (BG at section 3). 
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Figure 5.19(b) fault cases: R33-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-2.5km, fault detection time: 
35.0025 s fault categories: C8 (BG at section 3). 
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5.9 Discussion  
In this chapter, each stage of the digital data processing and analysing, algorithm 
construction and testing of the proposed rule-based fault identification and phase 
selection algorithm has been discussed in detail. The test results from the verification 
process have shown the following: 
 
a. The proposed adaptive rule-based fault identification algorithm can 
successfully indentified all of the SLG fault cases under consideration.  
 
b. The proposed phase selection algorithms can successfully indentifying the 
faulty phase and faulty section after a particular fault case is indentified.  
 
c. The proposed method is effective over a wide range of network operating and 
fault conditions.  
 
d. The fault detection time varies with fault cases. The speed of fault detection 
time is subjected to the criterions being used to construct the rule-based fault 
identification algorithm. 
 
e. The proposed method has successfully indentified the faulty phase and faulty 
section within a period of one cycle after fault inception. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
 
6.1 Summary and Conclusions  
 
6.1.1 Literature Review  
Current protection arrangements in existing radial distribution networks that are 
based on a conventional overcurrent protection approach and three phase auto-
reclosing scheme are becoming incompatible with the presence of DGs. Substantial 
research work has been carried out to find potential solutions for various DG 
protection issues. Examples include the application of an adaptive distance protection 
scheme to improve the transient performance of DGs during fault condition in cable 
distribution network. Another example involving the application of an ANN 
technique to detect LOM condition particularly where the DGs is islanded with a 
load of similar capacity, has been proposed. 
 
The following issues have been indentified from continuous literature survey: 
 
a. Current protection solutions that consider maintaining operation of DGs 
during fault condition are limited. In most proposed solutions, where the 
DGs are connected downstream of a feeder, protective devices need to 
ensure the disconnection of DGs before the 1st reclose action of the 
recloser takes place, to prevent islanding operation and disruption of the 
operation of conventional three phase auto reclosing schemes. Only a few 
research works that deal with solving the problem of maintaining the 
continued operation of DGs have been reported.  Examples of such 
include the implementation of a zone protection scheme and an intensive 
communication medium in a distribution network with DGs to ensure 
continued operation of the DGs during fault conditions as far as possible. 
 
b. With efficient DG placement and effective new adaption in both network 
voltage control and network protection, there is a possibility that future 
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distribution networks can be operated in ring, rather than radial mode, to 
increase the penetration of DGs. Although, general protection issues in 
ring operated networks have been addressed in the literature, further 
comprehensive research work is needed to identify the factors which 
influence the transient stability of DGs in a ring network. This is 
necessary to determine the new protection requirements needed to ensure 
continued operation of DGs during fault conditions in both radial and ring 
network modes of operation. 
 
c. The adoption of a dynamic model of the DG is essential to thoroughly 
understand the transient response of DGs during network fault condition 
which in turn would help in facilitating the development of a potential 
protection solution for a particular protection issue due to grid connected 
DGs. However, the appropriate dynamic model of DGs, particularly FSIG 
and DFIG, which are the two popular types of DG, technologies in wind 
power generation, has not been considered in most of  the research work 
has been conducted to investigate network protection issues related to 
DGs.  
 
d. It has been recognised that 80% of faults which occur in existing 
distribution networks are temporary, and most of them are SLG. This 
should give a strong incentive to find ways for maintaining DGs in 
service during temporary SLG faults as far as possible, which would 
benefit utilities, DG developers and customers. It appears from the 
literature review that no research work has been carried out to investigate 
fault identification and phase selection algorithm in existing overhead 
distribution networks that takes into consideration the operation of DGs 
during fault conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 164 
Thus, the work conducted in this research project has been focused on investigation 
of the following three topics in order to address the issues that have been identified 
above:  
 
a. Investigation into the feeder protection requirements for continued 
operation of DGs in ring overhead distribution networks with DGs. 
 
b. Investigation into the requirements of a new auto-reclosing scheme by 
assessing the sustainability of FSIG and DFIG during temporary SLG 
faults and observing the performance of both types of induction generator 
during recloser opening time. 
 
c. Investigation into the development of fault identification and phase 
selection algorithms to be used in a novel SPAR scheme, specifically 
suitable to a distribution network with DGs. 
 
The adoption of an appropriate dynamic model of both DFIG and FSIG based on 
wind power generation has been used in the investigations listed above.   
 
6.1.2 Investigation into Factors affecting Transient Stability of DGs during 
Fault Condition in Distribution Network with Ring Operating Mode. 
The literature review carried out in this research project shows that future 
distribution networks will be operated in ring operation mode, compared to radial, to 
increase the installation capacity of DGs. Thus, an investigation is presented in 
chapter 3 to indentify the generator’s CCT for the FSIG and consequently the factors 
that affect the transient stability of integrated FSIG in a ring feeder in MV overhead 
distribution network during fault condition. The investigation is intended to identify 
the requirements for feeder protection in a ring network with DGs to ensure proper 
coordination between protective devices in a ring feeder, so that the fault clearing 
time does not exceed the generators’ CCT, and operation of DGs can be continued 
after the faulted line section has been detected and isolated.  
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In this investigation, the investigated system is assumed to be configured in radial 
operation mode and then switches to ring operation mode. The considered FSIG is 
located at a feeder different from the faulty feeder. The following has been 
concluded from the simulation results obtained in this study:  
 
a. Transient stability of DG is improved in ring compared to radial network 
operation. Thus, different relay time tripping setting are required to 
preserve the operation of DG that is located at an adjacent healthy feeder 
during fault condition in a ring network, compared to a radial network.  
 
b. Other than that, it is reported in this investigation that longer tripping time 
can be allowed to maintain the stability of DGs if the faulty feeder is 
protected with zone protection scheme compared to a conventional time-
graded overcurrent scheme. Under a zone protection scheme the faulty 
feeder is divided into several sections by installing additional protective 
devices. In such an arrangement the internal fault occurring within a 
particular section is isolated from the investigated system. In contrast, 
under a time graded overcurrent protection scheme, the whole faulty 
feeder is isolated from the investigated network, regardless of the fault 
location at the feeder.  
 
c. Finally, simulation results revealed that an optimised generator location 
and tripping sequence of protective devices need to be taken into 
consideration when developing a novel protection in a ring network with 
DGs to maintain continued operation of DG at healthy feeders during 
fault conditions. 
 
6.1.3 Investigation into the Sustainability of FSIG and DFIG during Temporary 
SLG fault 
The literature survey shows that 80% of network faults occurring in overhead 
distribution networks are temporary and most of them are SLG fault. It is becoming 
increasingly important that DGs should remain in service during temporary SLG 
fault events as far possible for the benefits of customers, power utilities and DG 
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developers. Thus, investigation into the sustainability of both FSIG and DFIG during 
temporary SLG in MV overhead distribution networks has been presented in Chapter 
3. The investigation is intended to determine the requirements for a new auto-
reclosing scheme in a distribution network with DGs to ensure the continued 
operation of DGs during SLG fault condition. The following conclusions have been 
reached with respect to the sustainability of FSIG and DFIG during temporary SLG 
faults.   
 
6.1.3.1 Comparison between Transient Performance of FSIG and DFIG in 
Radial and Ring Operated Distribution Network 
a. The literature survey shows that it is important to adopt an appropriate dynamic 
model of DGs in research work related to DG protection issues in existing 
distribution networks. Thus, detailed dynamic models of both grid-connected 
FSIG and DFIG that are suitable for fault analysis have been used to compare 
and examine the transient performance of FSIG and DFIG in a network with 
radial and ring operating modes.  
 
b. The simulation results revealed that for a fault event located at the DG feeder, the 
overall transient performance of both DFIG and FSIG is considerably improved 
in ring network compared to radial network operation. Moreover, longer fault 
clearance time can be allowed while maintaining the transient stability of both 
DFIG and FSIG in a ring network compared to a radial network.  
 
c. In addition to that, DFIG has a better transient performance following a three-
phase-to-ground fault, compared to FSIG in both radial and ring operated 
networks. The operation of DGs should be maintained in fault conditions to 
maximise the benefits of the DGs interconnection. In this context, operating 
FSIG in a radial network has been found as the worst case scenario in deciding 
the tripping time setting of the circuit breakers.  
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6.1.3.2 Effect of Unsymmetrical SLG Fault Event on the Transient Stability of 
DG and Operation of G59 Protection 
a. The sustainability of both FSIG and DFIG during temporary single-phase-to-
ground fault condition, while complying with the under/over voltage protection 
requirements of G59 have been determined in this investigation.  
 
b. The simulation results revealed that SLG fault are not critical compared to 
symmetrical three-phase-to-ground faults. Both FSIG and DFIG remain stable 
during SLG fault conditions, although the voltage dip during fault conditions 
drops below the undervoltage limits specified in G59. Thus, if the operation of 
DG during fault conditions is permitted in the future, then the current voltage 
limits of under/over voltage protection specified in G59 needs to be justified.  
 
c. Additionally, the action of the control scheme installed on the DFIG can improve 
the transient performance of DFIG compared to FSIG during the post fault period.   
 
6.1.3.3   Impact of Operation of SPAR on the Transient Performance of DGs 
a. The following two aspects related to the impact of the operation of SPAR on the 
transient performance of DG have been assessed in this investigation :  
• Effect of recloser opening time (To) on dynamic behaviour of DG 
• Effect of recloser opening time (To) on transient stability of DG 
 
b. The effect of recloser opening time (To) on dynamic behaviour of FSIG is more 
significant compared to DFIG, particularly when the investigated system is 
operated in radial operating mode e.g., the terminal voltage of FSIG drops 
significantly during the recloser opening time when To settings of high speed 
reclosing attempts are increased from 0.5s to 2.0s.  
 
c. The effect of recloser opening time (To) on the transient stability of DGs is 
determined by assessing the main machine parameters of DG which include 
generator terminal voltage, active power and rotor speed. If these parameters 
regain their prefault values during recloser opening time, after isolating the fault, 
the generator will be considered as stable, otherwise it is unstable. 
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d. The simulation results revealed that DFIG is more robust compared to FSIG. 
With the action of the control scheme installed at DFIG, it remains stable under 
different To settings for high speed and time delayed reclosing attempts. To 
settings of high speed attempts that have been considered in this simulation are 
0.5 s, 1.0s and 2.0 s. To settings of time delayed attempt that have been 
considered in this simulation are 10 s, 30 s and 60 s.  
 
e. If DGs are permitted to operate in SLG fault conditions in the future, the type of 
DG technology and network operation mode needs to be taken into consideration 
when deciding the recloser opening time. For instance, in the radial network with 
grid connected FSIG, if the faulty section is located far from the generator, a 
longer To setting can be applied.  
 
6.1.4 Investigation into the Development of Adaptive Rule-based Fault 
Identification and Phase Selection Algorithm for Maintaining Continued 
Operation of DGs during Fault Condition 
The development of an adaptive rule-based fault identification and phase selection 
algorithm to be used in SPAR scheme for a distribution network with DG has been 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
In Chapter 4, a comprehensive simulation analysis has been presented to demonstrate 
how types of SLG faults occurring in overhead 11 kV distribution networks with 
DFIG can be indentified and then isolated from the network with the proposed rule-
based fault identification and phase selection algorithm. The SLG fault is assumed to 
occur at the DG feeder where the feeder is protected with a zone protection scheme 
incorporated with SPAR. Under the zone protection scheme with SPAR, only the 
faulty phase within the faulty section is isolated from the network to ensure the 
operation of the DG at the same feeder can continue in SLG fault conditions. The 
proposed fault identification strategy is based on the analysis of the phase angle 
between line currents, and the ratio of sequence components of the line currents that 
obtained from the relay point before fault condition and during the transient period 
that follows the fault condition. 
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 The simulation results indicate that the proposed rule-based fault identification and 
phase selection algorithm can successfully identify the type of SLG fault, only using 
three line current measurements at the relay point. The type of SLG fault has been 
indentified within one cycle after fault inception. The fault detection speed depends 
on the criterions being used to construct the rule-based fault identification algorithm. 
The high speed of fault detection capability of the proposed technique can facilitate 
the operation of a high speed phase selector. Additionally, high speed fault detection 
is also one of the main requirements to maintain the transient stability of grid 
connected DGs.  
 
A total of 2592 fault cases have been simulated using PSCAD/EMTDC transient 
analysis software packages to reproduce the possible SLG fault events assumed in a 
practical overhead MV distribution network with varying system operating and fault 
conditions. Consequently, a more effective manner is needed to analysis the fault 
data, so that the unique characteristics of each considered SLG fault case can be 
found and eventually the fault type of each fault case can be indentified correctly. In 
this context, several software programmes have been specifically developed using 
C++ to handle the process of data saving and analysing in order to effectively 
manage the large volume of collected fault data and extract the useful information 
required for the development of the proposed rule-based fault identification and 
phase selection algorithm.   
 
The overall process of digital data processing, that includes fault data analysis and 
fault data optimisation, followed by the process of rule-based fault identification and 
phase selection algorithm construction and finally the verification process, have been 
presented in Chapter 5. The aim of the fault data analysis process is to determine 
common parameters of interest, e.g., max and min values, and to identify the features 
of each fault case. A total of 38 elements that represent the features of each fault case 
have been indentified. These elements are stored in a vector X where X = {x1, x2,…., 
xi,….,xm}, i = 1, 2, 3,…, m. xi is the ith element in vector X and m = 38.  They are 
selected from a total of 275 data points which constitute the total collected data 
points within a window for a particular fault case. The aim of the fault data 
optimization process is to determine the minimum number of elements of vector X 
that is sufficient to distinguish each fault case from the others in the total of 2592 
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fault cases. Application of optimization process has resulted in an optimized vector 
Xoptimise with 26 elements such that Xoptimise ={x1, x2,….,xk,….,xn}, k =1, 2, 3,…, n. xk 
is the kth element and n = 26. The input data used to develop the rule-based fault 
identification algorithm consists of the elements of Xoptimise. A phase selection 
algorithm is developed to further classify each of the fault cases that have been 
successfully indentified into 9 fault categories that reflect the information of fault 
section and fault phase corresponding to that fault case. The output result of the 
phase selection algorithm is used as an output tripping signal for the phase selector 
module that contains the proposed rule-based fault identification and phase selection 
algorithm. 
 
Verification of the proposed rule-based fault identification and phase selection 
algorithm was achieved by feeding each fault case into the test module that contains 
developed rule-based fault identification and phase selection algorithm for testing the 
ability of the algorithms to correctly identify the considered fault case and fault 
category. In this context, a graphical user interface (GUI) of the test module has been 
developed using Delphi software, for easy access to the verification process. 
 
The simulation test results from the verification process revealed that the proposed 
adaptive rule-based fault identification algorithm has successfully indentified each of 
the considered SLG fault cases. Additionally, it has been proved that the proposed 
rule-based fault identification and phase selection algorithms are effective over a 
wide range of network scenarios. It was also found that, the fault detection time 
varies with the fault cases. The speed of fault detection time is subjected to the 
criterions being used to construct the rule-based fault identification algorithm. 
Finally, the proposed phase selection algorithm has also successfully indentified the 
faulty phase and faulty section within a period of one cycle after fault inception. 
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6.2 Contribution to Knowledge  
 
1. Appropriate dynamic models of FSIG and DFIG that are suitable for use in fault 
analysis have been adopted in all investigations carried out in this research 
project. 
 
2. The factors affecting generator’s CCT in a ring operated 11kV overhead 
distribution network with FSIG have been determined.  
 
3. Transient response of both FSIG and DFIG in radial and ring operated 11kV 
overhead distribution networks have been investigated. 
 
4. The effect of unsymmetrical SLG fault events on (i) the transient stability of both 
FSIG and DFIG and (ii) the under/over voltage limits specified in G59 protection 
have been determined. 
 
5. The effect of recloser opening time (To) on the transient response of both FSIG 
and DFIG has been determined.  
 
6. A proposal was made for the implementation of SPAR, incorporated with a zone 
protection scheme, to an existing MV overhead distribution network with DG, to 
ensure continued operation of DG during SLG faults.  
 
7. Development of adaptive rule-based fault identification and phase selection 
algorithm to be used in SPAR stated in (6), for the SLG fault detection and 
isolation. 
 
8. Development of several software modules in C++ to efficiently handle the 
process of data analysis followed by algorithm development and verification tests.  
 
9. Development of a verification test panel with a GUI using Delphi for easy access 
to the verification process.  
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6.3 Future Work 
The work presented in this research project can be further developed to enhance the 
final research output results if sufficient time is allowed to accomplish the work 
involved for further development as listed below:   
 
6.3.1 Further Development on the Proposed Method to Indentify All Types of 
Fault Events  
There are two aspects in relation to the objective of developing the proposed rule-
based fault identification algorithm and phase selection technique. The first aspects is 
related to identifying the type of SLG fault event and faulty section within the DG 
feeder in the investigated network to ensure the correct isolation of the faulty phase, 
within the faulty section, from the network, so that the operation of DG can be 
continued during an SLG fault. The second aspect is related to identifying other 
types of fault event including DLG, LL and three phase symmetrical faults to ensure 
the tripping of all three phases of a faulty section when one of these fault types is 
indentified. Due to insufficient research time, only the first aspect of the main 
objective has been achieved and the verification test results show that the proposed 
method is very accurate. The second aspect of main objective is left to be 
accomplished subsequently, if the research project is to be continued.  
 
The proposed method is essentially dependent on the analysis of the phase difference 
between the fault currents and the magnitude of the sequence component of the fault 
current at the fundamental frequency. According to the comprehensive analysis 
presented in Chapter 4, DLG, LL and three phase symmetrical fault types can be 
distinguished, based on the same principle that has been used in the proposed method. 
The process of fault data analysis presented in chapter 5 needs to be adapted to 
accommodate the large volume of the fault data that takes into consideration DLG, 
LL and three phase symmetrical fault cases.  
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6.3.2 Analysis to Distinguish between Fault Event and Other Network Transient 
Event 
Network transient events such as load switching activities, will produce transient 
currents which are similar to fault events. For instance, in a distribution network, 
most of the industrial loads are squirrel cage induction motor  and the transient 
current due to the starting of the squirrel cage induction motor is 8 to 10 times the 
full load current, which is similar to a fault event .  
 
The proposed method basically dependents on the analysis of the significant 
variation of the phase angle between fault currents within the first cycle after fault 
inception, rather than the magnitude of the fault current (see Chapter 4 section 4.3.4). 
The variation of phase angle between line currents during the first cycle after starting 
of a motor may not be significantly different compared to those found in the first 
cycle after fault inception and needs to be checked. Thus, an analysis could be 
carried out to compare the variation of phase angle between line currents due to fault 
events and those due to the starting up of a squirrel cage motor in order to ensure that 
the proposed method can distinguish between these two network transient events. 
 
 
6.3.3 Modification to the Existing Model of 11kV Overhead Distribution 
Network with DG Used in the Proposed Method 
Several assumptions have been made in modelling the investigated 11kV overhead 
distribution network with DG used in the development of the proposed method. The 
following modifications could be made to improve the reliability of the output results 
of the proposed method.  
 
a. As reported in Chapter 3 section 3.2.6, an assumption has been made in 
modelling the distribution line. In the absence of detailed information about 
the zero sequence impedance, Z0 the ratio of Z0 /Z1 = 2 as suggested in the 
literature [84] has been adopted in the development of the proposed method. 
Due to the fact that Z0 is important in determining unsymmetrical fault 
currents, the generated fault cases would be more reliable if real data for Z0 is 
used compared to the assumed one. Thus, it is worth carrying out analysis to 
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compare the existing fault data, based on the assumed value of Z0,  with those 
based on its real value.  
 
b. Only one type of system earthing arrangement has been considered in the 
proposed method, which is the solid neutral earthing arrangement. As 
reported in Chapter 2 section 2.3, it is one of the common earthing systems 
being used in 11kV distribution networks in the UK. The other earthing 
system arrangement in 11 kV distribution networks is an impedance neutral 
earthing system arrangement. The proposed method essentially depends on 
the phase difference between fault currents and the magnitude of the 
sequence components of the fault currents at the fundamental frequency. 
Thus, the magnitude of these sequence components would be varying. Thus, 
it is worth carrying out analysis to compare existing fault data with those 
obtained from an investigated network with an impedance neutral earthing 
system arrangement. 
 
c. Inclusion of different types of DG model into the investigated network, such 
as wind turbine driven induction generator and synchronous generators. 
According to the literature review, different DG technologies have their own 
unique operational characteristic, which will affect their transient response 
during network faults. Thus, it is worth carrying out analysis to compare the 
existing fault data with those obtained from investigated networks with the 
wind power generator based on fixed speed induction machines and 
synchronous machines. 
 
6.3.4   Development of Proposed Method Based on Fault Data Obtained from 
Real-World Overhead Distribution Network   
The development of the proposed method is based on the simulation data. In order to 
check the reliability of the proposed method into a real-world power distribution 
network, an investigation into the development of the proposed method based on 
fault data obtained from a real-world power distribution network with DG could be 
carried out.  
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Appendix A.1 
 
 
System Data for 0.6MW Wind Power based FSIG [69] 
1. Wind Turbine Mechanical System Parameters: 
Generator moment of inertia = 0.5s 
Turbine moment of inertia = 3.2s 
Generator damping coefficient = 0 p.u 
Turbine damping coefficient = 0 p.u 
Turbine-generator mutual damping coefficient = 0 p.u 
Shaft stiffness = 55 p.u 
 
2. Induction Generator Parameters : 
Stator resistance = 0.0092p.u 
First cage resistance = 0.0082p.u 
Second cage resistance = 10p.u 
Stator leakage reactance = 0.0945p.u 
      Magnetising reactance = 4.0958p.u 
     Rotor mutual reactance = 0.113p.u 
Rated frequency = 50Hz 
Synchronous speed = 1500r.p.m 
Number of poles = 4 
 
Note: The per unit data are given based on corresponding full load voltage and active 
power of 0.6 MW squirrel cage induction machine. 
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Appendix A.2 
 
 
System Data for 2.0 MW Wind Power based FSIG and DFIG Generator [81] 
1. Wind Turbine Mechanical System Parameters: 
Generator moment of inertia = 1.4s 
Turbine moment of inertia = 6s 
Generator damping coefficient = 0.02p.u 
Turbine damping coefficient = 0.02p.u 
Turbine-generator mutual damping coefficient = 4.5p.u 
Shaft stiffness = 100p.u 
 
2. Induction Generator Parameters: 
Stator resistance = 0.0175p.u 
Rotor resistance = 0.019p.u 
Stator leakage reactance = 0.2571p.u 
Rotor leakage reactance = 0.295p.u 
Magnetizing reactance = 6.921p.u 
Stator to rotor turn ratio = 0.4333 
Rated frequency = 50Hz 
Synchronous speed = 1500r.p.m 
Number of poles = 4 
 
Note: the per unit data are given based on corresponding full load values of voltage 
and active power of 2.0MW wound rotor induction machine. 
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Appendix B  
 
 
Table 1: Data points of φIa , φIb  and φIc corresponding to the a-g fault in Figure 
4.2  
Table 1 below shows the phase angle of line current a, b and c,  φIa , φIb  and φIc that  
obtained from relay R11 in the investigated system shown in Chapter 4  Figure 4.1.  
The parameters φAB, φBC and φCA are derived from φIa , φIb  and φIc using the three 
equations B.1 to B.3  shown below:  
 
ba IIAB ϕϕϕ −=         (B.1)   
                                                 
cb IIBC ϕϕϕ −=        (B.2)  
 
ac IICA ϕϕϕ −=                                                                                  (B.3) 
 
Table 1 
The value of φIa , φIb  and φIc prior and following a-g fault corresponding to figure 
4.2 from t = 34.996 s to t = 35.016 s. 
Time (s) Phase angle of line current Ia, Ib, and  Ic 
φIa ( ۫ ) φIb ( ۫ ) φIc ( ۫ ) 
34.9960 -14.0570 -136.1375 106.2083 
34.9965 -13.8800 -136.0587 106.2158 
34.9970 -13.7347 -136.0115 106.2225 
34.9975 -13.6255 -135.9892 106.2232 
34.9980 -13.5332 -135.9868 106.2036 
34.9985 -13.5819 -135.9968 106.1484 
34.9990 -13.6993 -136.0176 106.0726 
34.9995 -13.6750 -136.0695 106.0184 
35.0000 -13.4886 -136.1683 105.9866 
35.0005 -13.1623 -136.3782 105.9304 
35.0010 -13.0842 -136.4466 105.7062 
35.0015 -13.2440 -136.3923 105.2618 
35.0020 -13.7143 -136.2746 104.5883 
35.0025 -14.5742 -136.1850 103.7096 
35.0030 -16.4898 -136.5343 102.2418 
35.0035 -18.5565 -137.1445 101.1142 
35.0040 -21.1113 -137.8823 100.1614 
35.0045 -24.0959 -138.7393 99.5523 
35.0050 -27.5279 -139.8730 99.5430 
35.0055 -32.8547 -141.8226 101.1301 
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35.0060 -37.3408 -143.5310 104.2045 
35.0065 -42.1321 -145.3541 109.7348 
35.0070 -47.0646 -147.1367 118.6236 
35.0075 -52.1589 -148.8563 131.0095 
35.0080 -59.1655 -150.8052 149.4766 
35.0085 -64.5169 -151.6305 160.7965 
35.0090 -69.8992 -151.2830 168.4584 
35.0095 -75.2697 -148.5195 172.9555 
35.0100 -80.5897 -140.3460 175.1830 
35.0105 -87.5476 -108.7990 175.8776 
35.0110 -92.6244 -73.8178 175.3688 
35.0115 -97.5357 -53.8101 174.4064 
35.0120 -102.2311 -45.9375 173.2555 
35.0125 -106.6507 -43.4769 172.1166 
35.0130 -111.9515 -43.8342 171.0030 
35.0135 -115.3660 -45.3361 170.6912 
35.0140 -118.2673 -47.3637 170.9106 
35.0145 -120.6517 -49.6943 171.7237 
35.0150 -122.4536 -52.0966 173.2437 
35.0155 -123.9554 -55.1688 176.3442 
35.0160 -124.5081 -57.2638 179.2832 
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Appendix C  
 
 
Data Points of 2592 Fault Cases under Consideration 
Appendix C is stored in the attached CD-ROM.  Appendix C shows the data points 
of 2592 fault in txt.form. The values of the data points of the 2592 fault cases under 
consideration have been generated using PSCAD/EMTDC.  
 
Appendix D 
 
 
Elements of Vector X of 2592 Fault Cases under Consideration 
Appendix D is stored in the attached CD-ROM.  Appendix D shows the values of 
elements of vector X of 2592 fault cases that have been investigated in the fault data 
analysis process of section 5.2, Chapter 5.  
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Appendix E 
 
 
Table 1: Data point of φAB, φBC , φCA, R01and R21corresponding to fault case: 
R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km 
Table 1 
Data point of φAB, φBC , φCA, R01and R21corresponding to 
fault case: R22-Ri-HL5R0D-BG-7.5km, from investigated time interval  t = 34.9915 
s to t = 35.0185 s 
Time (s) 
Phase angle difference between line 
current 
Ratio of magnitude of 
sequence component of 
line current  
φAB( ۫ ) φBC( ۫ ) φCA( ۫ ) R01 R21 
34.9915 123.3140 -242.0193 118.7053 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9920 123.1413 -242.0090 118.8678 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9925 122.9590 -241.9527 118.9937 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9930 123.0985 -242.0334 118.9349 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9935 123.1695 -242.0825 118.9129 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9940 123.0578 -241.9435 118.8857 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9945 122.9072 -241.7119 118.8046 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9950 122.9027 -241.7103 118.8076 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9955 122.9357 -241.9100 118.9743 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9960 122.9338 -241.8922 118.9583 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9965 122.9660 -241.7905 118.8245 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9970 123.0049 -241.7136 118.7086 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9975 123.0399 -241.6544 118.6145 0.0000 0.0009 
34.9980 123.0699 -241.5841 118.5142 0.0000 0.0010 
34.9985 122.7951 -241.4437 118.6486 0.0001 0.0012 
34.9990 122.2632 -241.8024 119.5391 0.0021 0.0032 
34.9995 122.1035 -243.3164 121.2129 0.0097 0.0083 
35.0000 122.4668 -245.9976 123.5308 0.0259 0.0175 
35.0005 123.8450 -251.1255 127.2805 0.0642 0.0367 
35.0010 125.5766 -255.9939 130.4173 0.1055 0.0555 
35.0015 127.9787 -261.3532 133.3745 0.1568 0.0782 
35.0020 131.0631 -266.8470 135.7839 0.2165 0.1048 
35.0025 134.7765 -272.2805 137.5040 0.2826 0.1335 
35.0030 -219.0675 80.9110 138.1565 0.3769 0.1738 
35.0035 -213.2407 76.2931 136.9477 0.4495 0.2055 
35.0040 -206.1558 72.1417 134.0141 0.5215 0.2377 
35.0045 -197.5448 68.5248 129.0201 0.5919 0.2697 
35.0050 -187.3829 65.4481 121.9348 0.6588 0.3013 
35.0055 -173.3479 61.9710 111.3769 0.7384 0.3425 
35.0060 -164.2627 59.8185 104.4442 0.7877 0.3716 
35.0065 -157.3010 58.1077 99.1933 0.8260 0.3979 
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35.0070 -152.9198 56.7472 96.1726 0.8524 0.4204 
35.0075 -150.7511 55.6950 95.0561 0.8680 0.4391 
35.0080 -151.1245 54.6995 96.4250 0.8753 0.4547 
35.0085 -153.2127 54.2078 99.0049 0.8770 0.4598 
35.0090 -156.2175 53.8540 102.3634 0.8824 0.4615 
35.0095 -159.3926 53.4530 105.9396 0.8967 0.4642 
35.0100 -162.0572 52.8325 109.2247 0.9231 0.4704 
35.0105 -163.2757 51.5205 111.7552 0.9779 0.4858 
35.0110 -160.1076 50.1693 109.9383 1.0315 0.5025 
35.0115 -147.4849 48.6602 98.8247 1.0914 0.5233 
35.0120 -110.8990 47.0770 63.8219 1.1539 0.5480 
35.0125 -67.3936 45.3306 22.0630 1.2193 0.5739 
35.0130 -46.3822 42.9378 3.4444 1.3093 0.6084 
35.0135 -41.7975 41.2427 0.5548 1.3755 0.6344 
35.0140 -40.2717 39.6772 0.5944 1.4386 0.6604 
35.0145 -40.1406 38.2620 1.8786 1.4980 0.6861 
35.0150 -40.8785 37.0489 3.8296 1.5546 0.7115 
35.0155 -42.6920 35.7180 6.9740 1.6232 0.7452 
35.0160 -44.3797 34.8823 9.4975 1.6666 0.7698 
35.0165 -46.0346 34.1132 11.9214 1.7011 0.7926 
35.0170 -47.4735 33.4105 14.0630 1.7254 0.8118 
35.0175 -48.5325 32.8011 15.7314 1.7395 0.8261 
35.0180 -48.9861 32.1821 16.8040 1.7439 0.8361 
35.0185 -48.4359 31.4798 16.9561 1.7564 0.8403 
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Appendix F 
 
 
Elements of Vector Xoptimise  of 2592 Fault Cases under Consideration 
Appendix F is stored in the attached CD-ROM.  Appendix F shows the values of 
elements xk of vector Xoptimise of 2592 fault cases that have been investigated in the 
optimisation process of section 5.3, Chapter 5.  
 
Appendix G 
 
 
Algorithm and Graphical User Interface (GUI) for Fault Data Analysis Process 
and Optimisation Process  
Appendix G is stored in the attached CD-ROM. Appendix G shows the algorithm 
and graphical user interface (GUI) for fault data analysis process and optimisation 
process to extract  elements of vector X and Xoptimise of 2592 fault cases under 
consideration. 
 
Appendix H 
 
 
Algorithm for Rule-based Fault Identification and Phase Selection and 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) for Verification Test. 
Appendix H is stored in the attached CD-ROM. Appendix H shows the completed 
rule-based fault identification and phase selection algorithm and verification test 
algorithm that have been developed in this research project. This is followed by the 
GUI test panel that was used to verify the performance of the rule-based fault 
identification and phase selection algorithms proposed in this research project. Note 
that in order for the reader to access the verification result, all fault cases under 
consideration have been loaded into the upper text window of the GUI test panel. 
The reader can access the verification test results corresponding to a particular fault 
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case by clicking on that file name shown in the upper text window, so that the output 
result corresponding to that fault case will be displayed in the bottom graphical 
window and bottom text window in the GUI test panel. The input signal 
corresponding to that fault case will be displayed in the top and middle graphical 
windows. 
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